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FOREWORD
In June 1973 the first scientist arrived at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (nASA). He came, just nine months after the
signing of nASA's charter, to work on the Institute's first major study-the
Energy Project. In the years since, more than 140 other scientists have come
from over nineteen countries to participate in what has become nASA's
Energy Systems Program. Under the leadership of Professor Wolf Hafele,
they have carried out a truly comprehensive analysis of the world's energy
future.
This book reports their findings. It is also a "first"-the first complete
report of a major nASA program. As such, it carries a dual responsibility.
On the one hand, it provides a clear, thorough, and objective presentation
of the results of a large, multifaceted study. On the other hand, it demon-
strates to a wide and interested audience the nature of the contribution that
nASA can make to a better understanding of major international issues.
Although analysis strives to be objective, it cannot avoid completely the
imprint of personality or the influence of individual and group experience.
Consequently this study, like all others, reflects the character and back-
ground of its authors. Good analysis, however, tries to make these influ-
ences and assumptions explicit, so that the user of the analysis can be aware
of and compensate for them. Professor Hafele and his team have taken
special care in this report to state carefully the assumptions they have made
and to distinguish their "visions" from their calculations.
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The Institute, for its part, has provided the environment in which this
major international and interdisciplinary study could be carried out. And it
has established the procedures for scientific review of the report by an
international group of experts on energy. But the findings and conclusions of
the study are those of the Energy Systems Program under the leadership of
Professor Wolf Hafele and should not necessarily be ascribed to the Institute,
its Council, or its National Member Organizations.
The global energy problem is so complex that no single study can hope for
complete acceptance. This analysis instead aspires to contribute to the con-
tinuing debate and discussion by providing a globally comprehensive frame-
work and a long-term perspective. Inevitably, there will be those who
disagree with some of its assumptions, methods, or conclusions. They are
challenged to trace the consequences of their alternative views within the
same constraints that everything add up across and over time. The discipline
of quantification and the necessity of coherence are prerequisites for serious
energy analysis.
The global energy problem is so difficult that no nation acting alone can
solve it. Yet for the necessary international cooperation to succeed, there
must be a base of shared understanding of the nature of the problem and its
possible solutions. The IIASA Energy Systems Program has aspired to con-
tribute to the development of that understanding. It has done so both
through its own research and through the creation of an international net-
work of collaborating energy institutions and specialists who share its
perspective and approach. Thus, this book is just one-very important-
dimension of the results of the Energy Program. As it is disseminated and
read, we hope that it will help to enlarge the network of those who have a
common understanding of the global energy problem and, thereby, will help
to establish the basis for wise, successful, and equitable international col-
laboration in its solution.
When the first IIASA scientist began working on energy seven years ago,
the Institute's aspirations were high, but its prospects for success were
uncertain. This book demonstrates, we believe, that the Institute's inter-
national and interdisciplinary analysis can contribute to a better under-
standing and resolution of major problems of international importance.
Jermen Gvishiani
Chairman of the IIASA Council
Roger E. Levien
Director of IIASA
PREFACE
This volume summarizes the findings of the study of the global energy sys-
tem by the Energy Systems Program, Phase 1, of the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). In the companion volume (Volume
2), Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis, the study findings
are reported on in great detail, with all the necessary references and qualifi-
cations that are typical of a comprehensive scientific work.
Of course, a summary volume does provide the reader with a more easily
understood and condensed accounting, but not without cost. Those in-
terested in a fuller explanation of certain reasonings or in more information
about a subject that is only touched upon here are referred to Volume 2 and
to the sixty research reports published by IIASA that underlie this energy
study.
The goal of the IIASA Energy Systems Program was to understand and to
conceptualize by qualitative and quantitative means the global long-range
aspects of the energy problem-not to advance the state of the art of a par-
ticular discipline (although we would be pleased if this were to happen). We
have tried to look at each of the different aspects of the energy problem in a
new way-to view them as an integral part of an overall pattern. We therefore
suggest that the reader consider this book as a picture or a pattern and not
concentrate solely on individual chapters or subjects.
Our aim throughout the study has been to be objective. However, in
summing up, we recognized the need to take a position and to express the
X111
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views we actually hold. Thus, the assessments and implications of our study
for energy policy cannot be defended merely on an objective scientific
basis: They are either evident or not.
IIASA is a small research institution, and the group studying the energy
problem was relatively small. We therefore did not judge it useful to compete
with the energy research of larger national and regional study groups. Our
intent was to complement their work by providing a long-range, global view
of the problems facing civilization. In particular, we aimed for complemen-
tarity with the Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES). Simi-
larly, our thinking was stimulated by the World Energy Conferences of
Detroit (1974) and of Istanbul (1977) and by our contacts with major
groups in the energy field such as those of the Academy of Sciences of the
Soviet Union and of the European Community.
IIASA, as a nongovernmental institution, is fortunate to receive the
cooperation and support of its seventeen National Member Organizations,
which span both East and West, and the Energy Systems Program has bene-
fited greatly from the diverse political, social, and economic points of view
on the energy problems in these countries. But for a truly global perspec-
tive, one must also consider the dynamics of the developing countries, and
we are grateful for the cooperation received from numerous institutions,
groups, and individuals from these countries. We especially wish to acknowl-
edge the support of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
in Nairobi, which helped us to strengthen our rapport with the developing
world.
We would not have been able to complete the research reported on here
without the help and support of many institutions, groups, and individuals.
In the list below we gratefully acknowledge the help received from these
bodies by means of contracts and cooperative agreements. It would give a
false impression, however, if this list were considered exhaustive. It is simply
impossible to include all here.
UNEP awarded us a major contract on "The Comparison of Energy Op-
tions: A Methodological Study," which covered a major portion of our
work. Thus, to some extent, UNEP could be considered a co-sponsor of
this phase of the Energy Systems Program. UNEP also awarded us a con-
tract on "A Systems Study of Energy and Climate," which permitted us to
examine the possible climatic impacts of energy technologies.
The Meteorological Office, Bracknell, United Kingdom, cooperated
very closely with us in our study of man's impact on the climate system.
Specifically, they provided us with their Global Circulation Model, which
served as the basis of the numerical experiments carried out with the above-
mentioned UNEP support. We are also grateful to the Meteorological Office
for providing us with experimental output.
The Nuclear Research Center (Kernforschungszentrum), Karlsruhe, FRG,
provided us with large amounts of inexpensive computer time for executing
the numerical experiments supported by UNEP and the Meteorological
Office.
For our research on the impacts of solar energy production on the meso-
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scale climate, we received the cooperation of the Stanford Research Insti-
tute, Palo Alto, California.
The National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado, lent
their cooperative assistance to the above-mentioned climate studies sup-
ported by UN EP.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, Austria,
formed a joint team with IlASA to study risks. This team made important
contributions to IIASA's work in this field.
The Volkswagen Foundation (Stiftung Volkswagenwerk), Hanover, FRG,
awarded us a contract for studying "Procedures for the Setting of Stan-
dards," which complemented the work of the joint IIASA-IAEA risk team.
The Volkswagen Foundation also gave us a contract for studying "The
Mechanisms of Market Penetration," which very much expedited our work
in this area.
The Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (Bundesministerium
fur Forschung und Technologie), Bonn, FRG, awarded us a major contract
for a "Systems Study on the Possibilities of Intensified Use of Solar Energy
in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)." Through this assistance we
were able to broaden our knowledge of developments in the field of solar
power.
The Austrian National Bank (Osterreichische Nationalbank), Vienna,
Austria, awarded us a contract for studying "Capital and Currency Demand
as a Constraint for Future Technological Strategies for Meeting Demand."
Their support helped us in the development of the IlASA set of mathe-
matical energy models.
The Siberian Power Institute of the Siberian Department of the USSR
Academy of Sciences, Irkutsk, cooperated closely with us, in particular by
giving us the early version of a computer program that, after adaptation at
IIASA, became the economic IMPACT model.
The USSR Academy of Sciences, through the Kurchatov and the High
Temperature Institutes in Moscow, participated in our study of "Fusion and
Fast Breeder Reactors."
The Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, California, contributed
to our study of "Fusion and Fast Breeder Reactors."
The Institute of Energy Economics and Law (Institut Economigue et
Juridigue de l'Energie), Grenoble, France, cooperated with us, in particular
by providing us with a computer program that, after adaptation at IIASA,
became the MEDEE-2 model.
Shell Austria, through the Technical University of Vienna, contributed a
grant in support of our WELMM studies.
We also wish to acknowledge here the close cooperation of the National
Coal Board, United Kingdom; of the United Association of German Hard
Coal Mines (Gesamtverband des Deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus) and the
Hard Coal Mining Association (Steinkohlenbergbauverein), FRG; and of the
institutions in Poland, the USSR, and the United States that helped us with
our assessment of the coal option.
Additionally, we were greatly assisted in our work by the following in-
XVI PREFACE
stitutions and industrial firms: The Institute of National Planning, Cairo,
Egypt; Siemens, Erlangen, FRG; Kraftwerk Union, Erlangen, FRG; Shell,
London, United Kingdom; General Electric, New York; The Organization
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Kuwait; Gulf Corporation, Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania; Electricite de France, Paris; Institut Francais du Petrole,
Paris; Bureau de Recherches Geologiques et Minieres, Orleans, France;
Charbonnages de France, Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scienti-
fique, Paris; and Institut fur Kernenergetik und Energiesysteme der Universi-
tat Stuttgart, FRG.
The IIASA Energy Systems Program was carried out by a closely coopera-
ting multinational team. In addition to scientists from both East and West,
we were assisted by scientists from the developing countries who shared with
us their first-hand knowledge of energy problems in their countries. The
members of the Energy Systems Program over the study period are listed at
the beginning of this book. Each member who was with us at Laxenburg for
more than a month is included, with the average period of service being
between one and two years.
Our team was also multidisciplinary: Economists, physicists, engineers,
geologists, mathematicians, psychologists, a psychiatrist, and an ethnologist
gave us their different views of the energy problem, thus making it im-
possible for us to hold an extreme, one-sided view.
The scientific authorship of the various contributions is diffuse and has
been explained to the extent possible in the second volume. These con-
tributors cannot be held responsible for ideas that have been synthesized
into the overall pattern presented here. The final responsibility rests with
the Program Leader.
Naturally, the condensation of voluminous material into summary form is
a difficult task and we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Robert
Gerwin, author of World Energy Perspective: Analysis to the Year 2030,
According to the IIASA Study, Energy in a Finite World, presented by the
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, and published by the Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,
Stuttgart, FRG. Specifically, we were guided in structuring our material
contained in this volume by this German-language report of the IIASA
study.
We hope that this book will contribute to a better understanding of and
among people and also of nature, which makes it possible for us to live on
the earth. We mean this book to contribute to keeping the peace.
Wolf Hafele
Program Leader
Energy Systems Program
IIASA
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1 THE ENERGY PROBLEM:NO EASY FIX
Energy specialists no longer have to acquaint the public with the existence of
an energy problem. The symptoms of our increasing dependence on dwin-
dling fuel resources have emerged sometimes slowly and gently, sometimes
suddenly and painfully. We are all aware of the forms in which we have ex-
perienced them in our own lives, and we are becoming increasingly aware of
the ways in which they affect others. Our appreciation of the connections
between energy problems and difficulties falling under other headings-social,
political, environmental, economic, institutional-has also grown. With this
understanding it has become clear that the label applied in 1973, "The
Energy Crisis," is inaccurate, or at least misleading. The difficulties associ-
ated with supplying and using energy spread throughout society and are not
temporary; they will continue, and we must learn to deal with them.
Yet most people, whether in their day-to-day living or in their professional
lives, have been obliged to deal with their energy difficulties within a limited
perspective. They have not had a broad picture of the energy situation, one
that encompasses the likely future patterns of global demand and supply, the
actual magnitude of fossil resources, the possible efficacy of energy-saving
measures, the likelihood of the global trading of energy, or the prospect of
ameliorative institutional changes.
To be sure, until the oil shock of 1973 there had been no urgency to think
in such long-range and global terms. Institutional and national planning for
future activities, some of which might even be strongly energy dependent,
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simply went on in the absence of such facts and foresight. But subsequent
events have pushed to the fore the recognition that sharp oil price increases
were merely the trigger and that the world faces not a temporary "crisis,"
but a pervasive, chronic "energy problem."
The change in perception goes further: It recognizes that the world is
tightly interconnected and explains why the development of appropriate
energy policics is such a difficult process. While the energy problem tran-
scends national borders, policy analyses have tended to follow suit only
selectively. Other nations are scrutinized only when they might prove to
be suppliers of energy; as for their problems, those are their own business.
But such provincialism can only lead to dangerously misguided national
policies. To underestimate the difficulties of others, to fail to appreciate the
differences between developing and developed countries, and to neglect the
repercussions that one nation's actions can have on another, only inspire
policies that increasingly will strain the world's resources and institutions.
And the more these are strained, the more painful and difficult will prove
any attempts to overcome the energy problem.
Is finding a solution to the oil problem a way of solving the energy prob-
lem, or does it go deeper than that? To answer this question, it is imperative
first to understand the many sided character of energy, described in the ac-
companying boxed material and in Figure 1-1, and to appreciate the factors
that have shaped today's energy problems.
Today's high gear economies run largely on fossil fuels-coal, natural gas,
and especially oil. In 1975, roughly 70 percent of the world's primary
energy came from oil and natural gas, and roughly 20 percent of this oil was
crude from the Persian Gulf. There are many reasons why energy infrastruc-
tures are built around oil. Oil is a clean, versatile, and relatively easy to use
fuel that until recently was in constant supply at relatively low prices. And
because of its liquid properties, oil can be easily transported over long dis-
tances and stored conveniently. Oil not only serves the purposes of indus-
trialization, but, even in developing rural areas, a barrel of oil can fairly
easily be brought in, stored, and used for cooking and heating.
If the energy problem had arisen in a fairly static world, it might have
been possible to solve it, in time, by reducing the amount of energy used and
by gradually substituting new energy sources for oil. But we live in a dy-
namic world-a world in which populations are growing rapidly, in which the
work force is increasing, and in which aspirations for amenities are growing.
if the living standards of the industrialized world are at the very least to be
maintained, and if the peoples of the developing world are to achieve reason-
able standards of living in time, there will have to be economic development
and, in the case of the least developed countries, rapid economic growth. But
development requires energy-lots of it. Specifically, the need for liquid fuels
is high in nations at early stages of industrialization. So, to meet the needs
of a rapidly expanding world population undergoing economic development
is likely to require a considerable increase in the amount of energy used,
especially liquid fuels, as well as the substitution of nondepletable energy
sources for those now in use. The question is not whether, but when.
Then too, the earth has come to be seen as a finite system sensitive to
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THE CHARACTER OF ENERGY
When people talk about energy, it is not always clear what kinds of
energy they are talking about, and this adds to the problem. Therefore,
in order to understand the physical energy system, it is important to
distinguish between energy at various stages of conversion and use.
Figure 1-1 is helpful for understanding this point.
Primary energy is the energy recovered from nature-water flowing
over a dam, coal freshly mined, oil, natural gas, natural uranium. Only
rarely can primary energy be used to supply find I energy-energy used
to supply the consumer with energy services. One of the few forms of
primary energy that can be used as final energy is natural gas, which is
why it is a fuel of preference whenever it is available.
For the most part, primary energy is converted into seconddry
energy. This is defined as an energy form that can be used over a broad
spectrum of applications: Electricity and gasoline are the major ex-
amples. Less convenient (which is why they are declining in their
market shares) forms of secondary energy include charcoal, sorted and
graded coal, and cut and split fuelwood. In order to apply energy with-
out making undue demands on the consumer, it must be converted into
a form that may be readily transported, distributed and used in a vari-
ety of devices. The trend has been toward grids, for obvious reasons-
specifically toward electricity, gas, and district heating grids. For con-
venience of storage, portability, and transportability, the trend has
also been to liquid fuels, of which gasoline and diesel oil are the best
examples.
Primary energy is converted into secondary energy in several differ-
ent ways. For example, central power plants produce electricity and,
sometimes district heat. Refineries convert petroleum to more conveni-
ent liquid fuels-gasoline, jet fuel, diesel oil, and naphtha. Sometimes
the conversion plant is the end point of a system, as with nuclear fission
energy (for which chemical conversion, isotopic enrichment, and fuel
fabrication all precede the power plant); sometimes, as with a hydro-
electric or a wind generator, it is a simple machine. But regardless,
there are conversion losses in going from primary to secondary energy
and transmission losses in getting that energy to the consumer. It is
wrong to think of these losses as waste. They represent a trade-off of
efficiencies: The use of energy to transform and transmit energy per-
mits the end user to apply it efficiently for his purposes.
These final steps are the conversion of secondary energy into final
energy-the energy in a motor, a stove, a computer, or a lightbulb-and
of final energy into useful energy-the energy actually stored in a pro-
duct or used for a service. It is important to realize that in providing the
service-say, a well-lit room-energy is not merely a stored entity, but
even more an input for the efficient use of other resources, of labor, of
capital, and especially of skill.
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Figure 1-1. Energy conversion and use.
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Table 1-1. Estimated global primary energy supply, 1975.
Type
Level
(TWyr/yr)
Commercial Energy
Oil
Of which oil from Middle East and North Africa
Natural gas
Other
Total Commercial Energy
Noncommercial Energy (e.g., fuelwood, agricultural
waste)
Total Energy
(1.6)
3.8
1.5
2.9
8.2
0.6
8.8
Sources: Commercial primary energy supply estimates are based on data from United Nations
(1978). Estimates of noncommercial energy supply are taken from Parikh (1978).
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human activity. People are becoming more aware of the possible long-term
harmful effects of their activities on the environment and it is no longer
automatically possible to substitute new resources and technologies for those
in short supply or whose use has become uneconomic. Indeed, the deploy-
ment of nuclear energy or of coal in place of oil is constrained by such con-
cerns. It seems as though the whole range of human activities must be taken
into account in the development of new energy strategies.
Another possible way of grasping today's energy problem is to assess the
amount of primary energy being consumed around the world. As Table 1-1
shows, in 1975 the world consumed primary commercial energy at a rate of
8.2 terawatt-years per year (TWyr/yr) and noncommercial energy (e.g.,
animal and farm wastes) at a rate of 0.6 TWyr/yr.
The fact that it has been necessary to use terms like "terawatt" gives some
indication of the increase in worldwide energy consumption. One terawatt-
year per year is a big unit; it equals roughly one billion tons of coal per year
or 14 million barrels of oil per day, which is more than the oil production
rate considered currently possible for Saudi Arabia. Definitions of the units
that can be used for describing energy supply and consumption are given in
the accompanying boxed material.
ENERGY UNITS
There are two fundamental types of energy units, those that describe
amounts of energy, and those that describe rates at which energy is
supplied, converted, transported, or used. In the first category, amounts,
are units such as barrels of oil equivalent (boe), tons of coal equivalent
(tce), or kilowatt-hours of electricity (kWh(e)). In the second category,
rates, are million barrels of oil per day (mbd), tons of coal equivalent
per year (tce/yr), and kilowatt-hours of electricity per year (kWh(e)/yr).
The unit most commonly used in this book for amounts of energy is
the terawatt-year (TWyr). One terawatt-year (1 TWyr) is equal to
1,000,000,000,000 watt-years (which can also be written as 1012
Wyr). It is therefore also equal to 1,000,000,000 kilowatt-years (109
kWyr) or 1,000,000 megawatt-years (106 MWyr) or 1,000 gigawatt-
years (103 GWyr).
The unit most commonly used here for rates of energy supply, con-
version, transportation, and use is the terawatt-year per year (TWyr/yr).
The unit, terawatt (TW), which is sometimes used in place of terawatt-
year per year (TWyr/yr), is in this book reserved for the description of
the capacities of various energy conversion facilities. Thus the capacity
of an electricity generating station might be listed as 1,000 MW(e)
(= 0.001 TW(e)). Since energy conversion facilities seldom operate at
their installed capacity all year long, their ratings in TW or GW or MW
will differ from the actual rate at which they convert energy, as ex-
pressed in TWyr/yr or GWyr/yr or MWyr/yr.
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Figure 1-2. Distribution of world population and energy use in 1975.a
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aConsumption figures exclude 0.21 TWyr/yr in bunkers.
The problem can be seen to be even more complex when viewed through
the lens of per capita energy use worldwide. Figure 1-2 shows how the 8.2
TWyr/yr of primary energy supply in 1975 was divided over the globe. The
United States and Canada, with 6 percent of the world's population, used
energy at the rate of 11.2 kWyr/yr per capita-more than five times the
worldwide average of 2 kWyr/yr per capita. In contrast, energy was used in
Central Africa and Southeast Asia, which account for 36 percent of global
population, at a rate of only 0.2 kWyr/yr per capita-one tenth of the world-
wide average. About 60 percent of the world's population exists with less
than half of the average 2 kWyr/yr per capita.
These statistics illustrate once again the variety of forms that the immedi-
ate energy problem can take. Conservation potentials differ throughout the
world, energy requirements for development differ, and the global pattern
of energy use is but one dimension of a broader set of disparities and ten-
sions that exist between the developed and the developing countries.
These issues are just the surface of what we today call the energy problem.
While the world's communities work to solve their immediate energy prob-
lems, they must simultaneously set in place strategies for the future. This
means that the peoples and nations of the world will have to work together
toward these two goals.
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Specifically, in the short term, growing energy demands must be satisfied
in ways that would allow differing rates of economic development and that
promote the welfare of a rapidly growing global population. The world will
have to respond to the potentially explosive aspects of this growth and
attempt to maintain a degree of geopolitical stability. Both human and
natural resources of the globe will be stretched in this enterprise.
At the same time, looking to the long term, the nations of the world must
build sustainable, equitable, and resilient energy systems that satisfy the
needs of the global population in the next century and beyond. By sustain-
able, we mean systems that do not simply consume or burn energy resources
but also invest these resources in order to generate additional ones. By equit-
able, we mean that all peoples have their fair share of these common global
resources. And by resilient, we mean systems that can respond vigorously
and flexibly to a wide range of unanticipated global energy needs and
difficulties.
Can these goals be met? The pragmatic question of any global energy
study is to determine whether there are realistic strategies for satisfying
such challenging goals.
For the most part, today's debates about energy policy in the world legis-
latures, parliaments, central committees, special energy groups, and in
advanced scientific research groups focus on relatively short-term adjust-
ments. This is natural, for much higher oil prices (and therefore higher
energy prices) have created emergencies in the industrial economies that
have subsequently reverberated throughout the world community. But there
is good reason to believe that the most appropriate perspective in which to
make choices about energy strategies emerges only if we look sufficiently
far into the future and only if we add up the situations of all parts of the
world.
Considering the tremendous scope of energy markets in a world steadily
growing and progressing, it is essential to address possible adjustments at all
levels-national, continental, and global. For example, the flow of oil from
the Persian Gulf must be studied as a wide ranging system, feeding an ex-
pansive global market; likewise, the enormous coal basins of the United
States, the Soviet Union, and China must be analyzed for their potential
role in a global coal supply system.
The transition from the present fossil era to an era based on inexhausti-
ble energy sources will not be straightforward. We cannot even be sure it is
possible. At the very least, it will require that national energy policies,
corporate energy policies, and personal energy behavior be conceived with as
clear an understanding of their relationship to the global energy problem as
possible. For better or worse, we cannot isolate ourselves.
The purpose of this book is to contribute to that understanding. We do
not pretend to have definitive answers to the questions of when and how the
fossil era will decline in the years to come. Nor can we recommend detailed
energy strategies for all the nations of the world. But the analytic results
presented here, and the insights that can be derived from them, illuminate
features of the way in which our world operates that are far from self-
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evident, even in retrospect. To communicate these findings clearly is our
objective here. Only then can they become useful to those who must deal
with the energy problem daily-to all of us.
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2 THE IIASA APPROACH
Our purpose in the last chapter was not to belabor the obvious, but to recall
and illustrate the familiar-that there is associated with the rubric "the
energy problem" a wide variety of dimensions, perspectives, repercussions,
and interests. These inspire a comparable diversity of approaches, each with
its particular focus and concomitant strengths and weaknesses. Thus, it is im-
portant before launching into the details of our analysis that we state clearly
the major characteristics of our approach; specifically,
• The boundaries defining our area of inquiry;
• The way in which we categorized and sequenced the material within
those boundaries; and
• The analytic tools we used.
A WORLDWI DE, LONG-TERM PROBLEM
A Global Analysis
The international dimensions of the energy problem are clear-often pain-
fully clear: Domestic politics of nuclear development in the developed
countries can limit the hopes of those developing countries poor in tech-
nology; the internal politics of Iran and Iraq can have severe repercussions
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on economies worldwide; and the frustration and bitter words generated by
long lines at gas stations can reappear on a grander scale when allies find
themselves competing for the same barrel of oil. Thus, any informed energy
policy-personal, corporate, or national-must rest on as clear an under-
standing of these intercontinental realities as possible. In the past this has
not always been the case. For example, there have been many national
analyses, most of which have implicitly or explicitly concluded that any ex-'
cess of energy demand over energy supply would be met by imports. If every
nation goes through a similar exercise (and practically everyone does), there
arises the question of whether one given barrel of imported oil has been, at
least analytically, appropriated by several different parties.
For our study we therefore chose to extend our geographical boundaries
to include the entire globe. This is not to say that we tried to predict inter-
national politics; that is a risky business at best and one that we leave to
those more expert in the field than we. However, underlying the politics are
realities of a more physical nature-resource limitations, technological limi-
tations, and population growth. We were qualified to analyze these, and
IIASA, as an East-West institute, was particularly qualified to provide a
globally comprehensive analysis.
To analyze energy supply and demand for every country in the world
individually would have been impossible, yet to ignore international dif-
ferences in resources and consumption patterns is to neglect the causes of
international competition and dependence. As a compromise between these
conflicting considerations of theory and pragmatism we grouped the coun-
tries of the world into seven regions, chosen on the basis of national energy
resources and economic structure and not necessarily on the basis of geo-
graphic proximity. Figure 2-1 shows this grouping, and Appendix A lists the
countries in each region. Briefly the regions can be characterized as follows:
Region I (North America) has developed, market economies and is rich in
resources.
Region II (the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) has developed, centrally
planned economies and is rich in resources.
Region III (Western Europe, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and
South Africa) has developed, market economies, but is relatively poorer in
resources than the other developed economies.
Region IV (Latin America) is a developing region with market economies
and many resources.
Region V (South and Southeast Asia, as well as sub-Sahara Africa excluding
South Africa) is also a developing region with mostly market economies,
but with relatively few resources except in a few instances (e.g., Nigeria
and Indonesia).
The countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa (region VI) are a spe-
cial case with their economies in transition and their rich oil and gas
resources.
Finally, region VII (China and other Asian countries with centrally planned
economies) is a developing region with only modest resources.
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Figure 2-1. The IIASA world regions.
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1980-2030: Half a Century
If the 1970s have vividly reminded us that the energy problem is inherently
worldwide, they have further taught us that its nature is long term. How we
exploit or conserve the resources available to us today, how vigorously we
develop new technologies, and how carefully we contain their potential for
environmental damage all determine the range of opportunities left to future
generations. Looking at it from the reverse perspective, if we wish to guaran-
tee that in the future, and particularly in those parts of the world that are so
poor today, there will exist the opportunity to meet certain aspirations, we
are restricted in the range of actions allowed today.
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The period studied in the work reported here covers the next fifty years,
from 1980 to 2030. That such an extended period could be considered was
due to the unusual opportunity offered by an international institute like
IIASA, which is insulated from many of the short-term pressures that pre-
vent corporate strategists or national administrators from concentrating as
much on the year 2020 as on the year 1985. But more importantly, we
chose to look at the next fifty years because of what we expected to find
there-specifically, the possibility of a transition from a global energy system
based on consuming depletable fossil fuels to a sustainable system based on
nondepletable fuels. Such a transition must occur sometime, and for the fol-
lowing four reasons-technological inertia, social inertia, market inertia, and
population growth-we expected that the coming fifty years would provide
an opportunity, though of course with no assurance that that opportunity
would be exploited.
Technological Inertia. The study of certain technologies, from wood stoves
to nuclear power plants, is a necessary part of a study of the energy problem.
Understanding how various technologies might be used, improved, and sub-
stituted for one another is critical. While the methods described in Chapter
7 explore these relationships in detail, it is still possible at the very begin-
ning of our study to make some general observations. Specifically, while
some technologies, such as hydroelectric projects and residential buildings,
have lifetimes longer than fifty years and while others, such as automobiles,
have shorter lifetimes, many of the key technologies in the current energy
system, such as oil refineries and electricity-generating plants, have life-
times on the order of twenty-five to thirty years. Thus, a period of fifty
years corresponds to two generations for such technologies and is therefore
not so short to rule out the possibility of major technological transitions
during the study period.
Social Inertia. Even more critical than the energy technologies are the
people who use energy. While people are more adaptable than machinery,
they nonetheless have their own forms of stubbornness. Because fifty years
also encompass two human generations, the study period should allow time
for major social transitions, whether manifested in individual lifestyles or in
international relations.
Market Inertia. The development of a technology, whether a small-scale
solar water heater or a new coal liquefaction process, and the successful
penetration of that technology into the energy market, are two different
processes. From a global perspective, the substitution of one energy tech-
nology for another cannot occur overnight: It takes time-judging from his-
tory, quite a bit of time. In the case of the fuelwood crisis in Europe over a
century ago, it took about fifty years for the contribution of coal to rise
from 20 to 50 percent of the primary energy market. In the United States
it has been shown that fifty to sixty years are needed for a new energy
source to increase its share of the primary energy market from 3 to 50 per-
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Figure 2-2. World population. Projections to 2030 based on data from Keyfitz (1977).
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cent.a These figures only reinforce the need to look as far as fifty years into
the future, in order to allow not only for technological improvements, but
also for technologies already developed to penetrate the market.
Population Growth. A fundamental driving force behind the energy prob-
lem is population growth, and as indicated in Figure 2-2, the period 1980 to
2030 coincides with what is anticipated to be the steepest increase ever in
global population. By 2030 the population will have doubled from four bil-
lion in 1975 to some eight billion, and although it will continue to grow
thereafter, the rate of growth is expected to diminish steadily. The energy
problem with which the world is confronted during these next fifty years is
therefore unique, and any analysis based on a period of less than fifty years
would run a risk of underestimating the pressures that will be placed on
energy supplies due solely to population increases.
For these reasons, then, fifty years were thought to be sufficient to repre-
sent accurately the severity of the energy problem facing the world, and
at the same time to allow for the possibility of a transition to a sustainable
global energy system. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, that transi-
tion turned out to be elusive. Within those fifty years and within the scope
aData and calculations supporting these numbers are discussed more fully in Chapter 7. An even
ll10rc complete treatment is provided in Marchetti and Nakicenovie (1979).
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of our analysis, we found only the possibility for a less sweeping transition,
one that would precede the transition we had expected. This preliminary
transition is perhaps best characterized as one from clean conventional fossil
fuels, such as natural gas and oil, to dirtier unconventional fossil fuels, such
as heavy crudes, tar sands, and oil shales. But so straightforward a charac-
terization can be deceptive, as will become clear in Chapter 8. Quite simply,
time proved to be the major constraint, the most limited resource.
FINDING A PATH THROUGH THE
ANALYTIC MAZE
The last section described the geographical and temporal boundaries of our
study; it covers the whole world and extends over the fifty years from 1980
to 2030. The next question is, Within those boundaries, where to start?
It is a truism that everything affects everything else. More particular to
our case are the observations that the evolution of energy demand depends
on the supply options available, while the availability of different supply
options is itself influenced by the level of energy demand. Moreover, both
depend on environmental constraints, safety constraints, resource con-
straints, and the like. Where one chooses to start to impose order among all
this need not be critical: What is more important is that once a starting point
has been chosen, the analysis should proceed systematically and consistently.
It is the purpose of this section to describe where we began, how we pro-
ceeded from there, and how we eventually brought together the lessons we
learned along the way.
Supply
We began by looking at supply options and in our study borrowed the four
categories most often used in discussions of supply-fossil fuels, nuclear
power, centralized high technology solar power, and decentralized solar
power and other renewables.
Fossil Fuels (Including Coal, Oil, and Gas). A consideration of fossil fuels
usually starts with estimates of reserves and resources. Our study is no ex-
ception. Where it differs from most studies is in its concentration on un-
conventional resources, on deep offshore oil, on oil available only with
tertiary recovery methods, on tar sands and oil shales-in short, on fossil
resources that are much more expensive in terms of money, environmental
impacts, and possible social effects than we are used to. Because we are look-
ing fifty years into the future, our investigation of fossil fuels also considers
both conversion technologies available today or in the forseeable future and
technologies that are only in the early stages of conception or research.
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Nuclear Power (Including Fission, Fusion, and Hybrid Schemes). Our con-
sideration of nuclear power also begins with resource estimates and examines
technological developments-existing, probable, and possible. However,
there is an additional dimension not present in the case of the fossil fuels.
This arises because of the variety of nuclear processes that can contribute
to a power production system. These range from those of existing light water
reactors (LWRs), through those of breeder reactors and converter reactors,
to possible fusion schemes. How the different types of reactors might be
arranged to complement and supplement each other turns out to be critical
for assessing the world's nuclear resources.
Centralized, High Technology Solar Power. Estimating the amount of sun-
light falling on the earth is much easier than estimating the amount of fossil
and nuclear fuels beneath the ground. Even estimating the land that might be
available for centralized solar power stations is an easier task. But to estimate
what part of that sunlight might ultimately be converted into the forms of
energy we need is extremely difficult, partly because of our relative lack of
experience with the technologies in question and partly because of the in-
termittent nature of the solar resource. To complete the examination of
solar energy, we devote much of Chapter 5 to describing how hydrogen, in
particular, could be used as a secondary energy carrier that would comple-
ment electricity, in order to better match the supply characteristics of solar
energy to demand patterns. And, by considering hydrogen as an inherent
part of a solar energy system, we are able to suggest ways to exploit the solar
potential that go beyond the usual schemes based on the traditional engi-
neering hardware of mirrors, boilers, photovoltaic cells, wires, pipes, and
valves.
Decentralized, But Not Necessarily Low Technology, Solar Power in Con-
junction with Other Renewables. The definition of solar energy is often
extended to include energy derived from biomass, hydropower, the wind,
and ocean temperature gradients, currents, and waves. No matter how these
sources are labeled, an examination of their potential is critical for assessing
the earth's energy resources. In this book they are considered in Chapter 6 in
conjunction with geothermal energy, tidal energy, and decentralized uses of
direct solar insolation. Each of these sources represents a continuous flow of
energy, in one form or another, through the environment. The questions that
must therefore be examined include: What portion of these flows might we
be technically capable of diverting for our immediate use, and what would
be the effects on the environmental system from different levels of diversion.
As with the other resource categories already discussed, the examination of
these renewable sources leads from considerations of resource magnitudes,
to conversion technologies, to the characteristics of an energy system con-
sistent both with the special attributes of these sources and with the energy
demand patterns that might evolve over the next fifty years.
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In our initial look at each of the four resource categories, we aimed to
explore the full technical potential of each under the most optimistic of as-
sumptions. Problems of environmental impacts, safety questions, or mis-
matches between supply and demand patterns were presumed essentially
solvable; promising technological developments were presumed to reach
timely fruition and to be readily implemented. The only limits that we im-
posed in each case were those due to direct fuel resource limitations and
those associated with the time required to build up or expand any given
technology on the global scale.
The intent of stretching our thinking to the technological limits for each
supply possibility was twofold. First, it revealed the technical character-
istics of each supply option that would ultimately determine its attractive-
ness in competition with the others. Second, it focused attention on the
side effects that would accompany aggressive development of any of the
options on an unprecedented global scale. That we chose to look at only one
option at a time is not to imply that we believe the globe's energy future
must be exclusively solar or exclusively nuclear or exclusively anything else.
As will become clear in Chapter 8, our synthesis of the considerations of
supply and demand, and particularly of those factors constraining supply,
revealed the feasibility of scenarios that rely on a mix of the various sources,
at least for the next fifty years.
Constraints
The exploration of the different supply options also revealed the sorts of
resource constraints, environmental constraints, and possibly institutional
constraints that become vividly important when considering supplying
energy for a global population expected to double in the next half century.
Chapter 7, which describes the study of these constraints, is divided into
four sections. The first considers the limits on the rate at which one energy
technology or source can replace another in the worldwide primary energy
market. This subject was already mentioned as one of the considerations that
originally led us to choose a time period of fifty years. Essentially, the lesson
that emerged from the study of the theory and data of market penetration
confirmed our intuition-that time is a scarce resource. But beyond this,
Chapter 7 provides the numbers that allowed us to be more quantitatively
precise when we eventually brought together supply, demand, and con-
straints as reported in Chapter 8.
The second section of Chapter 7 addresses the climatic effects that might
accompany the large-scale deployment of any of the four categories of
energy resources-fossil, nuclear, hard solar, and soft solar plus other re-
newables. Three classes of such effects are considered:
• Carbon dioxide released by the burning of fossil fuels can increase the
amount of heat absorbed by the atmosphere. This is commonly referred
to as the greenhouse effect, a phenomenon that could theoretically lead
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to a significant increase in global temperatures. Other gases, as well as
particulates generated by fuel combustion, can also alter the atmo-
sphere's tendency to reflect, transmit, or absorb different types of
radiation.
• Essentially, all energy that is used is ultimately degraded to waste heat,
which is dissipated in water and air and transported to the upper atmos-
phere, where it eventually leaves the earth as infrared radiation. The
rate at which waste heat is released differs from technology to tech-
nology, but none escapes the problem entirely. The question, then, is
whether the waste heat associated with providing energy for a growing
global population might lead to climate changes that are globally, or even
locally, severe.
• In addition to their atmospheric impacts, energy conversion technologies
can also affect important characteristics of the earth's surface. These
range from possible changes in the radiation properties of large land areas
to changes that could more directly alter major wind and water currents
within the global climate system. An example of the former might be the
effects of large arrays of solar photovoltaic cells, while alterations in
wind and water currents might arise from the extensive use of windmills
or from the large-scale exploitation of temperature differentials in the
oceans. Again, local effects might be of concern, even if global impacts
proved negligible.
The third category of constraints discussed in Chapter 7 includes resource
limitations other than direct fuel limitations and environmental factors other
than those dealt with under climate considerations. Specifically, the discus-
sion is divided into five parts addressing the following resources-water,
indirect energy requirements, land, materials, and manpower. Our goal in
examining constraints was not to define acceptable levels of environmental
impacts or manpower utilization. Rather, the investigation was intended to
reveal potential dangers and to clarify the relation between the different con-
straints and supply possibilities.
The fourth section of Chapter 7 deals primarily with health and safety
risks, both public and occupational. Again, the object was not to determine
"acceptable" levels of risk, but rather to identify what such a determination
might involve. The discussion is divided into three parts-risk estimation,
risk evaluation, and risk management:
• Risk estimation refers to the identification and quantification of risks
associated with constructing and operating different energy technologies.
The objective is initially to describe the magnitude of the risks, their
frequency, and any other characteristics that are felt to be important.
Only after this has been done can one address the more explosive ques-
tions of whether certain risks are acceptable given their associated
benefits or which risks should be avoided more than others. Still, risk
estimation is hardly a trivial task, and much controversy remains con-
cerning the impacts of various energy technologies on health and safety.
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• Risk evaluation is the term we use to describe analytic methods for com-
paring risks with one another and with different sorts of benefits. It is
at this stage that one goes beyond numerical estimates and tries to in-
corporate individual and social values and perceptions. Evaluation is even
more controversial than estimation, and it would be presumptuous to
suggest that we have resolved that controversy in this book. What we
have done is describe the methods that were developed by us and by
others, and explore how they can be used and the sort of results they
might produce. How these results might influence social policies belongs
to the topic of risk management.
• Risk management refers to the organizational and political aspects of the
environmental management of energy systems. It deals with the prag-
matic problems that arise when competing groups, which most likely
disagree on both the estimation and the evaluation of risks, actually try
to negotiate and implement an energy strategy. Here, analytic techniques
and insights are even less developed than in the cases of risk estimation
and evaluation. We therefore limit the discussion to describing work
done at IIASA in an effort to better understand the dynamics of negoti-
ating environmental standards, since the setting of such standards appears
to be a popular technique for managing both health and environmental
risks.
The investigation of the different constraints, from those associated with
market penetration to those of health and safety, parallels in spirit the earlier
explorations of different supply options. The intent was to go as far as avail-
able analytic tools would take us-and a little farther. We did not limit our-
selves to considering only technologies used today, but tried to imagine how
these might be modified and expanded in the next fifty years to meet the
energy demands of a rapidly growing world population. While in many cases
the insights gained were only qualitative, others could be described numeri-
cally and could therefore be incorporated directly in the quantitative analy-
sis of demand and supply about to be described.
Demand, Conservation, and Two Scenarios
We now turn our attention to that aspect of the energy problem that under-
lies the need to look at supply possibilities in the first place-energy demand.
To analyze future energy demand is to deal in assumptions-a lot of them.
This necessitates, first, that the assumptions be reasonable (which is not
necessarily the same thing as conservative); second, that they be consistent
with one another; and third, that they be stated explicitly. We therefore
had to make assumptions about the four major factors determining energy
demands:
1. Population growth in the different regions of the world and at different
times during the period analyzed;
THE IJASA APPROACH 19
2. Economic growth, again for different regions and at different times;
3. Technological progress in the processes and machines involved in energy
conversion; and
4. Structural changes within national or regional economies.
These last two categories encompass the many aspects of energy conserva-
tion. The third includes both improvements in machines (e.g., a better
insulated, more efficient refrigerator) and improvements in the way
machines are used (e.g., locating refrigerators and furnaces so that the
former is not wasting energy trying to cool down the latter while the latter
is, in turn, trying to heat up the former). The fourth category, while not
restricted to structural changes involving conservation, includes energy
savings resulting from economic shifts away from energy-intensive manu-
facturing industries to more labor-intensive service industries. It also includes
the reverse sort of shift-from, perhaps, labor-intensive farming in a develop-
ing country to activities consuming more energy.
The assumptions made range from those concerning near-term energy de-
mand in economies where data are voluminous, if not always directly useful,
to such things as the appropriate room temperatures in India in 2010, where
available data prove less helpful. The object in each instance is, first, to make
the best use of available data, analytic techniques, and collective human wis-
dom to produce reasonable numerical values and, second, to organize the
resulting numbers systematically. Our basic method for meeting these objec-
tives involved the writing of two quantitative scenarios. These two bench-
mark scenarios are labeled "High" and "Low," the former referring to a
situation in which the demand for energy is relatively high, the latter to one
in which demand is relatively low. These, as well as three variations arising
from them-a worldwide nuclear moratorium case, an enhanced nuclear
development case, and a very low energy demand case-will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 8, but it is worthwhile to outline here their most important
features.
In writing scenarios we were in no sense attempting to make predictions.
Rather, we viewed scenario writing as a way to organize our thinking about
available information; specifically, we insisted rigorously on two criteria-
internal consistency and global comprehensiveness. We started by assuming,
first, the pattern of global population increase for the next fifty years and,
second, the pattern of global economic growth. The population assumptions
were shown in Figure 2-2 and will be described in their disaggregated form
in Chapter 8. For economic growth patterns, we considered two different
sets of assumptions, and it is the difference between the two that defined the
two distinct scenarios already alluded to.
Table 2-1 shows the regional growth rates associated with the two sce-
narios. The growth rates of Table 2-1 do not represent initial assumptions
that remained unchanged throughout the subsequent analysis. Rather, we
began with two sets of such growth rates, but continually reexamined and
modified them as we proceeded through the calculation of energy demand
associated with economic growth; the supply technologies needed to meet
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Table 2-1. Historical and projected growth rates of GOP, by region, High
and Low scenarios (%/yr).
A. High Scenario
Historical Scenario Projec tion
7950- 7960- 7975- 7985- 2000- 2075-
Region 7960 7975 7985 2000 2075 2030
I (NA) 3.3 3.4 4.3 3.3 2.4 2.0
II (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.5
III (WE/JANZ) 5.0 5.2 4.3 3.4 2.5 2.0
IV (LA) 5.0 6.1 6.2 4.9 3.7 3.3
V (Af/SEA) 3.9 5.5 5.8 4.8 3.8 3.4
VI (ME/NAf) 7.0 9.8 7.2 5.9 4.2 3.8
VII (C/CPA) 8.0 6.1 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.0
World 5.0 5.0 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.7
B. Low Scen ario
Historical Scenario Projection
7950- 7960- 7975- 7985- 2000- 2075-
Region 7960 7975 7985 2000 2075 2030
I (NA) 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.0 1.1 1.0
II (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 2.0
III (WE/JANZ) 5.0 5.2 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.2
IV (LA) 5.0 6.1 4.7 3.6 3.0 3.0
V (Af/SEA) 3.9 5.5 4.8 3.6 2.8 2.4
VI (ME/NAf) 7.0 9.8 5.6 4.6 2.7 2.1
VII (C/CPA) 8.0 6.1 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.0
World 5.0 5.0 3.6 2.7 1.9 1.7
Note: Historical and projected values of GDP in constant (1975) U.S. dollars are given in Chant
(1980).
that demand; and the pressure on the economy in general, and economic
growth rates in particular, arising from the provision of such supply tech-
nologies. Thus, the numbers shown here are the result of an iterative pro-
cedure (discussed in Chapter 8) that insured internal consistency within each
of the scenarios.
Several observations on the numbers in Table 2-1 are in order. First, they
reflect something of a conservative bias on our part in that they decline
consistently over time. Second, they incorporate a recognition that the de-
veloping countries will be limited in their economic growth potential to one
or two percentage points above that of the developed countries.b More
bThe fact that economic growth rates in the developing countries are in some way tied to growth
rates in the developed countries is intuitively appealing. It would be unrealistic to assume high growth
rates in the former while assuming low or zero growth rates in the OECD countries. For further dis-
cussion of the relationships see Hicks et al. (1976).
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specifically, for the next several decades, the developing countries will still
be tied to the economies of the rest of the world through trade and other
relations.
After population growth and economic growth, the third and fourth de-
terminants of energy demand listed earlier were technological progress and
structural changes within economies. Since it is more difficult to specify
in a single figure or table the basic features of the many distinct input
assumptions falling within these two groups,C we summarize some of the
scenario results that suggest the extensive degree to which shifts to less
energy-intensive technologies, processes, and activities were incorporated
in the scenarios. This is done in Figure 2-3 where the historical energy
intensiveness of the different regional economies is shown in conjunction
with the energy intensiveness indicated by the two scenarios for the years
1985, 2000, 2015, and 2030. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, energy
intensiveness is expected to drop consistently throughout the study period
in the developed regions, while it is expected to peak in the developing
regions over the next fifty years.
The scenarios began with the quantification of demand assumptions, but
were extended well beyond purely demand considerations. Rather, their
principal function was to provide for the detailed quantitative synthesis and
balancing of demand and supply. The mechanics of carrying out that synthe-
sis and the numerical results obtained for the seven world regions form the
material of Chapter 8. The scenario results incorporate the technical supply
characteristics explored in Chapters 3 through 6, though the supply poten-
tials considered available within the context of the scenarios were limited
to what would be feasible within the next fifty years. To the extent that
they could be reliably quantified, the constraints discussed in Chapter 7
were also incorporated in the scenario calculations. One type of constraint
not included explicitly is that dealing with the environment. While some of
the global environmental implications were considered directly in designing
the two scenarios,d to have gone beyond that to suggest actual upper limits
to be enforced would have been dangerously presumptuous. The purpose of
the scenarios was to detail the engineering and economic consequences that
might follow from two different sets of reasonable assumptions, and not to
predict how political and social controversies will be resolved.
Interpreting Results
The quantitative results of the two scenarios, and the three variations arising
from them, are voluminous. They represent the synthesis of a tremendous
amount of data, analysis, and insight and present a globally complete pic-
cThe demographic assumptions. the sectoral assumptions, and assumptions about energy intensive-
ness, technological adaptations, use patterns, and the like are detailed in Chapter 16 of Volume 2,
where the numbers are summarized in Tables 16-1 through 16-24.
dIn Chapter 8 the changes in atmospheric carbon dioxide that are associated with the two scenarios
are discussed. Requirements for land and water are covered in Chapter 9 of Volume 2.
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Figure 2-3. Energy intensiveness in six world regions.
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ture. Although they can in no sense define a unique set of conclusions, they
are suggestive, and in Chapter 9 we elaborate and defend the important im-
plications they suggest to us.
Here, we summarize the picture we see emerging from all the laborious
analysis as one of a world endowed with the necessary physical resources to
support a population of eight billion people in 2030. Moreover, this appears
possible without exhausting our depletable energy resources and without
shifting completely to sustainable energy sources. Still, such a shift must
come eventually, and while the scenarios indicate that we can buy perhaps
another fifty years using mainly fossil fuels (albeit unconventional ones),
they also indicate that the buildup of a sustainable global energy system is a
more time-consuming process than had been expected.
Paths to a Sustainable Future
While fifty years proved too short a time to allow the transition to a sustain-
able global energy system, the analysis of the two scenarios provided insights
on some of the features of such a system. In the final chapter of this book
we bring together the relevant bits and pieces that emerged and arrange them
such that they are suggestive.
There are two components to the discussion in Chapter 10. The first con-
cerns the technical possibilities, as they are discerned from this vantage point
in history, for exploiting resources with essentially unlimited potential. More
specifically, these are solar technologies, nuclear fusion, and nuclear fission
technologies involving breeder reactors. The material covered here is that
from the more exploratory and futuristic sections of Chapters 4 and 5 on the
nuclear and solar supply options. The second aspect of the discussion in
Chapter 10 concerns the relationship between the technical characteristics
of all the supply options (Chapters 3 through 6) and the important features
of energy demand as examined in the scenarios of Chapter 8. For example,
existing solar and nuclear technologies provide energy in the form of either
heat or electricity, but a persistent part of energy demand will continue to
be for liquid fuels-for transportation and chemical feedstocks. How to
modify the supply technologies so that they provide energy in forms better
suited to demand patterns will therefore be a critical feature of any energy
system based on solar or nuclear technologies.
Any attempt to discuss the world's energy future as far away as fifty years
and beyond, as is done in Chapter 10, requires careful qualification. The
"path" sketched in that chapter, along with the short cuts and alternate
routes and destinations that it suggests, is not offered as "the solution to the
energy problem." In retrospect from fifty years hence, what we outline here
may serve as a vivid reminder of our limited, transitory, prejudiced perspec-
tive of the possibilities available to us. Nonetheless, it does describe what we
have seen, while taking a long, hard look at the future. It is certainly not all
that might await us over our temporal horizons, but it is a part of it.
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THE ANALYTIC TOOLS: THEI R
STRENGTHS AI'lD WEAKNESSES
The focus of our study was principally on the natural science aspects of the
energy problem, and our methods were primarily those of engineering and
economics. But to have restricted our scope and our techniques in this way
is not to assert that those aspects of the energy problem not properly ad-
dressed by this approach are unimportant or specious. Rather, it is to address
that part of the problem where we feel particularly equipped to make a
contribution. Quite simply, IIASA is an international institute that seeks to
provide a service to its national member organizations, and in this case that
service takes the form of clarifying a factual basis upon which certain politi-
cal issues might be settled.
Still, to limit our focus is to incorporate certain implicit assumptions, and
it is the purpose of this section to make those explicit.
• The future is assumed to be relatively free of surprises. We are neither
confronted with catastrophic wars nor rescued by technological pan-
aceas. The world's economic and physical regularities that are the subject
of modern economics and engineering are assumed not to be unrecog-
nizably transformed.
• The future is assumed to be blessed with a degree of international co-
operation that can only be described as optimistic, though by no means
impossible. What the results suggest is not what will be done or what
should be done, but what could be done with the world's endowments
of energy resources, manpower, capital resources, and know-how if we
succeed in translating our increasing understanding of international
dependencies into increasingly effective patterns of international co-
operation. In particular, a functioning world trade in oil, gas, and coal,
allowing for the flow of resources from the resource-rich to the resource-
poor, is assumed.
• The constraints included explicitly in the analysis described in Chapter 8
were restricted to those that are technical (e.g., the efficiencies of elec-
tricity generating plants), physical (e.g., the heating value of different
deposits of coa!) , or structural (e.g., limitations on the rate at which
one energy source can be substituted for another in the global energy
market). To some extent these include well-established concerns that
could be described as basically political or social. But there is a much
larger class of sociopolitical constraints that is left out of the analysis;
these must be kept in mind by anyone drawing conclusions from the
numerical results.
• The analysis of competitive economics is carried out throughout in terms
of constant 1975 U.S. dollars. Thus the monetary aspects of the energy
problem, particularly those associated with inflation, are essentially
neglected.
Two more assumptions have to be added here, although they were
touched upon earlier and are, in fact, more explicit than implicit.
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• A unifying characteristic of the demand and supply assumptions in-
corporated in the scenarios is that they reflect a future in which strong
energy conservation programs in the industrialized countries would be
pursued in conjunction with aggressive exploration for additional energy
resources.
• In both scenarios, economic growth rates are assumed to be moderate,
declining over time, and consistently greater in the developing countries
than in the developed countries.
The accompanying boxed material presents the various aspects of the
energy problem (as we perceive them), catalogued under ten different head-
ings. Of these ten, our analysis addressed only the first seven. The final
three, though touched upon throughout the text, were not given the sort of
detailed treatment we afforded the others.
This categorization is one we found useful, and we refer to it here in an
effort to better communicate to the reader what we sought to accomplish at
llASA. The analysis described in this book cannot hope to cover every di-
mension of the global energy problem. But it does examine a large and im-
portant piece of that problem-and provides as thorough and as careful a
treatment of it as we believe has been done to date.
The energy problem cannot be broken down into individual elements
requiring solution; rather, it is the whole pattern of the energy system
that constitutes the problem. It is from this basis that the following
elements must be considered:
• Absolute size of energy demand.
• Rate of annual increase of energy demand.
• Allocation of global resources to countries-features of world
energy trade.
• Buildup rates of technical supply facilities.
• Innovation rates.
• Absolute size of resources.
• Absolute size of environmental and ecological impacts.
• Management of environmental and ecological impacts.
• Societal and political acceptance of technical and economic changes.
• Relationship between energy problems and policies and more gen-
eral social problems.
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3 FOSSIL RESOURCES:FROM CLEAN TO 01 RTY
BUT STILL INDISPENSABLE
For centuries people satisfied their energy needs principally by local fuel-
wood. But with the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the Western world
in the early nineteenth century, local forest reserves in many countries were
gradually depleted. And because there was no adequate transportation sys-
tem to balance supply and demand, people encountered their first energy
cnSlS.
Fortunately, coal was able to fill the supply gap. Although coal use dates
back some 2000 years, it took the pending energy crisis to foster the devel-
opment of a coal industry. The growth of cities and of the railway system,
as well as the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, com-
bined to make coal the preferred primary energy fuel, a position it held
from around 1840 to 1920. Because of its high energy density, coal offered
consumers many benefits that were not possible with fuelwood. Coal yields
more energy than an equal amount of fuelwood. Then too, coal could be
more easily stored and transported, features that were essential to well-
functioning industrial societies.
However, during the 1920s coal began a gradual decline on the primary
energy market, and by 1975 it contributed only 28 percent to world energy
supply.
Why, after such a convincing development in favor of coal, did it stagnate
and eventually decline in the primary energy market? How was it possible
for oil, and to some extent for gas, to encroach upon coal's position in the
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energy supply infrastructure-a supply system that evolved on the basis of
coal? In Chapter 7, when we take up the subject of how energy sources can
replace each other in the energy market, we will examine the market pene-
tration process, which is illustrated in Figure 7-1 for primary energy.
Here we note briefly that coal's replacement by oil and natural gas was
not simply a matter of price, nor was it stimulated by a shortage of coal
resources. Coal as a commodity was displaced not so much by these two
sources as by secondary energy carriers. During the eighty years of coal's
reign, urban lifestyles were evolving, and consumers increasingly sought more
convenient forms of secondary energy such as town gas, electricity, heating
oil, and hot water. Grid systems were gradually built up in cities to supply
both electricity for lighting purposes and gas for heating and cooking, and
consumers learned to rely on centralized supplies of environmentally clean,
quality energy. The utility industries turned to oil and gas as their mainstays,
generally for the very reasons that once made coal the preferred fuel over
fuelwood. Oil and natural gas have higher energy contents and are easier to
transport and handle. High degrees of storability and transportability also
mean a minimum of required infrastructure. Then too, both fuels are en-
vironmentally cleaner to burn than coal.
Oil was especially attractive, as it could be moved inexpensively around
the globe. Furthermore, the development of the oil-based automotive and
airplane industries and of modern agricultural technologies strengthened the
demand for secondary liquid fuels-or, more precisely, for oil.
Yet despite coal's historical decline on energy markets, there is renewed
interest in this black solid, spurred by several factors-most notably, the oil
crisis of 1973-1974, coal's advantageous resource position in relation to
dwindling supplies of other fossil fuels, and the political debates constraining
the full-scale deployment of nuclear power.
CAN COAL MAKE A COMEBACK?
Our study of the global energy supply options revealed that the transition to
a nonfossil energy system would not occur by 2030 and that fossil fuels
would still be needed during the interim period. Moreover, there would be
no abatement to the demand for secondary liquid fuels. Is coal a possible
solution?
We are convinced that a return to coal as a major energy source is not only
necessary but also inevitable, both for the coal-rich nations and for the rest
of the world. But this time around coal use will have to be managed differ-
ently for several reasons. Coal should not be used as the major source of
primary energy for meeting world demand for large amounts of energy over
the next fifty years, since this would not only deplete its resource base
within one hundred years but also create severe environmental and human
health hazards. This is not to say that coal as a primary solid fuel should not
con tinue to be used restrictively for certain traditional purposes-say, for
steel production.
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But, over the near term, perhaps the next ten or twenty years, coal must
be used in such a way as to permit an orderly buildup of the coal industry
and particularly of the coal supply industry to a level that will allow it to
become a major source of secondary liquid fuels. Coal must become "new
coal"-that is, it will have to be adapted to suit the specific features of
secondary energy requirements which in today's terms means liquid fuels.
Thus to be used strategically during the period of dwindling fossil resources,
new coal must serve as the raw input for the production of synthetic liquid
and gaseous fuels, so-called synfuels and syngas. Used in this way, coal would
serve as a bridge to a future energy world built around nondepletable energy
sources.
How Soon Can We Expect New Coal?
As we explain in Chapter 7, the market penetration of new coal will take
time, even with public and private support. There are many technologi-
cal, environmental, and economic problems to be resolved for the min-
ing, processing, and transporting of very large amounts of coal. Then too,
sociopolitical factors will work either for or against the revival of the coal
industry.
Our study of new coal's prospects in the Federal Republic of Germany,
for example, revealed that some ten years would be needed before it could
contribute significantly to meeting secondary energy requirements. A similar
study of coal's future in the United Kingdom showed a somewhat longer
lead time-about ten to fifteen years-which can be attribu ted to this coun-
try's prodigious oil and gas resources from the North Sea.
While we see certain difficulties for new coal, they are not insurmount-
able. But before we consider these, we first examine whether one can confi-
dently assume that there is enough coal to support the development of a new
coal industry.
Is Coal Really A Giant Resource?
First, it is worthwhile to distinguish between reserves and resources, as ex-
plained briefly in the accompanying boxed material.
Coal reserves are large. The economically recoverable coal reserves world-
wide are estimated to be 600 billion tons of coal equivalent (tce), or, equiva-
lently, about 600 TWyr, which is almost seventy times the amount of all
primary energy fuels used globally in 1975. Coal resources are even more
impressive, estimated at some 10,000 billion tce or about 10,000 TWyr
(World Energy Conference 1977). Although for technical reasons it will
probably not be possible to use all these resources, we estimate that between
2400 and 3700 TWyr could eventually be reached (Astakhov 1980).
The data in Table 3-1 indicate the unequal distribution of coal resources
around the globe, with China, the United States, and the Soviet Union own-
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Reserves and resources are different. Reserves are those deposits
that are known and measured and that can be produced at economic
costs. Beyond that are resources-deposits that are known fairly well,
shading out into those that are known only generally, and continuing
into those that exist only as estimates of what we might find if we look
harder. In the cost dimension, resources are marginally economic,
shading out into those that can be produced only at higher and higher
prices. Resources may be transferred into reserves through discovery
and measurement, through improvements in production technologies
that decrease production costs, and through economic changes that
increase the price of the product and thus the cost that is considered
acceptable in extracting the product.
ing some 88 percent of the total. Japan, for example, has only 0.1 percent,
while only two developing countries-Botswana and India-have noticeable
coal resources, with some 1 and 0.6 percent of world totals.
The fewer resources a country has, generally the harder it works at im-
proving its reserve base. As Table 3-2 shows, region IV has only 0.3 percent
of the world's coal resources; region V, 1.9 percent; and region VI, with its
Table 3-1. World distribution of coal resources (in 109 tce).
Greater than 70 12 tee
(1000 X 709 tee)
Between 1011 and
10 12 tee
(700 and
1000 X 709 tee)
Between 70'0 and 7all tee
(10 and 700 X 70· tee)
Between 70· and
70 10 tee
(I and
70 X 7a· tee)
USSR
United States
China
4860
2570
1438
Australia 262
FRG 247
UK 163
Poland 126
Canada 115
Botswana 100
India
South Africa
Czechoslovakia
Yugoslaviaa
Brazil
57.0 GDRa
57.0 Japan
17.5 Columbia
10.9 Rhodesia
10.0 Mexico
Swaziland
Chile
Indonesiaa
Hungarya
Turkey
Netherlands
France
Spain
North Korea
Romania
Bangia Desh
Venezuela
Peru
9.4
8.5
8.3
7.1
5.5
5.0
4.6
3.7
3.5
3.3
2.9
2.3
2.3
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.6
1.0
aMostly lignite.
Source: Based on data from World Energy Conference (1978a).
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Table 3-2. Coal resources and reserves for the seven IIASA regions (in
109 tce).
Coal Resources Coal Reserves
Region Hard Coal Brown Coal Total Hard Coal Brown Coal Total
I (NA) 1286 1400 2686 122 65 187
II (SU/EE) 4127 892 5019 107 41 148
III (WE/JANZ) 683 80 763 117 29 146
IV (LA) 25 9.3 34.3 4.9 5.9 10.8
V (Af/SEA) 179 4.9 184 43 1.9 44.9
VI (ME/NAf) 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2
VII (C/CPA) 1427 13.4 1440 99 n.a. b 99
Total a 7727.4 2399.6 ~10,127 493.10 142.8 635.9
aRegional figures do not sum to totals because of rounding.
b Data not available.
Source: Based on data from World Energy Conference (1978a).
rich oil and gas deposits, has no known coal resources. Coal reserve figures
for these regions are slightly higher-1.7, 7.1, and 0.1 percent, respectively.
Relatively energy-poor region III has 23.3 percent of global coal reserves but
only 7.5 percent of resources, suggesting an already intensive search for coal.
These figures could serve to explain why countries rich in coal reserves-for
example, the Soviet Union-have not felt compelled to look intensively for
new coal deposits.
Indeed, coal experts are almost unanimous in predicting large additions to
the resource figures. Unlike oil, coal resources have not been of large interest,
owing generally to the comfortable reserve picture that has allowed the in-
dustry to keep up with demand. Likewise, many see a large potential for
finding coal deposits in the vast land areas of Africa and South East Asia
(region V) because of the minimal exploration that has thus far gone on
there. For a developing country with, say, an annual energy consumption of
1 tce per capita, even a small discovery of 50 to 500 tce per capita could be
important. Further, the potential for new discoveries exists even in known
coal districts, as the Selby example illustrates: A new coal field of some 600
million tons of clean, dirt-free coal was discovered in 1972 in the Yorkshire
coal region of Selby in the United Kingdom, which had previously been ex-
plored unsuccessfully.
Still, the earth's favorable coal deposits have been largely exploited by
today's technologies. Surface coal mines in the western part of the United
States, for example, now operate at a 10 to 20 million ton per year level.
Surface mines near Garsdorf in the Federal Republic of Germany are ex-
ploiting brown coal deposits at a record rate of 50 million tons annually,
and a few miles from there, in Hambach, brown coal extraction at an annual
rate of 100 million tons is planned by the 1990s. The Siberian mines in the
Soviet Union are expected to reach an annual level of 50 to 100 million tons
within a short time.
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We look to technological progress to enhance the coal industry. New tools
and techniques, such as seismic exploration adapted from the oil industry,
are enhancing possibilities for successful coal exploration, especially in many
developing countries where coal occurrences are known to exist and where
manpower is abundant and inexpensive. Although pollution problems cannot
be ignored, they are not judged to be as pressing in these countries as they
are in the developed ones, and there is time to develop control techniques.
But surface mining-so-called strip mining-can only buy time. If the coal
industry is to survive globally for a long time, it will have to go to incredible
depths to reach the big veins. Technologically there are many possibil-
ities, from robotization to chemical and bacterial leaching. Of these possi-
bilities, only underground gasification has been used thus far, mainly in the
Soviet Union, although it is currently being explored also in Belgium, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, and the United States. The suc-
cess of this method would make it possible to reach levels of 1000 or 1200
meters, which are generally not included in reserve estimates, and would thus
improve the process of transferring resources to reserves as well as adding
new resources.
There is yet another problem facing the coal industry that technology
could resolve. For coal, as with oil, as the best sources are explored, users
must accept poorer grades and must work harder to extract and process
them into quality energy. The coal industry in Bulgaria, for example, is now
extracting brown coals with a low energy content of only 1400 kilocalories
per kilogram (kcal per kg) and plans to go to even lower grades of 900 kcal
per kg. The many technological and environmental problems associated with
such endeavors can perhaps be understood best when we consider that good
quality brown coals in the Federal Republic of Germany yield some 3000
kcal per kg and the hard coals in the western part of the United States yield
some 7000 kcal per kg.
Converting Coal Into New Coal
Since the demand for secondary fuels, particularly for liquids, drives today's
energy problem, we considered how coal could be used in the production of
synthetic fuels. We focused on those coal conversion technologies that would
be technologically mature over the near term and that would allow new coal
to be used in conjunction with, or to substitute for, primary energies such as
nuclear power, oil, and natural gas in meeting secondary demands. By
emphasizing a strategic role for coal in synthetic fuel production, we do not
wish to minimize the importance of other coal-based technologies, such as
the fluidized bed process for producing industrial heat and electricity. Still,
it is the need for liquid and gaseous fuels that is of utmost concern and
therefore deserving of the most immediate attention.
Coal Gasification and Liquefaction. The problems of converting coal into
a gas or a liquid are not technically insurmountable. Both gasification and
liquefaction are known technologies, although their use up to now has been
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[n autothermal coal gasification and liquefaction schemes, both the
process heat and the required hydrogen are produced by burning coal,
in addition to the amount of coal needed for the chemical carbon con-
tent of the synfuels. A large amount of energy is lost in the conversion
process, and the resulting gas or liquid contains about half of the energy
content of the original coal.
For the allotbermal process the process heat and the required hydro-
gen are supplied exogenously, preferably by means of heat from a
nuclear reactor such as the high temperature reactor (HTR) or in more
futuristic schemes by means of hydrogen gas from a solar plant. The
synfuels thus produced have a higher energy content than the original
coal. While in both processes the combustion of coal releases carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere, the allothermal process requires less coal
(by a factor of 3 to 4) and accordingly releases a smaller amount of
carbon dioxide than the autothermal method.
Allothermal gasification processes are still in the development stage.
However, the adoption of such methods will probably be influenced as
much by strategies for deploying nuclear and solar energy as by con-
siderations of the efficient use of coal.
on a smaller scale than what is being considered here for coal. Currently,
autothermal processing is the preferred method, but there are many who
argue for the rapid development and deployment of allothermal processing.
The distinction between the autothermal and allothermal methods of coal
gasification and liquefaction is explained briefly in the accompanying boxed
material.
There are a number of known gasification processes, the most technically
advanced being the Koppers-Totzek, the Winkler method, and the Lurgi
method. Additionally, new processes are being developed for burning coal
in steel converters that would not only reduce the amount of pollutants but
also permit the use of low-grade coal for producing high-quality energy. [n
the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, some $350 million has been
invested in research projects in this direction.
The raw gas generated can be converted to produce liquid fuels such as
methanol. Although the energy content per volume of methanol is lower
than that of gasoline, it can substitute for gasoline or be used in combination
to supply the transport sector. [n South Africa, for example, an advanced
Fischer-Tropsch process is being used to liquefy some 10 million tons of
coal annually.
A Global Coal Trade
[n 1977, the World Energy Conference (l978a) estimated the existing inter-
national coal market as 7.7 percent of the total global coal production in
1975 and prognosticated a meager 8.6 percent for world trade in 2020. But
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interest in coal has been growing to such an extent that at the 1980 World
Energy Conference it was suggested that total global coal production would
probably increase 20 percent by the year 2000, assuming that steps to de-
velop the industry are taken very soon. It seems certain that a global trading
system for coal will evolve, but we refrained from dealing with this issue ex-
plicitly. There are several major studies on this subject, among them the
World Coal Study (WOCOL) organized by Carroll Wilson of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (WOCOL, 1980).
OIL: THE KING OF THE FOSSILS-
BUT FOR HOW LONG?
Oil is the commercial fuel to which the world has become accustomed,
around which major infrastructures have adjusted, and on which highly
mobile lifestyles are based. In short, liquid fuels are indispensable in today's
world-and for good reasons. Oil is high quality energy and surpasses all
other fossil fuels in the ease with which it can be transported and stored.
It was only after the first oil shock of 1973 that people began to question
the future role of oil in energy systems. Until then, it was easy to ignore pre-
dictions about oil supplies running out. New discoveries were being made
often, supporting the view that oil would somehow always be an available
commodity.
Disagreement among experts as to the amount of oil has clouded an al-
ready murky situation. Over the past thirty-five years there have been at
least twenty-five estimates of what are termed variously as recoverable global
resources, but comparatively speaking, there are only about a half a dozen
independent estimates. Among the major assessments, made in 1977, was
that of a group led by Pierre Desprairies (1977) of the Institut Francais du
Petrol, conducted under the sponsorship of the World Energy Conference.
Our judgments of what is realistically possible for oil are indebted to Des-
prairies' work.
The thirty experts participating in the Desprairies study made estimates of
ultimately recoverable conventional oil resources ranging from a low of 173
billion tons to a high of 950 billion tons, with the mean value being 257
billion tons. Estimates were also made of the cost (1976 U.S. dollars) of ex-
tracting the oil: of the 257 billion tons of oil, 36 percent would be recovered
at a cost of less than $5 per barrel, 26 percent at between $5 and $12 per
barrel, and 38 percent at $12 or more up to the limit of $20. To put these
numbers in perspective, more than 50 percent of the world's conventional
oil was extracted in 1976 at a cost of less than $2 per barrel. It is interest-
ing to note that in 1977, when Desprairies' study was underway, from the
estimated total of 257 billion tons of oil only 88 billion tons of oil had
actually been discovered.
We estimate conventional oil resources to be some 300 billion tons (or
equivalently 430 TWyr) and to include oil in deep offshore and polar
regions, which Desprairies' group could not include because of the con-
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straint that production costs (excluding taxes and profits) not exceed $20
per barrel (1976 U.S. dollars) by the year 2000. Then too, our time horizon
is wider-that is, 2030, as opposed to 2020 in Desprairies' study.
A look at the regional distribution of conventional oil resources and of
proven reserves as given in Table 3-3 shows that region VI possesses some
42.4 percent of global resources, followed by region II with 18.2 percent,
and region I with 10.9 percent. The industrialized countries of region III,
which rely heavily on oil supplies, have only 6.2 percent of total global
resources.
How realistic is our estimate of 300 billion tons of conventional oil? Can
we expect discoveries of a new "Middle East"-say, off the coast of China or
in Antarctica? Although the possibility cannot be excluded, the chances are
generally thought to be small. Still, recent discoveries in Mexico provide
arguments for the optimists.
Then too, progress in exploration and drilling might serve to revise our
estimate upward. The large differences in the drilling densities between the
developing and developed regions do point to a possible "drilling gap." Curi-
ously, the two regions that have been drilled the least are oil-rich region VI
(but with surprising success) and the vast land area of developing region V,
indicating the need for care in addressing world oil perspectives. Enhanced
recovery might also result in much more oil than our 300 billion ton esti-
mate. This is particularly the case for heavy oils for which improved heat-
processing methods could increase the rate of recovery from 5 to 40 percent.
Even a minor increase in the rate of recovery-say, from 40 to 41 percent for
300 billion tons-would add 7.5 billion tons (or 10 TWyr) to our estimate.
For perspective, such additions would result in conventional oil resources
that are only slightly more than the amount of primary energy (8.2 TWyr/yr)
that the world consumed in 1975.
Table 3-3. Oil resources, reserves, and drilling densities for the seven IIASA
regions.
Prospective Total Number Drilling Density
Resourcesa Reservesb A reasc of Wellsc (total weI/51
Region (7 06 tons) (7 06 tons) (x 7000 km') (end of 7975) 7000 km'l
I (NA) 28,000 4857 12,928 > 2,575,000 202.75
II (SU/EE) 46,730 10,670 9797 542,325 55.36
III (WE/JANZ) 16,020 4021 11,030 34,737 3.15
IV (LA) 23,000 5521 12,444 103,359 8.31
V (Af/SEA) 21,150 6176 17,729 28,281 1.60
VI (ME/NAf) 109,100 54,363 8212 12,501 1.52
VII (C/CPA) 12,730 2736 2831 8500 3.00
Total 257,230 88,344 ~75,OOO > 3,300,000 44.00
aBased on data from Desprairies (1977).
bBased on data from International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1978).
cBased on data from Grossling (1976).
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Still, there are experts who argue that 300 billion tons of conventional oil
is too high an estimate, since it assumes a continuation of present discovery
rates which they consider unrealistic in light of the discovery of most of the
giant and super-giant fields. Also, many doubt the feasibility of worldwide
increases in recovery rates up to 40 percent and believe that eventually the
high extraction and production costs for conventional oil will make alterna-
tive energy sources more attractive. Then too, a deteriorating political cli-
mate in the oil-producing regions may ultimately force the international oil
companies out of the oil business. No matter what opinion one may hold
about the worth of these companies, they do have the know-how and the
capital to support the search for less accessible, more expensive oil deposits.
Oil from Unconventional Sources
Meanwhile, as, prices of conventional oil rise and supplies become threatened,
the production of unconventional oil has begun in earnest. Unconventional
oil-that is, heavy crude oil, tar sands, and oil shales-are found in the earth's
layers where geological changes were either insufficient to produce petroleum
or where later disturbances have led to changes in existing oil deposits.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the basis of recent theories of oil formation in the
earth's crust that are guiding today's oil explorations. The burial of organic
matter led eventually to the formation of kerogen-that is, to oil shale for-
mation-which is significantly more abundant than coal. Had the kerogen
remained near the surface, it would have constituted the oil shale deposits
that are currently known. But generally organic layers were buried under
Figure 3-1. Continu ity of oil resources.
Oil shales Conventional oil
Heavy crude oils
or tar sands
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additional layers of sediment-that is, they crossed the so-called petroleum
window-and kerogen was transformed into oil (and eventually into gas
if burial was even deeper). Often, the fluid oil migrated to anticlinal or
stratigraphic traps, forming today's deposits. But if this oil were to be
forced back up to the surface by geological means, the chemical processes
would convert it into tar sands or heavy oil deposits.
Exploration of these unconventional oil resources is at an early stage, but
the quantities appear vast-about 300 billion tons. In some respects, world-
wide distribution of unconventional oil resembles that for coal, with a broad
geographical distribution dominated by a few giants. Interestingly, the super-
giant deposits of unconventional oil belong to the "oil ring" of the ancient
continent of the Pangea, which, before it drifted apart some 180 million
years ago, included known deposits in Alaska, Texas, Mexico, North Africa,
the Middle East, and western Siberia.
The estimated 300 billion tons of heavy oil and tar sands are divided as
follows: Orinoco in Venezuela, with 100 billion tons; Athabasca in Canada,
with 86 billion tons; Olenek in the Soviet Union, with 86 billion tons; and
Cold Lake in Canada, with 23 billion tons. Another 27 billion tons are
spread out among eight large fields-two in Canada, five in the United States,
and one in Madagascar.
The reserve base is also impressive, although only 5 to 10 percent of these
unconventional oils can be extracted by surface mining techniques with their
high recovery rates. The rest will call for in situ technologies that have lower
rates of recovery, about 35 to 50 percent less than what is possible with
either surface mining or retorting methods.
Thus, these figures are only rough estimates that will probably benefit
greatly from technological progress in extraction and recovery. Recently
progress has been made in the recovery of heavy oil and tar sands, particu-
larly in Canada, Venezuela, and the United States. The Syncrude Plant, owned
by Syncrude Canada Limited, began operation in 1978 with today's maxi-
mum level for both surface mining and surface processing of 6.25 million
tons of oil per year, and government incentives in Canada are leading to
other plants of this type. Likewise, several pilot processes for in situ recovery
are being developed in Canada to extend this maximum recovery figure.
Estimates of oil shale resources are even larger-420 billion tons, of which
5 to 10 percent is considered recoverable by present methods. Two-thirds
of these resources are located in North America. While the extraction of
these deposits is uneconomic by today's terms-that is, it exceeds the $12 to
$15 per barrel cost category-the Synfuel Program set up in the United
States in the late 1970s for producing synthetic fuels is expected to lower
costs.
It is very difficult to predict exactly when these unconventional fuels could
enter the market at a noticeable level. But the findings of the Desprairies'
group, as well as those of our quantitative analysis described in Chapter 8,
point to a progressive phasing in of unconventional oils globally sometime
around the 1990s.
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Oil Trade
Clearly, region VI will continue to playa major role in the international oil
trade. We will consider the implications of oil production ceilings on oil
trade later in Chapter 9.
GAS: AN EMERGING GIANT
It was not long ago that those searching for oil were disappointed if drilling
operations resulted only in discoveries of "useless" gas deposits. To be sure,
interest in natural gas is a recent phenomenon.
The natural gas industry itself is relatively young. In the United States, for
example, it began after the Second World War and only developed in Western
Europe in the early 1970s, with the discovery of gas fields in Italy, France,
and especially in the Netherlands. Development has been impressive, so
much so that natural gas now holds the energy share in Western Europe that
postwar energy forecasters projected for nuclear energy-some 15 percent.
Yet less than 8 percent of the estimated global resources have been con-
sumed, with a good part of this being burned away wastefully in the major
gas-producing region of northern Africa and the Persian Gulf because there
have been no means for transporting the gas to distant markets such as those
in Western Europe.
Conventional gas resources are large, with some 280 trillion m 3 (or 330
TWyr) remaining to be produced worldwide as of 1976 (WEC 1978b). Com-
paratively speaking, this is the same resource level as for conventional oil
resources; only the recovery rate of gas is higher-about 80 to 90 percent.
And there is no slackening in the rate of finding giant deep gas deposits as
a result of advanced exploration technologies. While worldwide gas consump-
tion is expected to increase over the next decades, production could most
likely grow even faster, reaching 3.7 to 4 trillion m3 per year (or 4.3 to 4.7
TWyr/yr) between 2000 and 2030. From a resource standpoint, this level
could be maintained for several decades.
As Table 3-4 shows, distribution of conventional gas resources, like that
of the other fossils, is uneven. Region VI has some 34 percent, followed by
region II with 25 percent, and by region I with 18 percent. Region III is
again in a weak supply position, with only 6.7 percent.
We need to say a few words about unconventional gas resources in order
to present an accurate picture of global gas resources. Unconventional gas
includes gas in geopressure zones, gas in tight formations such as sandstone,
Devonian shales, methane from coal fields, landfill gas, and gas hydrates.
Because of the ample supply of conventional and cheap natural gas, there
has not been much interest in knowing how much more is available or in
making use of what we know about unconventional resources. Yet most ex-
perts agree that these unconventionals are probably very appreciable, each
perhaps equivalent to or even one order of magnitude greater than conven-
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Table 3-4. Estimates of ultimate gas resources remaining to be discovered
and world gas reserves for the seven IIASA regions (in 109 m3 ).
Reserves (as of Resources Still to
Region 1 January 1977l be Discoveredb
I (NA) 7763 43,500
II (SU/EE) 22,654 59,000
III (WE/JANZ) 5061 14,500
IV (LA) 2695 15,000
V (At/SEA) 3560 12,000
VI (ME/NAt) 21,157 78,000
VII (C/CPA) 594 10,000
Total C 63,484 232,000
aBased on data from World Oil (1978).
bBased on data from World Energy Conference (1978b).
cThe two values do not add up to the ultimate value of 280 trillion m3 given above because
of differences of dates and of origins of the data.
tional gas resources. But we need to know more about them before we can
make reliable global estimates.
The United States is pioneering in data collection and the development
of technologies for exploiting these unconventional gas resources. The data
in Table 3-5 indicate a large unconventional gas resources base in the United
States. Coal bed degasification techniques are being tried, and gas in Devon-
ian shale and in tight formations is being produced on a small scale that is
expected to reach higher levels once the technology of fracturing has been
mastered. In 1979, for example, a pilot well was drilled in Texas to assess gas
in geopressure zones and to see how much of the estimated volume could be
recovered. It was concluded that obtaining even as little as 5 percent would
bring recoverable unconventional gas reserves in the range of 4 to 70 trillion
m3 -which is roughly the same order of magnitude as global conventional gas
resources. And this is from only one form of unconventional gas. Thus, from
a resource perspective, the future of gas as a global fuel looks very promising.
Table 3-5. Estimated additional gas resources, United States.
Source
Coal bed degasification
Devon ian shale
Tight formations
Geopressured gas
Estimated Volume in Place
(10· m 3 )
8630-23,100
14,470-17,260
17,260
85,000-1,444,400
Source: Based on data from World Energy Conference (1978b).
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Transporting Gas
Global gas trade has been minimal up to now, and unless the problems of
transporting gas over long distances and of getting it from wellhead to con-
sumers are solved, international trade will not expand. Gas is moved pri-
marily by pipelines, but many countries and particularly Western Euro-
pean countries are facing limitations on regional gas trade through land
pipelines. The technological possibilities for extending the transportability
of gas include large diameter or high pressure pipelines, such as those
planned for moving gas from Tunisia to Western Europe.
Many experts see liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a way out of the gas
transportation problem. As is the case with coal, the liquefaction process
itself is not in principle challenging. But for gas, the main problems are those
of scale, of transporting gas economically, which means covering both the
costs of the special cryotankers that handle liquid gas at very low tempera-
tures and the capital investments for building up the necessary processing
facilities. There are high energy losses at both stages of converting the gas-
from gas to liquid and back into gas. What concerns many people and what
is challenging research efforts is the safety of the LNG technology.
Another alternative for making natural gas a global fuel is to liquefy it on
site, converting it into the liquid methanol that could then be transported
more easily by pipeline. The Soviet Union has made arrangements to pipe
its Siberian gas, as a liquid, to Western Europe.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Fossil resources will continue to be indispensable to the world's energy sys-
tem until we have a sustainable system built around nondepletable energy
sources. Thus, from now until some fifty years hence there will be a slow but
continuous change from the heavy reliance on relatively cheap and easy oil
and natural gas to an extended period of using fossil fuels that cost more to
extract and process and that have potentially larger and larger environmental
impacts. We call these "dirty" fuels.
The resource base of fossil fuels in indeed large, but only if one includes
these dirty, unconventional fuels. There is no imminent danger of running
out of coal, oil, and natural gas. Ultimately, conventional oil fields could
deliver perhaps 400 TWyr of energy; unconventional oil (heavy oil and tar
sands), possibly another 400 TWyr; shale oil, 60 TWyr (on the assumption
that environmental problems will be difficult and will restrict greater yields);
natural gas, 350 TWyr; and coal, 2400 TWyr. About half of the conventional
oil and natural gas resources are recoverable inexpensively. The rest comes
from a variety of sources that are associated with higher production costs:
poorer fields that require drilling more holes and capitalizing drilling and
land costs against smaller product yields; production from continental
shelves, deeper basins, and polar regions; and secondary and tertiary extrac-
tion. All these activities, moreover, imply larger environmental impacts.
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Eventually, we envisage a time when people will choose not to use fossil
fuels because of the availability of cheaper and easier alternatives. That the
transition from the use of fossil fuels is inevitable is indisputable.
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4 NUCLEAR ENERGY: REALIZINGTHE POTENTIAL
Nuclear energy could supply very large amounts of energy for millennia on a
sustainable basis. Even within the fifty year time horizon of our study,
nuclear power could contribute decisively to meeting global energy needs.
The question of whether or not this potential will be used is not so much a
technical question as a social and political one. The forces that have re-
stricted nuclear energy's growth to a level far below the rate once predicted
by its supporters are those that have mobilized around questions in which
subjective estimates and value judgments must playa large part-questions of
the balance between individual and societal sakty and other social and in-
dividual needs. We did not try to resolve these questions in our study, al-
though we addressed them. These remain decisions that go beyond simple
analysis and are influenced by national goals, values, and institutions. We
confined our examination of nuclear energy to an exploration of what its
potential would be if most of the crucial questions holding back its develop-
ment were resolved. Through this exploration we hope to clarify the global
stakes involved in the difficult and critical choices that face individual
nations.
The promise of nuclear energy lies in the high energy intensity of nuclear
fuels as a primary energy source: One gram of fissionable material yields
about three million times more energy than 1 gram of carbon from coal, oil,
or natural gas. In the temporal dimension, this means that when properly
used, nuclear fuels remain available almost indefinitely. The world's current
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resource of uranium, if used in "breeder" rather than "burner" reactors,
should last thousands of years. In the spatial dimension, this means that
nuclear fuel can be easily stored and transported over distances as great as
10,000 kilometers (km). Uranium is a truly global fuel that can be inex-
pensively shipped to any place on earth.
But the great potential of nuclear primary energy has been restricted thus
far by its almost exclusive use as a source of one form of secondary energy~
electricity. This is generated by conventional turbine technology from steam
produced by nuclear reactor heat. Uranium is simply a direct replacement
for coal or oil. Today's nuclear reactors are designed to produce steam, are
sized and sited to conform to the requirements of electrical power grids, are
designed for maintenance at schedules convenient for electrical demand
schedules, and are required to be chemically compatible with the steam to
be produced. They are thereby tied closely in space and time to the demands
of population concentrations-cities and urban agglomerations. And they are
limited to the portion of final energy demand that is served by electricity-
currently about 11 percent.
In 1975 nuclear energy provided only 1. 5 percent of total commercial
primary energy worldwide. But nuclear energy could also be used to produce
space heat (as is planned in the Soviet Union), process heat, and, most im-
portantly, the external energy input for allothermal gasification and lique-
faction of coal and for the electrolytic or thermochemical production of
hydrogen from water. The resultant coal-based synthetic fuels, or hydrogen,
could in the longer term be used to satisfy needs that cannot be fulfilled by
electricity. Indeed, we anticipate a future in which "electronic" (electricity)
and "protonic" (hydrogen) energy carriers become the only necessary
secondary energy forms. Nuclear energy would then, in principle, be able to
satisfy all of the energy requirements of a global society on an inexhaustible
basis. And because hydrogen (and synfuels) production is not tied to the
immediate demands of population (since they are storable and transporta-
ble), the nuclear energy system could be relieved, at least in part, of its close
tie in space and time to the needs of cities and urban agglomerations.
This far-ranging potential of nuclear energy cannot be fully realized during
the fifty year time span of our study, although it does playa role in the
longer term vision of a sustainable energy society sketched in Chapter 10.
But what could be obtained in the next decades? And on the assumption,
perhaps unrealistic, that political and social inhibitions would be relaxed in
coming decades, what is the maximum technologically and economically
reasonable development path for nuclear energy over these decades? The
answer to this question would tell us not only what we might obtain, but
also what we might forego if the inhibitions remain in effect.
Thus, in this chapter we shall ask: What facilities and institutional capaci-
ties would be needed to support a large-scale deployment of nuclear energy?
At what rates would they have to be built up? What would the resource
requirements be? We begin our inquiry by looking at the present status of
the nuclear power industry.
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THE PRESENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER
Nuclear fission power is not in its infancy. The light water reactor (LWR),
a class of reactors that includes both the pressurized water reactor (PWR)
and the boiling water reactor (BWR), is the workhorse of nuclear fission
power. Besides LWRs, there are other types of burners in use commercially
such as the Canadian CANDU heavy water reactor (HWR), the British ad-
vanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR), and the Soviet Voronezh reactor (VR).
These reactors are designed to use one neutron out of the two or three
available fission neutrons. This one neutron maintains the chain reaction.
The fissile atomsa are "burned," thus providing energy. Fueling these re-
actors by natural uranium or by enriched uraniumb means that essentially
only fissile uranium (235 U) can be burned, leaving more than 99 percent of
the natural uranium unused. Burner reactors are therefore inefficient users
of natural uranium resources.
Apart from burner reactors, there is a second type of reactor-sa-called
breeders that are under advanced development, such as the liquid metal
fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). Thus far, worldwide, there are four LMFBRs
in operation and five additional ones planned, of which two are being
constructed.
Breeder reactors are designed to use more than two of the available fission
neutrons. One neutron maintains the chain reaction, the other converts the
fertile atoms (2 38 U and thorium 232 (232 Th» into fissile atoms (plutonium
239 (239PU) and 233U, respectively). The converted fertile atom replaces the
fissile atom whose fission provided the energy initially. In effect, the fissile
atom is not burned, but is replaced by a new fissile atom; instead, the fertile
atom is burned. The fissile atoms serve no longer as fuel, but as "catalysts"
for converting fertile atoms into fuel-or, in other words, they "breed."
There is a third class of reactors designed to approach but not achieve the
situation of breeding. These are advanced converters or near breeders. Ex-
amples are the heavy water reactor (HWR), the high temperature reactor
(HTR), and specially designed advanced LWRs. These advanced converters
"burn" fissile atoms, but their share of fertile atoms that are converted and
ultimately burned is larger than that of burner reactors.
Table 4-1 reflects the status of fission reactors worldwide, showing that
by the end of 1980, some 300 nuclear power stations were operating with a
total installed capacity of some 180 GW(e). By 1993, when the reactors
presently under construction or on order would also be in operation, total
installed capacity is expected to be some 390 GW(e).
aFissile atoms are those that can be used to fuel a reactor; the most important ones are uranium-
235 (23S U), uranium-233 (233 U), and plutonium-239 (239 pu). But only 235 U occurs in nature-natural
uranium contains only 0.7 percent 235 U, and 99.3 percent fertile atoms 238 U.
bEnriched uranium means that a part of the 0.7 percent 235 U is separated from some of the natural
uranium and added to natural uranium fuel in order to increase the 235 U concentration in the fuel to
2 to 3 percent.
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Table 4-l. Nuclear power plants worldwidea
To wi
Installed Capacity
No. Installed Average Cumulative Annual
Ins wiled Capacity Per Size Growth
Year b Plants Year (GW(e)) MW(e) No. GW(e) Rate (%)
132.93 41 5.443
1966 6 1.719 286.50 47 7.162 31.6
1967 5 1.217 243.40 52 8.379 17.0
1968 7 2.165 309.29 59 10.544 25.8
1969 11 3.384 307.64 70 13.928 32.1
1970 6 3.099 516.50 76 17 .027 22.3
1971 10 5.755 575.50 86 22.782 33.8
1972 22 11.412 518.73 108 34.194 50.1
1973 15 8.541 569.40 123 42.735 25.0
1974 20 14.544 727.20 143 57.279 34.0
1975 19 14.464 761.26 162 71.743 25.3
1976 14 9.913 708.07 176 81.656 13.8
1977 19 15.160 797.89 195 96.816 18.6
1978 17 14.647 861.59 212 111.463 15.1
1979 44 35.580 808.64 256 147.043 31.9
1980 40 33.013 825.33 296 180.056 22.5
1981 39 34.938 895.85 335 214.994 19.4
1982 36 32.701 908.36 371 247.695 15.2
1983 32 31.974 999.19 403 279.669 12.9
1984 31 30.823 994.29 434 310.492 11.0
1985 23 24.902 1,082.70 457 335.394 8.0
1986 14 15.409 1,100.64 471 350.803 4.6
1987 9 9.536 1,059.56 480 360.339 2.7
1988 11 11.997 1,090.64 491 372.336 3.3
1989 6 7.190 1,198.33 497 379.526 1.9
1990 4 4.226 1,056.50 501 383.752 1.1
1991 4 4.880 1,220.00 505 388.632 1.3
1992 0 0 0 505 388.632 0
1993 2 2.530 1,265.00 507 391.162 0.7
aplants either operable, under construction, or on order (30 MW(e) and over) as of 31 December
1978. Additional 12 power plants with a total of 10,487 MW(e) are not included here since the
expected date of commercial operation is not known.
bActual or expected date of operation.
Source: Based on data in Nuclear News (1979).
Besides fission, there is fusion. The fusion D-T (deuterium-tritium) reactor
is also a breeder. Deuterium and tritium are made to fuse in a sophisticated
plasma configuration or in a rapidly heated pellet. The neutrons released in
fusion are used to make more of the tritium, which is needed as a fusion
fuel. Since tritium does not occur in sufficient quantities in nature, it must
be converted from lithium which, together with deuterium, acts as a fuel.
Lithium is therefore comparable to depleted natural uranium (i.e., fertile
238 U) and tritium to fissile material.
Fusion reactors have not yet reached the stage of scientific feasibility,
but this will undoubtedly be reached within a few years. Thereafter it will
NUCLEAR ENERGY: REALIZING THE POTENTIAL 47
be technological feasibility that must be achieved, and that includes both
the successful mastering of materials development and mature, reliable
engineering. This will take time. Only after the final stage of commercial
feasibility has been reached can fusion reactors be deployed at a scale that is
significant with respect to global energy demand-that is, at a terawatt and
not a gigawatt level. Therefore, we do not consider the contribution from
fusion reactors to be significant before 2030.
In the broader context of nuclear energy strategies, both the fission and
the fusion breeder have similar features. In both cases the resource potential
is roughly 300,000 TWyr so that for all practical purposes each of the
breeders permits an unlimited supply of energy and is essentially decoupled
from the resource problem.
In the more distant future, the fusion reactor could be designed to allow
fusion of deuterium with deuterium. Such a futuristic D-D reactor would
enhance the fusion potential resource by a factor of 1000.
Finally, in addition to pure fission and pure fusion breeders there are the
related possibilities of hybrid fusion-fission breeders and accelerator breeders,
either of which would also achieve a net production of fissile material, and
would be essentially resource decoupled. However, like fusion reactors,
accelerator breeders are technically not yet feasible today.
Operating nuclear reactors need a nuclear fuel cycle to serve them. The
front end of the fuel cycle includes all steps for producing the reactor fuel
elements. This comprises the mining of uranium, its processing into yellow-
cake, its conversion into the gas uranium hexafluoride, in most cases the
enrichment of fissile 235 U atoms and the conversion of this material into
uranium dioxide, and finally fuel fabrication. After the fuel elements are ir-
radiated, or burned in a reactor, they enter the back end of the fuel cycle.
The back end of the fuel cycle comprises intermediate fuel element storage,
chemical reprocessing for recovering the fuel materials (uranium and plu-
tonium) from the spent fuel, intermediate waste deposit, waste solidifica-
tion, and final waste disposal.
In sum, the front end steps of the fuel cycle, including enrichment and
fuel fabrication, are in hand, and we assume that additional capacity could
be built as needed. But for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, time is
needed to develop the facilities required industrially, if reprocessing and
waste disposal are not to become urgent problems. The challenges of de-
veloping the back end of the fuel cycle are not purely of an engineering
nature. Technically, reprocessing is in a stage of development similar to that
of enrichment, and the question is not whether reprocessing plants can be
built but whether they will be built. Currently, the nuclear civilian industry
worldwide has only one reprocessing facility at its disposal, the French plant
at La Hague, with scheduled additions being limited to the further expansion
of the La Hague plant and to the completion of a rebuilt facility at Wind-
scale in the United Kingdom. A similar situation exists for waste disposal:
There seem to be no insurmountable technical problems of solidifying wastes
into chemically stable forms and of disposing of them permanently, but
political opposition has delayed the execution of specific projects in many
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countries. The back end of the fuel cycle is therefore in hand only in the
technical sense, but is well behind the schedule necessary for nuclear power
to play an increasing role in the decades ahead.
URANIUM RESOURCES
The magnitude of high grade natural uranium resources in the United States
and throughout the world is subject to ongoing debate. This quantity is im-
portant, because, as we shall see, knowledge of how much uranium is avail-
able is useful for estimating both the worldwide potential of nuclear fission
energy in the absence of breeder reactors and, as a corollary, the rate at
which breeder reactors can be introduced in order to create a practically
unlimited supply of energy.
The availability of economically recoverable uranium resources, plus
known and speculative resources (rather than the total potential availability
of natural uranium) is relevant for planning nuclear industry projects over
the near term. The findings of the joint study by the OECD-NEA/IAEA
(1978) give a figure of orientation for the world (excluding Eastern Europe,
the Soviet Union, and China) of 4.3 million tons of natural uranium, at
prices below $130 per kilogram. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation (INFCE 1979) published a revised estimate of 4.8 million tons at
less than $130 per kg. It is these figures that are generally being referred to
by those stating that the world has enough natural uranium to fuel the
nuclear power plants both in operation or under construction.
But for exploring the real potential of nuclear fission energy, we regard
these figures as only a beginning rather than a conclusion. Our interest is
in the total uranium resources that would be available globally over the long
term. Unfortunately, after almost half a century of careful exploration, we
still do not know the ultimate amount or price of natural uranium available
globally. Still, assumptions must be made, and we therefore estimated global
uranium resources at 24.5 million tons. We will explain briefly how we ar-
rived at this estimate, acknowledging that we relied on current knowledge
of the nature of uranium deposits, which is at best only qualitative.
The United States, with the largest uranium reserves, has one of the
smaller finding rates-that is, the amount of discovered reserves compared to
the amount of drilling for uranium (OECD-NEA/IAEA 1977). A.M. Perry
(1979), among others, draws the reasonable conclusion that this does not
mean that the United States is unusually poorly endowed, but that it has
been relatively well explored. In the absence of any better assumption, and
because both the land area of the United States and the diversity of geologi-
cal provinces are large, we have regarded the country as a representative
sample of the world.
The uranium resource base of the United States has been estimated at
some 1.7 million tons (OECD-NEA/IAEA 1977). The country's land area is
9.4 million km2 , which translates to some 0.18 tons of available uranium
per km2 . Extrapolating this, we arrived at a a global figure of 24.5 million
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Table 4-2. Adjusted uranium resource estimates
OECD-NEA/IAEA IIASA
Area Estimate Estimate
IIASA World Regions (70· km') (7 O· tons)a (70· tons)
I (North America) 21.5 2.53 3.87
II (Soviet Union and E. Europe) 23.5 4.23
III (W. Europe, Japan, Australia,
N. Zealand, S. Africa, Israel) 15.5 1.26 2.79
IV (Latin America) 20.6 0.08 3.71
V (Africa except N. Africa and
S. Africa, South and Southeast Asia) 33.6 0.33 6.05
VI (Middle East and N. Africa) 9.8 0.08 1.76
VII (China and Centrally Planned
Asian Economies) 11.5 2.07
World 136 4.29 24.48
(14.2-26.4 )b
a Excluding regions II and V II.
blncluding the speculative resources given in OECD-NEA/IAEA (1977).
tons. Table 4-2 compares these uranium estimates for the seven IIASA world
regions and the values given in the OECD-NEA/IAEA report.
Again, the actual amount of ultimately recoverable uranium resources is
debatable. Some may argue that it is impossible to get 24.5 million tons or
that even more than this amount is possible. Against this background, we
now explore the potential of nuclear fission, using the extrapolated 24.5
million tons of uranium resources as a reference number. Given this figure
and in view of the uncertainties associated with its derivation, the following
discussion will be based on a range of 15 to 30 million tons of uranium
resources.
EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL
The answers to the questions of whether we will run out of uranium re-
sources and of how long the available natural uranium can be made to last
depend both on how fast nuclear fission is introduced in the future and on
the extent to which it is called upon to supply global energy. In Chapter 8,
where we describe our two global supply and demand scenarios for the year
2030, we address the specific issue of how much nuclear power can con-
tribute realistically over the next fifty years in light of real world constraints.
Here, our intention is to explore upper limits and to consider the full poten-
tial of nuclear energy, assuming that political and social constraints are
resolvable.
Nuclear power is different, not only from fossil power, but even from the
solar option. Fossil fuels are sooner or later depletable; solar and nuclear are
not. Unlike solar, the current status of the nuclear industry offers an infra-
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structure that would allow for the deployment of nuclear energy on a massive
scale during the next fifty years. The present status of nuclear power is
therefore our starting point for considering feasible rates for introducing
nuclear power.
On this basis then we explicitly defined an accelerated program of nuclear
energy supply that by the year 2030 would allow nuclear energy to con-
tribute 17 TWyr/yr of thermal power.c This is a hypothetical trajectory of
the nuclear potential and not a prediction that would allow us to draw un-
assailable conclusions from this exercise.
To achieve this trajectory, the installed generating capacity of nuclear
energy would have to be about 1.6 TW(e) by 2000, leading to 10 TW(e) by
2030. We arrived at this figure by considering many factors too complex
to detail here. Simply stated, our figure is based on our historical market
penetration analysis (see Chapter 7) and on our judgments about maximum
capabilities of the nuclear industry worldwide over the near term.
The nuclear industry worldwide, if called upon to do so, could supply an
additional 150 GW(e) of installed capacity annually by the end of the period
1995-2000. This would amount to a 50 percent expansion of supply capa-
bilities over the next 15 years. The annual additions implied in our trajectory
exceed neither the postulated installed capacity of 150 GW(e) per year by
2000 nor the market penetration rates for oil and natural gas observed in the
past, although the rate of additions is still below that historically observed
for nuclear energy. The annual additions to installed electrical capacity en-
visaged for the period 2000-2030 average less than twice those postulated
for the year 2000. From the information on our 17 TWyr/yr nuclear trajec-
tory given in Table 4-3, we can observe that the high levels of installed
capacity could be achieved only if there is a prompt upsurge now in orders
for new nuclear plants, that would bring installed electrical capacity to some
500 to 600 GW(e) by 1990. Let us recall that the added capacity of the re-
actors currently under construction and on order would lead to a total in-
stalled capacity of some 390 GW(e) by 1993.
In Table 4-3 we compare our trajectory with a "low" estimate of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency and with figures from the World Energy
Conference (1978). Our figures are consistent with other sources that are
optimistic about nuclear energy. Nevertheless, our trajectory is a pure con-
struct, whose purpose is simply to provide a framework for considering
reactor strategies and uranium requirements under conditions of high de-
mand for nuclear power.
From this basis, we observed that if the world continues to rely on current
designs of LWRs with their once-through fuel cycle,d by the year 2030 even
our expanded estimate of uranium resources (of 24.5 million tons) would be
CJ 7 TWyr/yr correspond to 10 TW(e) installed electrical capacity assuming, first, that by 2030
most reactors would show advanced thermal performance with some 40 percent efficiency of heat to
electricity conversion and, second, that the capacity factor for the whole nuclear system is about two
thirds.
dA once-through fuel cycle is one in which the fuel is only partially burned and then totally
discarded.
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Table 4-3. Trajectories for potential nuclear power installations worldwide
(in GW(e))
Year
7980 7990 2000 2070
IIASA high-nuclear reference trajectorya 160 580 1630 3640
Annual addition b 24 64 154 305
Annual growth rate (%)c 15 11 9 8
Nuclear capacity, INFCE hign 188 698 1654
Nuclear capacity, IN FCE low 167 531 1082
Nuclear capacity, IAEA high 207 909 2227
Nuclear capacity, IAEA low 162 558 1403
Nuclear capacity, WEC 152d 521 d 1543
2020 2030
7030 10,000
359 252
4 1
5033
aEquivalent electrical capacity, not necessarily for distribution on electrical grids.
blncludes replacement after 30 years of service.
c Net growth rate, after deduction of replacements.
d Interpolated by IIASA.
Sources: Data for the IAEA figures are from Laneetal. (1977); WEC (1978);and INFCE (1979).
used up. A simple calculation serves to illustrate this point: Currently about
130 tons of natural uranium are needed annually to fuel 1 GW(e) of installed
LWR capacity, implying that for 10 TW(e) of installed capacity in 2030
about 1. 3 million tons of uranium would be required in that one year alone.
Clearly, action must be taken before 2030-and preferably earlier-if our
nuclear trajectory is to be more than an episode of resource consumption
and depletion.
Basically, there are three ways of continuing the nuclear option according
to our trajectory: (l) to exploit more dilute sources of uranium than are
currently used, (2) to rely on more efficient advanced reactors and fuel
cycles, or (3) to adopt a strategy for providing practically unlimited amounts
of energy by means of breeder reactors. We looked into all three of these
alternatives and report on our findings in turn.
Mining Yellow Coal
Our figure of orientation-24.5 million tons of natural uranium-is an ex-
trapolation of the amount of relatively high grade uranium that might ulti-
mately be found-that is, ores with a uranium concentration of 2000 parts
per million (ppm) (0.2 percent) down to perhaps 500 ppm. There has been
very little discovery of intermediate concentrations (between 300 to 500
ppm) of uranium, but it is known that the quantity of uranium with average
concentrations of about 70 ppm, and especially of shales containing uranium
concentrations of between 30 to 300 ppm, is vast. Unfortunately, the prob-
lems of recovery are at least as forbidding as the quantity is attractive. The
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foreward cost would surge from some $130 per kg of uranium to at least
several hundred dollars per kg of recovered uranium. The switch from 2000
ppm uranium to 70 ppm uranium would have more than just price implica-
tions. The requisite mining operation would be very large, as the following
example best illustrates.
Earlier we observed that 1 gram of fissionable material (in this case 235 U)
yields three million times more energy than 1 gram of carbon. But mining
dilute uranium resources of about 70 ppm concentration would imply that
1 gram of mined material would yield about the same amount of energy
as 1 gram of carbon. One gram of 70 ppm uranium ore contains 7 X 10-5
grams of natural uranium. Recall, too, that natural uranium contains 0.7 per-
cent fissionable atoms (235 U) and 99.3 percent fertile atoms (238 U). But not
all of the 0.7 percent can actually be used in a reactor because of losses in
the enrichment plant tailse and because of incomplete burning in the re-
actors-some 0.5 percent (5 X 10-3 ) is actually used. Multiplying all of these
factors-3 X 106 • 7 X 10-5 • 5 X 10-3 ~ I-we observe that theuseof70
ppm grade ores in LWRs with once-through cycles would mean a return to
a scale of operation equivalent to mining coal or, as we refer to it, to mining
"yellow coal."
We also examined the environmental implications of relying on LWRs of
current design, and refer here to the concept of WELMM (Water, Energy,
Land, Materials, and Manpower) requirements discussed later in Chapter 7.
Table 4-4 illustrates some results for an installed generating capacity of
1 GW(e) over a 30-year lifespan for two types of LWR operations-one using
2000 ppm ores and the other 70 ppm ores. The results of a third type of
operation considered-coal mining-are also given for comparison.
Obviously, in terms of land use, manpower, and materials handling and
the related societal and environmental implications, the 70 ppm LWR opera-
tion approaches that of coal. Putting aside the problem of carbon dioxide
emissions resulting from coal use (see Chapter 7), we find that the 70 ppm
LWR operation is, in fact, more difficult. That is, almost all of the material
extracted from the ground becomes solid waste, whereas in the case of coal,
roughly one-half of the extracted material is overburden.
The data of Table 4-4 were applied to our reference case of 10 TW(e) of
installed nuclear capacity. We present some of the results of this exercise in
order to indicate the very large scale of operation that would be involved.
If this capacity were supported by uranium extracted from shales-that is,
from "yellow coal"-an area of 330,000 km 2 -comparatively speaking, the
land size of Italy-would have to be mined over a period of 30 years. This
would call for the use of some 1100 of the largest bucket-wheel excavators
that are currently used in open pit mining-a large operation, but not physi-
cally impossible.
We also analyzed two possibilities for extracting uranium with even lower
concentrations than those of shales-for example, granite rock with a uranium
eWhen 235 U is separated from natural uranium, not all 0.7 percent 235 U of it can be recovered. The
amount left in the depleted natural uranium is what is known as enrichment plant tail losses.
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Table 4-4. Requirements for the operation of a 1 GW(e) power plane
LWR (2000-ppm ore)
Coal
LWR (lO-ppm ore)
Land
30- Year Total
(km 2 )
3
10-20
33
Mining
Personnel
(person yr/yrjb
50
500
300
Material Handling
Involved
30- Year Total
(70 6 tons)
aCorresponds to an electricity chain producing 6.1 TWh/yr with a 30-year lifespan.
bperson year = 2000 hours.
cOverburden factor: 15 m 3 per ton (averaged).
dOverburden factor: 3 m 3 per ton (averaged).
content of about 3 ppm and uranium from the sea with about 0.0015 grams
of uranium per cubic meter. Although these resources from the sea are
enormous-estimated at about 5 billion tons (Weast 1974)-extracting
the 1.3 million tons of natural uranium needed annually to fuel our refer-
ence trajectory would call for the processing of some 870,000 km 3 of sea
water annually. This is more than twenty times the annual water flow to the
sea of all of the world's rivers-an enormous operation that is only con-
ceptually possible.
Thus, in extracting more dilute uranium resources-or, in our terms, min-
ing "yellow coal"-we are faced with the old problems of large-scale mining
and the new problems of solid waste, including both residues from rock mill-
ing and radioactive wastes.
More Efficient Reactors and Fuel Cycles
The use of advanced converter reactors, together with the recycling of spent
fuel after reprocessing, could stretch out the lifetime of natural uranium
resources. In sum, given the reprocessing of spent fuel and only the re-
cycling of uranium, the demand for "virgin" uranium could be reduced
by about 20 p:ercent. Additionally, the recycling of plutonium from spent
fuel (that is, 39 Pu, a conversion product of fertile 238 V) could reduce this
demand another 15 percent. (Such recycling could be achieved with LWRs
of current design.) Additional savings would be possible by using fuel cycle
designs that include thorium e32 Th) and its fissile conversion product, 233 V.
Then too, more fissile 235 V could be extracted from natural uranium by
lowering enrichment plant tail losses, although this would require an increase
in enrichment capabilities and therefore costs. Nevertheless, by going to en-
richment schemes that produce uranium tails more depleted than 0.15 per-
cent 235 V, more of the original 0.7 percent 235 V content of natural uranium
could be separated and made available for use in reactors, which would re-
sult in additional savings of up to 15 percent. All in all, it is conceptually
possible to run a LWR system, with reprocessing, using 239 Pu and 233 V and
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more 235 U separative work, which would require about half as much natural
uranium as does the existing LWR system.
Here we recall a salient point: The continued use of LWRs of once-
through fuel cycle design would use up the world's high grade natural
uranium resources during the build up phase of our reference trajectory-or
more precisely, some 2.5 million tons of natural uranium would be required
by the year 2000, and a total of 24.5 million tons by the year 2030. But,
by adopting more efficient reactors and fuel cycles as just described no later
than the year 2000, only some 15 million tons of virgin natural uranium
would be used by 2030. This is still not far below what might be ultimately
available, but perhaps buys us some time.
How much time? We recall two numbers. First, if we consider our ex-
panded estimate of natural uranium, we see that with advanced converters
about 9.5 million tons would still be available by 2030. Second, 10 TW(e)
of installed capacity by 2030 under the conditions of our reference case
would require about 1.3 million tons of natural uranium annually, while
with advanced converters the annual requirements would be reduced to 0.65
million tons. In brief, by using advanced converters we would be able to
stretch out the life of high grade uranium resources by less than 15 years
before we would be forced into mining yellow coal. One can play with the
numbers, but the fact remains that burning only fissile atoms makes nuclear
power a short affair when viewed in the global context considered here.
The Asymptotic Solution: The Breeder
We have just described how we could stretch the lifetime of the world's
high grade natural uranium resources. But some time in the twenty-first
century, if not by 2030, supply will run out, and there would be basically
only two choices-mining yellow coal or breeder reactors.
The use of LWRs with their once-through fuel cycle require about 0.5
percent of the mined natural uranium. The use of LWRs, along with re-
cycling of fissionable material after reprocessing and in conjunction with
lower 235 U tails, effectively requires about 1 percent, and the use of ad-
vanced converters requires at best 5 percent of the uranium mined. But
breeders, by relying on a stockpile of fissile atoms as catalysts for burning
fertile atoms, could use most of the energy of natural uranium and, with
proper design, also thorium. In other words, even if the 24.5 million tons of
natural uranium were used by 2030 in LWRs of current design to build up
our reference case, some 24.3 million tons of depleted natural uranium
(mostly 238 U) would still be left over, in addition to the thorium, and could
be made available for burning in breeders. This "reserve" translates into
6~,~00 TWyr of energy and would eliminate any need for further uranium
mmmg.
Thus, the deployment of breeder reactors is essential if nuclear power is to
achieve its real potential. When viewed from a sufficiently long-term perspec-
tive, this enormous resource saving would justify investment costs for
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breeder reactors, with their associated fuel cycle, that are higher than those
costs associated with cheaper burner reactors. Taking the argument one step
further, because breeders utilize natural uranium much better than burners,
the very low grade uranium ores of only a few parts per million would be-
come economic if used in breeders, increasing the resource potential of
breeders to some 300,000 TWyr, which is equivalent to the potential of
fusion reactors.
The transition to the system of using breeder reactors will have to take
place gradually over a long period. Indeed, time for building up the system
is a major constraint. We therefore examined two possible strategies for
moving from present reactor systems consisting of burners and a few
breeders to reactor configurations of 10 TW(e) of installed capacity that,
because of a sufficient number of breeder reactors, would create no further
demands on natural uranium resources. Because of this characteristic we
have labeled these "asymptotic strategies"; specifically these are the classical
reactor strategy, and the converter-breeder strategy. We will examine the
features of each briefly, in turn. Basically both strategies rely on the follow-
ing principle: Fissile plutonium converted from fertile 238 U in burner re-
actors is not recycled but is used to install the breeders, leading gradually
to the buildup of breeders.
It is standard practice to consider a combination of LWRs and breeders
that would lead eventually to the elimination of LWRs. Accordingly we call
this possibility the classical reactor strategy. In this strategy, about 13.6
million tons of natural uranium would be used by 2030, and by 2040 cumu-
lative demand of some 15 million tons would be reached for the buildup of
our reference case, with no additional requirements. Thereafter, the system
would be practically self-sufficient, using only the accumulated stockpiles
of depleted natural uranium left over from the buildup phase of the system.
In this way it would be independent of external sources of fissile materials
and, because of a net production of fissile materials, would also be self-
multiplying at a rate of a few percent per year.
The disadvantage of the classical reactor strategy is as follows. It would
require that prior to the year 2000 breeders be installed quickly to properly
complement the less efficient burners. For this to occur there would have
to already have been, worldwide, fast breeder programs comparable to that
of the French. This has not been the case.
To compensate for this an alternative strategy is needed, which we labeled
the converter-breeder strategy. The essence of this strategy is to enhance the
efficiency of the burners, effectively making them advanced converters, by
fueling them with 233 U in place of 235 U. The beauty of this scheme is that
the fast breeder reactors (FBRs) being introduced can produce the necessary
233 U.
For the converter-breeder strategy we assumed improved breeding ratios
on the order of 1.3 (through proper design measures that would, for exam-
ple, increase the share of fuel within the core volume) and good conversion
in advanced converters (that would improve current values of 0.55 to 0.9
by 2030). It would then be possible to achieve 10 TW(e) of installed ca-
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pacity by 2030 by means of 40 percent FBRs and 60 percent advanced
converters.
In the converter-breeder system, the converter reactors are fueled initially
by enriched natural uranium. The spent fuel is reprocessed, fissile uranium is
recycled, and plutonium is used to install FBRs.
Gradually, the capacity of FB Rs becomes large enough to convert the
thorium to 233 U in the radial blankets in sufficient amounts, which is then
used in the converters in place of enriched uranium thereby making them
advanced converters. The requirements for enriched uranium would there-
fore be reduced and ultimately eliminated. In sum, cumulative natural
uranium requirements would total only about 15 million tons before the
state of self-sufficiency is reached. Shortly after 2030, the system would be
a net producer of fissile materials in excess of the 233 U needed to fuel all
of the advanced converters, which would therefore still permit a certain
self-multiplication.
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND
ITS RELATED FACILITIES
Among the systems questions that have to be considered for 10 TW(e) of
installed capacity by 2030 is that of the nuclear fuel cycle-specifically, what
is the number of related facilities and how much material is processed by
these facilities. To evaluate these features we considered a converter-breeder
strategy at the stage of self-sufficiency as just described.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the flow of fissile materials, inputs of fertile uranium
e38 U) and thorium e32 Th), losses, and wastes for a system with an installed
capacity of 10 TW(e) in which the converter is assumed to be the thorium-
fueled high temperature reactor (HTR) and the breeder is the liquid metal
fast breeder reactor (LMFBR).
Altogether, less than 8500 tons per year of both fertile uranium and
thorium provide for the generation of 17 TWyr/yr of primary energy. As-
suming that about 15 million tons of natural uranium were used to achieve
the asymptotic self-sufficiency of this system, the reserves accumulated by
2030 of depleted fertile uranium could fuel the system for some 4500 years.
Further, only about 4600 tons of thorium would be needed per year. Again,
this is a negligible amount and requires only a minor mining effort. To put
this number in perspective, providing 17 TWyr/yr from coal would require
an annual input of 18.3 billion tons (four million times more material input).
The annual production of fission products is about 660 tons; in solidified
form this is a cube of 20 X 20 X 20 m. The share of discarded heavy ele-
ments in waste is about 1500 tons per year. From this amount, some 144
tons per year (or 1.7 percent of total waste) are 233U, 239pU, and higher
actinides, all of which are of potentially long-term concern. In the case of
coal, the analogue would be some 60 billion tons of carbon dioxide emis-
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Figure 4-1. Annual throughputs and losses (in tons) for a 17 TWyr/yr, FBR-HTR
operation. Only closed balances for Pu, U3 , and total (U 8 and thorium) are shown. The
6 ton mass defect associated with 17 TWyr/yr is not accounted for.
Power Power
4459 tons Pu
4416 tons Pu
1733 tons U3
1037 tons U3
3605 tons U8
Reprocessing
Refabrication
6634 tons
Fission products
715tonsU 3
4565 tons Th
43 tons Pu
19 tons U3
82 tons actinides
130 tons Pa & NP
494 tons U8
768 tons Th
1536 tons losses to waste
sions per year (equivalent to adding each year about 3.5 percent of the cur-
rent carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere), plus about 1.6 billion tons
of ashes and, if only high quality coal is burned, about 0.4 billion tons of
sulfur emissions per year. The annual flow of fissile uranium and plutonium
in this reactor configuration is about 6200 tons.
The number of nuclear facilities in the fuel cycle capable of handling these
fissile products is given in the accompanying boxed material. In view of ex-
tremely low maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs), tight confine-
ments are necessary for processing these materials.
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Total Number of Nuclear Facilities
A fuel cycle operation of 17 TWyr/yr from an installed generating
capacity of 10 TW(e) would require the following nuclear facilities:
• 10,000 nuclear reactors, each of an equivalent of 1 GW(e), or 3000
reactors of 3.3 GW(e) rating each. The present number of electrical
power stations, nuclear or nonnuclear, worldwide is of the order of
15,000.
• 94 fuel fabrication plants capable of handling 1500 tons per year.
• 94 chemical reprocessing plants capable of handling 1500 tons per
year.
• 650 intermediate (5-year) waste-storage facilities (tanks) of 1000
m3 . Seven such facilities would go with each reprocessing facility.
• 47 final waste storage facilities, one for every two reprocessing
plants, for example. The inventory of radioactivity practically
saturates after 20 years of input. Each final waste storage facility
therefore contains, under equilibrium conditions, the equivalent of
20 years multiplied by 6634 tons per year for the total of the 47
facilities-that is, 2823 tons per facility of stored fresh fission
products equivalent.
CONFINEMEI\lT REQUIREMENTS AND SAFETY
Nuclear power by its very nature is connected with radioactivity, and the
confinement of radioactivity is a necessary corollary to nuclear energy
providing virtually unlimited amounts of electricity and heat. The considera-
tion of confinement measures necessarily begins with the inventory of radio-
isotopes in reactors and other nuclear facilities. Under normal operating
conditions, this inventory can physically leave a facility only at a certain
rate. The ratio between the annual flow of a radioactive isotope in question
through a given facility and the related annual release of that radioisotope is
called the confinement factor (CF). In most cases, the CF is a large number.
But the pathways of radioisotopes in the environment once they are released
must also be considered. Usually these pathways involve diluting released
radioisotopes in water or air before the points of biological impact are
reached.
However, the opposite could also be the case. The famous example is the
iodine-grass-cowmilk-baby chain, where the concentration of iodine is in-
creased such that the resultant danger could be enhanced by a factor of 700.
Finally, the radiobiological concentration levels are important. They relate
the ambient concentration to the doses and dose rates that actually cause
biological effects. Those dose levels that have acceptably trivial impacts are
NUCLEAR ENERGY: REALIZING THE POTENTIAL 59
called maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs). From them, one can
infer how large the appropriate CFs have to be.
It is useful to compare the dose rate (B) with the existing natural back-
ground dose rate Bo ; (for orientation Bo =:: 110 mrem per year). We used this
approach to evaluate the design requirements for CFs associated with the
large-scale development of the nuclear fuel cycle-in particular, for those
relevant to our reference trajectory leading to 10 TW(e) of installed capacity
by 2030. Table 4-5 reports the results for the most critical isotope releases,
giving the CF required for each isotope and facility to make each contribu-
tion to the relative dose rate (B/B o ) below 1 percent. For example, the CFs
of reprocessing plants for krypton (85 Kr) should be increased to 100, imply-
ing an improvement by a factor of 3 to 10 over the next decades. This is
within technical reach, but requires further development. Similarly, the CFs
associated with the release of most of the other critical isotopes from re-
processing plants into water or air need further improvement. Such improve-
ments appear to be within reach over our planning horizon of 50 years,
and we assumed that they would be achieved. In some cases, special sites
for nuclear facilities could even lead to some relaxation of confinement
requirements.
Radioactive iodine (129 I) is a special case since its half-life is some 17 mil-
lion years. Although releases are small, they are large enough to have an im-
pact. The average iodine content of biomass and water is about 0.3 ppm, so
that a CF for radioactive 129 I of 100 would lead, after a few decades, to a
saturation dose rate (B/B o ) level of 1 percent in the neighborhood of the
facilities in question, and this is the maximum limit considered in our study.
But even in the neighborhood of the facilities, it should not be a problem,
though it requires further study.
Our discussion of confinement measures can only indicate the order of
magnitude of the problem involved, though fortunately there is a vast litera-
ture on more specific evaluations. We conclude that 17 TWyrlyr of nuclear
power appears possible with respect to the necessary confinement measures.
These measures are not straightforward, but that is the price that must be
paid and that must be compared with alternatives.
Table 4-5. Required confinement factors for making each relative dose
rate contribution well below 1%
85 Kr
'H into air
'H into water
Pu into air
Pu into water
Actinides
129 I
Reactors
Present designs, slightly improved
Present designs
Present designs
Reprocessing
100
100
100
109
109
10 9
-10'
Fabrication
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In evaluating design targets for confinement measures in the previous
section, we considered not only normal conditions but also accidental re-
leases. Whereas for normal operating conditions the CFs were limited by the
target values for the relative increase in the dose rate (B/B o ), in the case of
accidental releases the probability of the release per unit time is the parame-
ter for which target values should be established. Our evaluation on this
basis showed both that reactors are not the most critical facilities for the
occurrence of accidental releases and that the intermediate and final storage
facilities had the smallest target values.
Because any such method deals with expectation values, a large number of
small accidents is mathematically equivalent to a small number of large acci-
dents. It is not clear whether such an equivalence accurately reflects how
people really view possible nuclear accidents. But these are subjects that are
more properly left to Chapter 7, where the various constraints limiting the
options are dealt with.
THE USES OF NUCLEAR POWER
Up to now, nuclear power has been employed principally as a source of
large-scale, centralized electricity. Yet once breeding is established, the
practically infinite resource of nuclear energy will be realized, offering the
possibility of more widespread uses. Some, such as propulsion of naval ves-
sels, in particular submarines, and as power sources for remote bases in
Greenland and Antarctica, are already in use. Others have been suggested-in
space or the deep oceans, for factory ships and floating cities, for district
and chemical heat. We reconsider briefly three important specific characteris-
tics of nuclear energy that suggest such smaller applications in the future:
• Nuclear fuel is extremely compact and can therefore be easily stored and
transported.
• "Burning" nuclear fuel (the chain reaction) requires no air and consumes
nothing that must be supplied by the environment.
• Fission energy is of such high quality that the potential exists for gener-
ating very high temperature heat.
Nuclear electricity is generally associated with very large units of 1 GW(e)
capacity or more. The trend to even larger units is continuing and will proba-
bly evolve to the point of eventually aggregating power plants and other
associated facilities into "energy parks." But at the same time it may turn
out that one important aspect of nuclear power will be the location of
smaller plants at appropriate nodes in order to improve the reliability of elec-
trical grids. At the cost of economies of scale of large plants, smaller ones
could be more readily "over-engineered." Decreased transmission costs and
high grid reliability could perhaps make the final difference.
As soon as we consider smaller nuclear plants, many new applications be-
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come possible. Most of the low to medium grade heat in the output range of
20 megawatts or less is now supplied by oil and natural gas. Small nuclear
plants could substitute in this market effectively, especially in conjunction
with cogeneration of electricity. The cogeneration schemes are also very
attractive for district heating systems. For such purposes, small LWRs seem
to be appropriate. Finally, even by-products of nuclear power, such as iso-
topic heat sources, could be used for these low temperature applications.
Again, nuclear power is suited for propulsion of naval vessels. It takes very
little imagination to consider unconventional nuclear vessels such as sub-
marine cargo ships capable of mastering the Northwest Passage under the
Arctic. Concentrated reactor fuel could be used for hauling a string of barges,
perhaps DRACONE type plastic cargo carriers. This group of applications,
ranging from mundane cargo hauling to even planetary exploration, would
require special purpose reactors with particular design requirements.
Still, given all the listed opportunities, the large-scale generation of elec-
tricity and heat for chemical processes will probably still be the principal
use of nuclear power. In our reference trajectory to an asymptotically self-
sufficient nuclear system, the installed capacity that could be assigned to
electricity generation is enough to supply all the electricity needs of the high
energy demand scenario described in Chapter 8. Since electricity would
also be generated by other means by 2030 (e.g., solar, hydropower, renew-
abIes) a considerable surplus of both electricity and high temperature heat
exists in this hypothetical self-sufficient nuclear system, which offers yet
another potential opportunity for nuclear power application.
As our scenarios indicate (see Chapter 8), the major energy sources pro-
duce electricity and heat, while the looming shortages in the world are as-
sociated with liquid fuels. The persistent need for liquid fuels is basically
caused by the difficulties of transporting electricity over long distances
(losses and costs) and the high costs of electricity storage. For these reasons,
today the average electrical kilowatt-hour travels no more than 100 km be-
fore it is consumed.
Later, in Chapter lOwe take up the possibility of a hydrogen-electricity
world that could meet the energy requirements of the globe, say, within
100 years. Here, we observe briefly that hydrogen would be an ideal partner
to electricity in the future; it is a gaseous fuel that can be transported,
stored, and used in the synthesis of liquid fuels. Both electricity and hydro-
gen are clean energy carriers. Essentially hydrogen leaves water as a com-
bustion product, with some nitric oxides in the ppm range. Nevertheless,
the use of hydrogen would necessitate a significant adaptation of the existing
energy distribution and end use infrastructure. This problem of hydrogen
use could be overcome through the synthesis of liquid energy carriers, par-
ticularly methanol. Roughly 50 percent of methanol's energy content is due
to the carbon atom (that could come from coal or perhaps from atmos-
pheric CO2 ) while the remaining percentage is due to two of its four hydro-
gen atoms. Nuclear energy could provide both the required process heat and
the hydrogen. The most straightforward route to hydrogen is electrolysis,
while alternative routes make use of high temperature heat.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The real potential of nuclear energy would be realized not only through the
production of several terawatts of electric power, but also through the pro-
duction of hydrogen and other energy carriers at similar rates. In the long
run one can expect very large amounts of nuclear power. 17 TWyr/yr of
thermal power, which is equivalent to a capacity of 10 TW(e), appear as
an upper limit for the year 2030.
To exploit successfully this potential involves both the timely introduc-
tion of breeders and the use of a substantial part of our high quality natural
uranium resource. With fission breeders, the uranium used is in effect not
consumed, but invested in building a system where energy supply is not
constrained by resources limitations. Such a mode of resource use we labeled
"investive," a concept we elaborate on later in Chapter 10. Once installed,
such a system could provide steadily increasing amounts of energy for mil-
lennia. Its essence would be the use of breeding, whether fission or fusion.
And it would provide the return on the original investment of our natural
uranium resources-a continuous provision of energy.
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5 SOLAR ENERGY: BIG INVESTMENTSFOR LARGE-SCALE USE
Each day the earth receives from the sun one hundred thousand times more
energy than is produced in all of the world's electricity-generating plants.
The average power input from the sun is some 178,000 TWyr/yr of thermal
energy. Can the sun provide all the energy required for a growing world?
The answer lies in finding ways to tap even small portions of this flow of
natural energy.
In assessing the supply potential of solar power, we distinguish between
soft and hard solar energy systems. Soft solar generally comprises small, local
uses of both direct and indirecta solar energy for generating domestic hot
water and comfort heating. Hard solar implies the use of solar energy on a
large, centralized scale, as, for example, in solar power plants that thermo-
dynamically convert steam into electricity and in photovoltaic (PV) systems
that make use of solar cells to generate electricity.
Solar power can be both locally and globally significant. In ChapteI; 6 we
examine the potential contribution of local, soft solar energy when we con-
aThe labels "direct" and "indirect" are used to distinguish solar radiation that arrives at the point
of collection directly from the sun, from radiation that reaches the point of collection only indirectly.
Indirect radiation, which is also called "diffuse" radiation, includes radiation reaching the point of
collection after having bounced off the ground, off various objects, or off water droplets in clouds. The
distinction is particularly important when considering solar technologies that rely on mirrors to con-
centrate radiation onto an absorber. Radiation arriving at a mirror from a direction other than that of
the sun will not be reflected onto the absorber but will be bounced off in some other direction
entirely.
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sider the renewable energy sources, most of which come ultimately from
solar power. Soft solar, while important on the local level, will probably
contribute no more than a few terawatts of energy, which for a high-energy-
consuming world of, say, 36 TWyr/yr, is small.
But hard solar is definitely in the realm of the potentially large contribu-
tors. It is not an exaggeration to assert that sunlight-that is, hard, centralized
solar power-could eventually be the primary energy source and, concep-
tually, even the only source of heat, electricity, and synthetic liquid and
gaseous fuels for the entire world, continuously and indefinitely, on a scale
similar to the potential of fusion and of fission via the breeder reactor. This
could be achieved through a global network of solar conversion facilities that
would be coupled with energy transport and storage systems. All this appears
feasible within acceptable constraints on energy payback time, capital in-
vestment, and available suitable land.
The sociopolitical consequences of global solar are likely to be the most
far reaching. While the breeder reactor, in principle, permits countries to
eventually achieve complete energy independence, running the world from
sunlight would require extensive, unprecedented international cooperation.
The average annual distribution of solar radiation and the location of po-
tential solar sites are shown in Figure 5-1; Table 5-1 summarizes the basic
characteristics of solar radiation as an energy source. The solar insolation in
the sunny arid areas near the equator is three times higher than that in less
sunny areas farther north. Whereas seasonal variations in the amount of radi-
ation are only a factor of two in equatorial regions, solar radiation in north-
ern Europe during winter months is only one-tenth of what it is in summer
months. Extremes in the availability of direct beam radiation are even more
severe. In areas such as the United Kingdom and central and northern
Europe, where as much as 85 percent of total irradiation in winter months
is received as diffuse radiation, the use of tracking mirrors or of tilted solar
collectors cannot compensate completely for seasonal variations in sunlight.
Table 5-1. Characteristics of solar radiation as an energy resou rce.
The solar constant
Effective radiation temperature of the sun
Maximum direct beam irradiation at sea level
Region, Irradiance
Tropic, deserts
Temperature zones
Less sunny regions (e.g., northern Europe)
Average annual direct beam irradiance in
sunny regions
Monthly average direct beam radiation in
sunny, arid regions
Source: Weingart (1978).
1353W/m'
5760 K
-1000 W/m'
kWh/m'-Day
Annual 5-6
average 3-5
horizontal 2-3
7-8
5-10
W/m' (Average)
210-250
130-210
80-130
290-330
210-420
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SOLAR TECHNOLOGIES: ON THE
EDGE OF BREAKTHROUGHS
The dangers of speculating about the global potential of solar energy are
even larger than they are for other global supply options. The development
of most of the potentially important solar technologies is just beginning,
with current emphasis only on hard, complex, and perhaps inelegant tech-
nologies that are closely patterned after known industrial and engineering
capacities.
There is a large probability that research will open up totally new path-
ways for converting solar energy into electricity and into other secondary
energy forms (such as hydrogen) so crucial to meeting the world's energy
needs of the future. In fact, the large-scale use of sunlight could be achieved
with technologies that are not yet available or perhaps not even known.
What is feasible always depends upon the frame of reference, and given
the complexity and urgency of the energy problem, it seems likely that some
of these technological advances will probably appear within our fifty year
time horizon. It is from this perspective that we consider these in turn, ex-
amining their requirements and how the challenge of exploiting them fully
might best be met.
Solar Power Plants: A
System of Agriculture
One method for generating large amounts of high quality energy from solar
power is to use power plants that convert the energy from the sun into elec-
tricity. One of the most promising methods, but one that is not without its
technological problems, is solar thermal electric conversion (STEC). The
challenge is to be able to concentrate enough direct solar beam radiation
to produce temperatures as high as, say, 600°C. Figure 5-2 illustrates a
specific configuration in which thousands of suntracking mirrors, so-called
heliostats, are located on the earth's surface in order to focus the solar
energy on a boiler situated atop a 100 to 250 meter power tower. The
boiler, in turn, produces the superheated steam or hot gases that drive
either a conventional steam cycle or a high temperature cycle that then
generates electricity.
Figuratively speaking, the STEC process might be regarded as a form
of agriculture-the "fields" in this instance being the extensive arrays of
heliostats. The provision of 100 megawatts electric (MW(e)) of installed
capacity, which is less than one-tenth of the capacity of a modern-day
nuclear reactor, would require thousands of heliostats providing a mirror
surface area of approximately 0.9 km2 or, equivalently, about 3.8 km 2
of total land area. For these calculations we assume both an average insola-
tion of 500 watts per square meter (W/m 2 ), which is the maximum value
possible in sunny arid areas, and a 15 to 25 percent efficiency in convert-
ing direct beam solar radiation into electricity. The efficiency is relatively
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low, owing partly to losses incurred as the incident radiant energy is trans-
ferred via the mirror surfaces to the absorbers and converted to electricity
and partly to the energy required to power the mirror tracking system.
Although STEC systems can function only when there is direct radiation
and are therefore sensitive to daily, weekly, and seasonal changes in the
amount of such direct sunshine, efforts have intensified since the oil crisis
of 1973 to make STEC systems commercially successful. A large number
of thermal cycles, spanning a range of a few kilowatts of installed electrical
energy to a few hundred megawatts of such energy, are being developed. The
United States, Japan, and Europe are constructing prototype plants that are
expected to be operational within the next decade. Fully commercial STEC
systems may be available in the 1990s.
Published cost estimates for central receiver STEC plants operating under
optimum meteorological conditions indicate that currently they are much
higher than those for more traditional fossil and nuclear power plants. The
high costs of STEC material requirements are the major constraint. However,
the mass production of heliostats-say, at a level of 250,000 per year-that
could be forthcoming in the next few decades could reduce their costs con-
siderably to about $60 per m 2 of reflecting area (McDonnell Douglas 1976).
This is, of course, an aggregate figure that may differ according to local
conditions.
Based on recent cost estimates (Weingart 1978; see also Black and Veatch
1976; Blake, Walton et al. 1975; Blake et al. 1976; McDonnell Douglas 1973,
1974; Selcuk 1975; Smith 1976), the levelized busbar cost of electricity in
sunny arid areas would be in the range of 50 to 100 mills per kilowatt hour
of electrical energy (mills/kWh(e)). For orientation, 1 mill equals $0.001. In
less sunny regions such as central and northern Europe, the cost would be be-
tween 200 and 300 mills/kWh(e). The difference in these two ranges leads
to a consideration of systems for producing electricity from STEC plants
situated in lower latitudes and transporting it to less favorably located con-
sumption centers. Estimates of the cost of long distance, high voltage DC
transmission-say, from Spain to Oslo or from Phoenix to Boston--are on the
order of 10 mills/kWh(e) (Caputo and Truscello 1976). The indication is that
such systems-for example, using large areas of Spain and Portugal, Turkey,
sou them Yugoslavia, and southeast Bulgaria to produce electricity to be con-
sumed in central and northern Europe-might be less expensive than on site
electricity generation in the central and northern European regions.
STEC systems are really an attempt to imitate with concentrated sunlight
what we do today with coal, oil, gas, or nuclear reactors-namely, to produce
steam for running turbine generators. Thus, the development of such systems
should, in principle, not be a problem. Yet these cumbersome machines,
sophisticated thermal absorbers, heat transport and storage units, turbines,
generators, cooling towers, and vast land areas may turn out to be museum
pieces by the end of this century. The combustion of fossil fuels is probably
not the ideal model for the design of large solar power plants. Rather, the
best techniques will probably be either those that use the high inherent
energy content of the visible light photons or those that bypass the complex
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thermal mechanical systems, or both. Among such candidates the most
promising are PV systems.
Solar Cells: An Elegant Solution
The use of large, central station PV systems that make use of solar cells to
convert solar energy directly into electricity has several advantages com-
pared to STEC systems. First, PV systems do not require large sections of
land to generate an installed capacity of 100 MW(e) and can, in fact, operate
on "bits and pieces" of land. This makes them especially attractive for
countries in middle latitude regions, as, for example, Western Europe and
northern parts of the United States, where barren land is generally available
only on a small, scattered basis. A second advantage of PV systems is that
they function with both diffuse and direct solar radiation, allowing them to
be used even in areas where cloudiness is a predominant meteorological
feature. Moreover, PV systems operate without moving parts, have potential
lifetimes much longer than those of existing commercial power plants, and
exhibit efficiencies of up to 20 percent.
The use of PV systems can, in particular, be viewed from the perspective
of the "investive use of resources," a concept we mentioned earlier in Chap-
ter 4 and which we elaborate on later in Chapter 10. The lifetime of a PV
system is long-much longer than the thirty years generally attributed to
today's nuclear reactors. And, once the initial investment has been made in
the PV system-specifically, for the cells and for other plant materials-
sufficient energy would be generated on a continuous and inexhaustible basis
to provide the desired services from energy. No further investments, whether
physical or human resources, would be required other than for a minimum
of maintenance.
The large-scale use of PV systems, like that of STEC systems, is currently
being hampered by the high capital costs of setting up these systems. Here
too, we expect technological progress to improve the situation. There ap-
pears to be no shortage of candidates-single crystal silicon cells, amorphous
silicon, gallium arsenide, thermophotovoltaic designs, vertical multijunction
silicon, polycrystalline silicon, cadmium sulfide-copper sulfide. At present
the single crystal silicon cell is the most developed, primarily as a result of
its use in communication satellites and spacecraft. The current cost of using
these cells for the U.S. space program is high (about $10 per peak watt), and
if they are to be used economically on the earth's surface, the cost would
have to come down to about $0.50 per peak watt, based on a maximum
insolation of 1 kW/m 2 . Again, provided the problems hindering mass produc-
tion can be overcome, such cost reductions will probably be realized.
Solar Satellite Power Station
Beyond what can be accomplished through technological improvements in
the cells themselves, the potential of PV systems gains a new dimension if we
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consider locating them outside the filtering effects of the earth's atmosphere.
The concept of the solar satellite power station (SSPS) in geostationary orbit
originated with Peter Glaser of the Arthur D. Little Company in the United
States and has since been expanded by scientists at the Argonne National
Laboratory of the University of Chicago, working under a grant from the
U.S. Department of Energy.
In the scheme pictured in Figure 5-3, a receiver panel (5 by 5 miles) would
intercept 85 GW of radiant solar power in a geostationary orbit some 22,300
miles above the equator. Solar cells operating at 18 percent efficiency would
convert this power into 15 GW(e) of power that would be converted into
high frequency microwave beams to be transmitted to earth and reconverted
by an antenna into some 10 GW(e) of power. This would be enough to meet
the electricity needs of New York City. The receiving antenna would be
about 36 square miles-about five to ten times the area needed presently for
a coal-fired power plant of the same electrical capacity and about thirty
times the area of an equal capacity light water nuclear reactor of today's
design.
Often one hears arguments that this scheme is too futuristic and inher-
ently too capital intensive to become a near-term reality. But our goal here
is to explore the realm of the possible. Given the latest developments in
space shuttle technology, the required advances in SSPS technology are not
necessarily more difficult to achieve than the widely expected breakthroughs
in PV systems. Moreover, the SSPS scheme has an inherent capital cost
bonus. For terrestrial STEC systems, the cost per kW( e) of installed baseload
capacity is approximately four times the cost per peak kW(e); the inclusion
of storage costs for these STEC systems would increase this factor even
further. For the SSPS system, the costs are equal: The sun always shines in
space.
Biotechnology
A radical new approach to solar energy may come not from the old mecha-
nistic approaches but from biotechnology-a broad class of systems that
have at their core photosynthetic and biological energy conversion processes.
For example, the development of high efficiency plants that are cloned and
raised for feedstock for fuels and chemicals would represent a new level of
industrialization of biomass systems. Other biotechnologies would combine
biological processes into a mechanical matrix to convert sunlight and water
into hydrogen and oxygen. We found these possibilities intriguing and ex-
plored them with interest.
Plants have long "known" how to use the energy of sunlight to split
water, but they do not evolve hydrogen explicitly, since it is needed only
for internal energetic processes within the plant itself as a means for reducing
carbon dioxide. However, it may be possible to develop new biological
structures that in fact evolve hydrogen. At IIASA, Cesare Marchetti con-
sidered the concept of hydrogen-producing trees (see Figure 5-4).
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Figure 5-3. Solar satellite power station. Source: Summers (1971).
Receilling Antenna (6 X 6 miles)
Solar Collector (5 X 5 milesl
Microwalle Antenna
(1 X 1 milel
Control Station
Waste Heat Radiator
Cooling Equipment
The concept is essentially one of replacing expensive solar collectors and
solar cells with tree leaves. Swollen plant tissues, so-called galls, located at
the tree trunk would be genetically programmed to use the solar energy
captured in the leaves for generating hydrogen gas as a by-product of photo-
synthesis. The hydrogen gas would be collected within the galls and piped
to a central storage system. The essential features of such a system already
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Figure 5-4. The hydrogen tree. Graphical presentation of the proposal with a very
schematic chem istry. The gall actuates a reverse of photosynthesis and makes hydrogen
(or methane) available in an enclosed cavity that can be tapped by a collector pipe.
THE HYDROGEN TREE
exist in nature: Many insects and bacteria induce the formation of galls in
different types of plants. These various kinds of galls, which number in the
tens of thousands, then provide the shelter or nutrients needed by the
organisms that caused them. In at least one case, that of Rhizobium bacteria
in symbiosis with leguminous plants, substantial hydrogen is produced in the
galls, though currently it simply escapes to the atmosphere. It has been esti-
mated that in this way U.S. soybean plantations leak about 30 billion m3 of
hydrogen annually (Brill 1977). Adapting this potential so that the plants
can be easily integrated with some sort of collection system will depend on
the techniques of genetic engineering. Given the advances in this field in the
last decade alone, the potential of biotechnology appears large. This only
underscores for the use of hydrogen what was said earlier for electricity-
that new approaches to production could be far more attractive both eco-
nomically and environmentally than current, more mechanistic approaches.
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ELECTRICITY, HYDROGEN, AND SOLAR POWER
For both STEC and PV solar power conversion systems, there is an inherent
problem of matching supply characteristics with those of demand both in
time and in location. For example, the vast amount of solar power available
in December in the sunny arid areas of the south is needed much less there
than it is for heating homes in the cloudy, cold areas of the north. But get-
ting the energy from the point of origin to that of final use and having it
available continuously to meet daily, weekly, or seasonal needs will require
large-scale energy transportation and storage techniques. Electricity is
not easily storable as such, and currently peak demand must be met with
capacity.
Thus, to consider PV, and particularly STEC, technologies only as they
might be used to supply electricity to a power grid is to immediately restrict
their potential. If one is willing to look a little further than the traditional
energy carriers with which we are so familiar (oil in tankers, coal carried by
trains, natural gas in pipelines, and electricity carried by high tension wires)
and to contemplate what might be available when large-scale solar facilities
come of age, the real extent of the large-scale solar potential becomes ap-
parent. Of particular interest is the possibility of using hydrogen gas as an
energy carrier in the future. Hydrogen is especially attractive in connection
with solar power because it is more easily transported over long distances
and more easily stored than electricity. Moreover, with the right scheme for
concentrating incoming sunlight, solar plants could attain the very high tem-
peratures (2500 to 3000°C) needed to produce hydrogen directly from
water.
Even if, for the moment, we restrict our attention to hydrogen generation
processes less dependent on such high temperatures (see the accompanying
boxed material for a brief description of the different ways in which hydro-
gen can be produced), it has been estimated that a commercially mature
system operating under ideal desert conditions might produce hydrogen for
approximately $50 per barrel of oil equivalent (boe) (Weingart 1978).
HYDROGEN PRODUCTION PROCESSES
The source of most of the hydrogen used today in the fertilizer in-
dustry, for example, or in oil refining is one or another of the fossil
fuels. But if hydrogen is to be used as an energy carrier on a scale com-
parable to electricity, a different primary source is needed. The obvi-
ous choice is water, which is simply a compound of hydrogen and oxy-
gen in a ratio of two parts to one (as encoded in the formula H2 0). The
problem of producing hydrogen from water is a problem of breaking
the bonds holding the hydrogen and oxygen together. This requires the
input of energy, and thus hydrogen production processes can be divided
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into four categories depending essentially on the form In which this
input energy is added.
Electrolysis (Electrical Splitting). Perhaps the most established tech-
niques of splitting water into its hydrogen and oxygen components are
based on the input of electrical energy. The first patent on water elec-
trolysis was awarded in 1888, and today research continues to reveal
promising opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the process.
Currently, most experience is with small units, and improvements will
be needed before electrolyzers in the thousands of megawatt range
become practical.
Thermolysis (Heat Splitting). Energy added to water in the form of
heat raises the temperature of the water and weakens the bond between
the hydrogen and oxygen. Once temperatures on the order of 2500-
3000°C are reached, the bond fails completely. Because of the high
temperatures needed for pure thermolysis, large-scale use of this tech-
nique is conjectured to be possible only in conjunction with highly
concentrated solar energy.
Thermochemical Water Splitting. This category might properly be
considered a subcategory of thermolysis. It refers to processes that
rely partly on the input of heat and pardy on the special properties of
certain chemical catalysts that allow heat energy to be added at tem-
peratures between 600 and 1000°C and applied to the problem of
breaking the hydrogen-oxygen bond. Thus, by carefully designing the
order in which heat is added and in which the critical chemical reac-
tions take place, it is possible to produce hydrogen at temperatures
well below those needed for pure thermolysis. The number of different
possible thermochemical schemes is theoretically in the tens of thou-
sands. So far only some twenty to thirty of these have been investigated
thoroughly, and this area is therefore seen as one with tremendous
potential for producing a hydrogen production process compatible with
the sorts of heat sources already commonly available.
Photolysis (Light Splitting). In addition to electrical energy and heat
energy, energy in the form of visible light might possibly be used to
split water. As is mentioned in the text, plants use this energy source
to power their internal chemical cycles, and it might even be possible
to exploit plants directly to provide some hydrogen that we can tap for
our own use. But beyond that, it is possible to design sequences of
chemical reactions that can make use of visible light energy absorbed
by "photocatalysts" in breaking the hydrogen-oxygen bond in water.
However, of the four categories described here, the photolytic pro-
posals are the least advanced.
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Furthermore, using available technology, a pipeline system could transport
this hydrogen from Turkey to Oslo or from New Mexico to Maine for about
$2/MWh (Beghi et al. 1972), suggesting again the advantages of locating large
solar facilities in the lower latitudes and then transporting the energy pro-
duced to where it is needed.
MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
(Design of a Global Solar System)
For sunlight to be a primary source of energy for the world, it will be neces-
sary to decouple this resource in time and in location from the patterns of
energy demand. This would require an integrated energy system for trans-
porting solar energy over long distances (say, of 10,000 km) and for storing
it for long periods. The requirements for such a global system or network of
systems would be extensive and technologically complex and would display
enormous regional variations in character and evolution. The features of this
global system are given in the accompanying boxed material.
As we have seen, the problems of interfacing hydrogen with solar energy
on a large scale might be resolved within a few decades. Likewise, transport-
ing either liquid hydrogen via tankers or hydrogen gas via pipelines does not
present insurmountable technical problems. Thus, the probable constraints
on the buildup and operation of such a global system are land requirements
and material requirements, mainly for steel and concrete. We examined
these requirements explicitly. In both instances we drew heavily on insights
Large-scale Features (as Discussed in this Chapter)
• Solar electric power plants of various sizes located throughout the
world primarily in sunny regions, interconnected through large, in-
tegrated electrical utility systems over distances of many thousands
of kilometers.
• Solar fuel generation units primarily in sunny regions and inter-
connected globally via pipeline and, for a few locations (e.g.,
Japan), by tanker.
Smaller Scale Features (As Discussed in Chapter 6)
• Local use of solar-generated heat for space heating, water heating,
and industrial process heat where economically and logistically
suitable.
• Local and regional use of small-scale solar-mechanical, -electrical,
and-fuel generating units, especially in developing countries.
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gained from several published studies and from our case study of solar
energy use in Austria, a densely populated industrialized country that has
significant seasonal variations in solar radiation (Korzen 1979).
From this study, we saw that the potentials of both fallow land and mar-
ginal farm land demonstrate the considerable area that could be made avail-
able in Austria for solar energy use. If all the anticipated constraints (e.g.,
southern orientation of Alpine slopes) are included in the estimation, an
overall usable land area of perhaps 2500 km 2 could be made available, even
in such a densely populated coun try. This corresponds to 3 percent of the
total land area of Austria. This is not to say that it would be easy to utilize
the entire area. Because of complex land ownership arrangements, the poten-
tially available land area could be used only if extensive social changes were
to take place.
A comparable analysis done for the southwestern United States indicated
that between 2 and 16 percent of the total land in an eight state area was
available (Aerospace Corporation 1974). These states (California, New
Mexico, Arizona, western Texas, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, and Oklahoma)
represent one-third of the total continental U.S. land area, and the range
from 2 to 16 percent represents 50,000 to 400,000 km 2 . The approach
taken listed reasonable exclusion criteria, such as land with a tilt greater than
20 percent, land with any reasonable crop or grazing potential, and land
owned by Indian tribes or used as a local, state, or federal park. Some more
stringent criteria were also introduced-for example, exclusion of all federal
lands (which in one of these states amounted to half the land area).
On a global perspective, the waste, desert, and mountainous regions, ex-
clusive of uninhabited islands and polar areas, cover 62 million km2 (Doxia-
dis and Papaioannou 1974). Let us first assume that 20 million km 2 of this
land is worth considering as arid, sunny wasteland available for central solar
systems. Then, in line with the percentages for Austria and the southwestern
United States as arrived at above, we take 5 percent of this number as an
estimate of land with some potential for solar utilization. The result is 1 mil-
lion km 2 . (Note that for an electricity generation density of 20 W/m 2 , this
corresponds to 20 TW.) A completely independent estimate, based on (FAO
1969), of potential sunny wasteland excluding sandy regions and low use
grazing land comes up with 4.3 million km 2 . If sunny and other nonwaste
regions were included, the number could be ultimately as high as 10 million
km 2 . The lesson to be learned from these sorts of calculations is that as long
as only physical conditions and relations are reviewed, land availability is not
likely to be a binding constraint on solar development.
Probably the most crucial constraint on the buildup of solar power on a
large, global scale will be the material requirements. For the heliostat proto-
types of today we need about 30 to 80 kg of steel and glass and some 155 kg
of concrete and sand per m 2 mirror surface. In addition, 165 kg/m2 con-
crete and 10 kg/m 2 of steel are required for the rest of the plant structure
and machinery. Based on these figures and assuming that by 2080 solar
energy may reach a level of 35 TWyr/yr, material requirements can be calcu-
lated as shown in Figure 5-5. For perspective, to reach a total solar con-
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tribution of 35 TWyr/yr within one hundred years, solar energy production
would have to increase at an average rate of 0.35 TWyr/yr per year.
Figure 5-5 indicates that the annual material requirements of such a
scheme based on thermochemical hydrogen production would correspond to
about 10 percent of the world steel production and 2 percent of the world
glass production in 1975. The concrete needed annually would match the
1975 world concrete production. This hardly seems feasible from the present
perspective. However, the situation in 2030 might not be so critical, since it
is envisaged that by that time steel production could well be four times
higher and concrete production five and one-half times higher than at
present. The buildup of such a large-scale solar capacity would then only
absorb annually about 10 percent of the total production of these industries.
To put the material intensiveness of solar plants in perspective, we com-
pare the amount of construction material required for solar thermal elec-
tricity generation with the material requirements of coal and nuclear plants
per unit electricity generated over a plant lifetime of thirty years. For steel,
the solar plant needs twelve times the material required for the coal system
and seventeen times that used for a light water nuclear reactor system. For
concrete, the requirements for solar energy are sixty times those for the light
water reactor.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The technologies that might form the basis of future large-scale, centralized
solar energy conversion range from those already incorporated in prototype
designs to those not yet conceived. It is a young field of research and, if
one is willing to be imaginative, an especially promising one. What we have
done in this chapter is twofold. First, we have tried to escape traditional
engineering prejudices and look at novel systems for which we can only
sketch the most rudimentary outlines. Second, for those systems based
on more conventional technologies, we have tried to estimate the implica-
tions of building such systems on a global scale. The results of these investi-
gations form the basis both for the quantitative analysis described in Chap-
ter 8 and for the more qualitative exploration of Chapter 10 where we look
beyond 2030 to the possible features of a truly sustainable energy system.
For the moment, these results can perhaps best be summarized as follows:
First, clearly when one considers possible sustainable energy systems, solar
energy technologies have their place alongside nuclear breeder reactors.
Both sorts of systems could provide essentially inexhaustible long-term
energy sources for mankind.
Second, land availability is not expected to be a binding constraint for
large-scale solar power. Rather, material requirements (e.g., steel and con-
crete) will be unusually large and most likely the limiting constraint.
Third, currently the need for solar energy storage is a serious problem
capable of inhibiting the introduction of such solar facilities on a large scale.
But technological possibilities for solving this problem are promising.
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Fourth, high capital costs are an immediate obstacle to the early introduc-
tion of solar energy. However, there is room to expect technological break-
throughs that could improve the capital cost situation significantly.
Fifth, the emergence of a global solar energy system could perhaps bring
with it an unprecedented international interdependence and cooperation and
a substantial potential for development and growth in many poor but sun-
rich regions.
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6 RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES:TOWARD A PLANTATION WORLD
There is a wide spectrum of renewable energy sources available to man on an
inexhaustible basis. These include the direct energy from the sun, the energy
content of biomass and animal and agricultural waste products, and the
energy in flowing streams, wind, waves, ocean currents, and tides, as well as
the turnover of heat from the oceans' surface layers to the depths and the
geothermal heat flowing from the earth's interior to the surface.
How large is the energy potential of each of these resources? How much
of what is accessible can be used without disturbing the natural system too
much? These are some of the questions we addressed in our exploration of
the potential role of renewable energy sources in global energy supply. The
results of our study are summarized in this chapter.
ENERGY FLOWS IN THE ENVIRONMENT
Renewable energy systems have one universal feature: They divert some of
the natural energy flow present in the environment to serve useful human
activities. Figure 6-1 depicts the structure of these dynamic processes, which
are explained below in some detail.
The natural energy flows present in the environment include the power
flowing through the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the bedrock of the earth's
surface, and the biosphere. The environment receives energy from three
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independent primary sources-sunlight, geothermal energy, and planetary
motion in the solar system.
The dominating inflow of power is the sunlight arriving at the upper layers
of the atmosphere. The total energy flow of sunlight intersected by the earth
is 178,000 TWyr/yr. Part of the solar radiation is scattered on its way
through the atmosphere, and part is absorbed. On clear days, up to 80 per-
cent of the initial intensity is measured in sunny arid places like the Sahara
and the southwest United States. In middle latitudes, the power densities
measured on a horizontal area reach a maximum of 35 to 45 percent of the
extraterrestrial value. About 30 percent of the incoming radiation leaves the
earth directly after reflection at the cloud, the dust particle, and the surface
levels; about 70 percent is absorbed. Of the amount absorbed, approximately
83,000 TWyr/yr are found as sensible heat of air and water and 41,000
TWyr/yr as latent heat from the evaporation of water from the oceans and
the wetland surface. This latent heat in the atmosphere is eventually released
upon condensation. The absorbed solar energy finally leaves the earth in the
form of infrared (heat) radiation.
The natural power flows generated by sunlight and by the two other
sources in man's "direct" environment-that is, the thin boundary layers
between the atmosphere, land, and the oceans-are much smaller than the
direct energy transfer from sunlight. The continental runoff dissipates poten-
tial energy into heat via friction at a rate of only 5 TWyr/yr. Winds, waves,
and the kinetic energy of ocean currents dissipate roughly 370 TWyr/yr,
the majority being contributed by wind at high altitudes. The net conver-
sion rate of solar energy to biomass is on the order of 100 TWyr/yr.
The second primary source of energy, geothermal energy, feeds a com-
paratively small power flow in the accessible environment. Through heat
conduction, 35 TWyr/yr enter the atmosphere and the oceans from the
bedrock of the earth. Only 1 percent of this amount comes by way of vol-
canoes or active geothermal fields through convection mechanisms, giving
rise to significant temperature differences above the ambient conditions.
The third primary source, causing a still lower power flow, is the planetary
motion in the solar system. Approximately 3 TWyr/yr are dissipated through
tidal movements in the oceans.
Viewed against the background of these enormous flows from nature,
renewable energy sources would seem able to contribute substantially to
satisfying the world's thirst for energy and able to do so on an unlimited
basis. But our ability to make use of these energy sources depends on the
energy supply densities of the various forms, their locations, and the extent
to which they can be used economically and without affecting climate and
ecology systems significantly or diverting high value land from uses such as
food production.
When such factors are taken into account, as will be discussed in this
chapter, the technical potential of the renewables (not counting the direct
solar heat that can be used at the point of collection) comes to about 15
TWyr/yr of secondary energy, as shown in Table 6-1. For direct solar heat
that can be used at the point of collection, we came up with an additional
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Table 6-1. Technical potential (as secondary energy) of renewable resources.
Type
Biomass
Hydroelectric power
Wind
GeDthermal (wet)
OTEC
Tidal
Waves and Dcean currents
Power
(TWyr/yr)
6
3
3
2
0.04
0.005
15
Comment
Requires cultivatiDn of virtually all Df the
prDductive land of the wDrld.
A high quality product, equal tD three times
as much fuel; includes minDr potential frDm
glaciers.
High quality energy, but utilizatiDn must
deal with difficulties of energy storage.
Much more stored heat is available for
"mining," but technDIDgy is nDt available.
Potential is greater if ocean heat can be
diverted On a gigantic scale; still speculative.
Very localized potential.
MinDr quantities are available, but they dD
not add up to anything significant.
aThe additional technical pDtential of user'Driented direct solar heat was estimated at 2.2 TWyr/yr.
2.2 TWyr/yr. The term "technical potential" is intended to describe the
upper limit defined when only technical constraints are considered. Environ-
mental constraints and economic factors are not incorporated explicitly.
RENEWABLES ARE A MULTIPLE RESOURCE
This global potential of secondary energy indicates that renewable energy
sources collectively should be given a similar consideration to that for fossil
fuels, nuclear power, or centralized solar power. There is, however, one dif-
ference: This large sum does not come from a single source or from a single
technology. Instead, it is derived by adding up a number of smaller sources
and technologies. This affects our thinking in two ways that have opposing
implications. On the one hand, it is easy to look at, say, only 1 TWyr/yr of
wind power and conclude that it can make only minor contributions to
solving world energy problems. Yet when this is done on a source-by-source
basis, the promise of the renewable supplies can be lost in the statistical
"noise" of the energy problem. On the other hand, when the addition has
been made, it is all too easy to look at the total complacently, without
realizing that to achieve the promise, it will be necessary to pursue not one,
but a host of separate research, development, commercialization, and mar-
keting activities different in both scope and character.
Among the renewables, biomass is especially important because it could
be a self-renewing source of fixed carbon for use in producing liquid fuels. If
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economic obstacles can be overcome and ecological conditions satisfied,
biomass eventually could play an equally important role in liquid fuel pro-
duction as was discussed for coal in Chapter 3. This possibility, which is
significant for the development of long-range energy strategies, is discussed
later in this chapter.
Biomass
Of the approximately 100 TWyr/yr of fuel-equivalent biomass (net) pro-
duced from solar energy, about 23 TWyr/yr are fixed in swamps, grasslands,
and tundras; 29 TWyr/yr in forests; 10 TWyr/yr in cultivated land; and the
remainder in the ocean algae (Bolin 1979). Direct human food consumption
is about 0.4 TWyr/yr (four billion people at 2000 kcal per day), while the
consumption of animals is estimated crudely at 0.6 TWyr/yr. About 0.8
TWyr/yr could be withdrawn from forests as harvested wood (FAa 1975).
We estimate about 0.7 TWyr/yr of the net carbon product is associated
harvest from field and forest products that is returned to the soil. This would
be the rate of production of agricultural and sylvicultural "waste" associated
with human harvesting activity.
How much of this biomass can-or should-be harvested is a matter for
speculation. In Europe, perhaps half of the total land that was available in
primitive times is now being harvested, with acceptable levels of degradation
of the biosphere. But for tropical forests, there are indications that even this
much harvesting would bring about considerable soil degradation and a loss
of photosynthetic potential. Thus we judge that a harvest of 40 percent of
the 62 TWyr/yr of land biomass fixation would probably be the maximum
that could be prudently cultivated. This is still an impressive 25 TWyr/yr.
Of this, by the year 2030 a world population of eight billion people, double
that of today, would require about 1 TWyr/yr to be in food (not food
crops), 1 TWyr/yr in lumber and paper crops (producing between them
about 2 TWyr/yr of "waste"). With these crops, there would be need for
about 10 TWyr/yr of associated production in cultivated land. Under these
subtractions, 25 TWyr/yr reduces to 11 TWyr/yr of available production,
plus about 2 TWyr/yr of waste.
But even this amount cannot be exploited. Of this, at least half would be
lost in collection and conversion processes: Some would be returned pref-
erably to the soil as a conditioner; some (such as leaf and twig losses in
forests or stubble in field crops) could not be collected. The efficiency of
converting wood to charcoal is about 50 percent, the efficiency of con-
verting sugar or cellulose to fuel is less than 30 percent, and so on. We
therefore arrived at a total of 6 TWyr/yr of fuel, equivalent on the average to
high quality coal, that would be technically available from biomass.
This implies a sophisticated, careful management of the "photosphere."
The 6 TWyr/yr subsumes such uses as the formation of biogas from animal
residues, the use of wood as fuel directly in villages and in forest product
operation, and a residual fuel value of nonrecyclable waste paper and wood.
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These may be important locally, and the use of wood as a cooking fuel in
particular seems to double the amount of primary energy available. However,
this last increment is illusory, as the efficiency with which heat is delivered
to food that is cooked over wood is generally much lower than that using
charcoal.
The technical potential of 6 TWyr/yr given for biomass in Table 6-1
therefore cannot be used commercially, because of the low quality of this
fuel and because part of it would be consumed locally. Later, when we con-
sider how much renewable energy could be employed as user-oriented
sources, we identify the amount of biomass that could be diverted for such
uses. Here, we state that 1.15 TWyr/yr of biomass would be used in poor
rural areas; additionally, 0.8 TWyr/yr of forest products would be harvested
noncommercially by individuals. A total of 1.95 TWyr/yr would be used
locally, leaving 4.05 TWyr/yr of secondary energy to be commercially
processed from biomass.
Hydroelectricity
Of the 5 TWyr/yr of mechanical power available from the continental runoff
of water, no more than 3 TWyr/yr can be relied on technically. The re-
mainder is considered technically unavailable for one of several reasons:
• Some fraction of the water flow energy must still be allocated to over-
come the frictional losses of stream beds; otherwise, the water would
evaporate without going downstream.
• A certain water velocity must be retained in natural stream beds in order
to maintain riverine ecologies.
• Even if other uses of land and water were possible, it seems virtually
impossible to channel all the water for hydroelectric power; some of the
flow energy appears in myriad small streams at headwaters or in "lazy"
rivers near their outlets.
Because of these aspects, even such advanced projects as the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) and the Bonneville Power Authority (BPA) in the
United States actually capture much less than half of the runoff potential of
their respective river basins, and it is unlikely that a larger fraction could be
harvested anywhere else in the world. The potential of glacier power-that is,
tapping the hydromechanical energy of glacier runoff (Partl 1977, 1979)-
has been included in our total for hydroelectric power.
Wind
We estimated the technical potential of wind by considering the wind energy
available at heights up to 200 meters above ground level. Geographically,we
limited the areas to continental regions within 1000 km (on the average) of
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coasts running from 500 northern to 500 southern latitude. We excluded
polar regions and high mountain, uninhabited areas. This exclusion may be
considered an intrusion of the economic sphere on the technical potential,
since at least for the generation of network electricity, it seems economically
impractical to get the product competitively to the consumer.
There are a number of both pessimistic and optimistic assumptions in our
estimate of the technical potential of wind power, which amounts to 3
TWyr/yr. On the pessimistic side:
• We assumed that the total capture of low level wind energy at coasts
would create a several hundred kilometer zone of lower wind velocities
in its lee. In other words, the windmills would act like a chain of low
hills. Thus, we could not expect to capture more than the total low level
wind energy entering the coast.
• We ignored the smaller contributions of winds in the interiors of
continents.
On the optimistic side:
• We assumed that wind machines could be emplaced wherever the average
wind fields are favorable, ignoring the difficulties of doing so in regions
where these machines might be particularly vulnerable to destructive
storms.
• We assumed that large wind machines can be used. As far as the technical
potential is concerned, 200 meter wind machines capture more of the
wind energy than do smaller machines.
Wind power (and hydroelectric power as well) generates high quality
energy, and its product can be either electricity or stored mechanical energy
(as with pumped water). To the extent that this high quality energy can be
used, it is worth about three times as much as the same energy in low quality
heat.
Geothermal Energy
It is useful to distinguish between wet and dry geothermal energy sources.
Wet geothermal energy refers to steam or to hot water sources located near
the surface that arise from anomalies in the earth's crust in a few areas of the
world. The available temperatures of geothermal water or steam allow elec-
tricity to be generated at moderately low efficiencies compared with fossil-
or nuclear-fueled electricity generation and to be used for many direct
applications of low temperature heat, either domestic or industrial, provided
the application is located near the source.
There are developments directed at using dry geothermal heat from deep
boreholes (several kilometers) or from dry geothermal anomalies, but there
will have to be more research before the difficulties of tapping this energy
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source are mastered. Moreover, the time required to deliver geothermal heat
in quantity to a large body of rock, so as to heat it to useful temperatures,
is large compared to the time over which that heat might be extracted. To be
precise, this resource is really not a renewable one; like ocean thermal energy
conversion (OTEC), it is an instance of natural heat storage rather than
an actual heat flow.
Still the dry geothermal resource is very large. The total heat stored within
the top 6 km of the earth's crust at temperatures above 200°C was estimated
to be much greater than the energy content of all of the world's fossil fuel
resources. Nonetheless, we did not consider this energy source in our estimate
because, as already mentioned, we are awaiting the requisite development of
a large-scale technology and because we cannot now say how much of the
resource could ultimately be used. Other speculative resources, such as the
geopressurized brines of the Gulf Coast of the United States, were also not
considered.
Our estimate of the geothermal energy potential refers only to the wet
heat sources that are known to exist in populated regions. Our starting point
was the work of the Geothermal Resource Group (1979), which conducted
studies of the geothermal potential of the United States, which seems to
have a somewhat better than average resource of wet geothermal energy.
Rapid development of U.S. resources could yield on the order of 0.7 TWyr/yr
by 2010. The reference report did not consider resource depletion, but we
assumed this power to be close to the maximum that could be extracted on a
steady state. By multiplying by four to account for a whole world resource,
we arrived at 3 TWyr/yr.
We also considered another estimate of geothermal potential (Wick and
Schmitt 1977) that suggests a sustainable figure of 0.1 TWyr/yr of electrical
power, corresponding to 0.5 TWyr/yr of heat, plus some tenths of a terawatt
for direct application. From this, we might infer that up to 1 TWyr/yr of
heat could be available. We averaged the two estimates to propose a technical
potential of 2 TWyr/yr for wet geothermal heat.
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion
Although OTEC would tap a heat source of very low thermodynamic quality,
it would in principle provide access to extremely large quantities of such
heat. OTEC is a speculative technique that requires a close look for two
reasons. First, it could be a source of energy, once the technological diffi-
culties were overcome. Second, through its analysis, we gain insights about
how interferences with the mechanisms of the earth's system can be tol-
erated and are therefore in a better position to determine its technical
potential.
We begin by reviewing the thermal phenomena of the oceans, as they form
the basis for understanding how OTEC could perturb the global system for
distributing heat energy. About 3000 TWyr/yr of solar energy is absorbed
directly by the oceans, the largest part of this being in the equatorial zone
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between the two tropics. This heat is transported poleward by the giant
ocean currents, such as the Gulf Stream and the Japanese (Kuroshiu) current.
Almost all the heat is delivered to the atmosphere in the temperate and sub-
polar zones, which are thereby blessed with more moderate climates than
would otherwise be the case. Some small fraction of the heat is delivered to
polar seas, as a source of energy to melt ice. About 50 TWyr/yr is ultimately
dissipated by convective mixing with cooler deep layers of the ocean (Wick
and Schmitt 1977); it is this energy dissipation that at low efficiency is con-
verted into the approximately 0.2 TWyr/yr of kinetic energy in the ocean
currents.
To complete the physical description, we note a delivery of heat from the
earth's mantle upward to the ocean as well. This geothermal energy is con-
verted into chemical free energy in the ocean, but at such low efficiency as
to be essentially dissipated. The depths of the ocean remain cool, in spite of
heat deliveries, by the mixing of very cold saline waters from the polar
regions, compensated in mass balance by the mixing of water across the
thermocline.
Specific OTEC systems suggested in the literature transfer heat from the
warm surface water of tropical or subtropical oceans directly to deeper cold
water. The efficiency of conversion to electricity is extremely low-about
3 percent when the warmer tropical water is used exclusively. Technical
difficulties in capturing all the heat in surface waters (owing mainly to the
need to discharge water so that it is not drawn back into the system) limit
the electric power capability to 0.25 W/m 2 of tropical ocean surface (ASA
1975). Taking the area of the tropical oceans to be 90 million km 2 , this
translates into a technical potential of 22 TWyr/yr of electricity and a
diversion of 720 TWyr/yr from differentiated surface layers of the ocean to
greater depths.
If all of the 720 TWyr/yr were subtracted from the heat transported north,
the climatic impact would be severe. There would, of course, be compen-
sating "induction" effects. For example, if the result were the cooling of the
ocean currents, so that at the beginning of their poleward migrations their
temperatures would be, say, 18°C instead of 25°C, they would lose less heat
on their journey and pick up some more heat from the sun. Nevertheless,
one would still expect a major impact.
There have been other experiments in which the rate of heat transfer
across the thermocline was used to develop a yardstick for estimating the
technical potential of OTEC (Wick and Schmitt 1977). The natural transfer
between these two reservoirs is equivalent to a thermal power flow of 50
TWyr/yr across a temperature gradient of 12°C. Taking the same technical
efficiency for OTEC systems as above, we arrived at a technical potential
for OTEC systems of 1 TWyr/yr, only 4.5 percent of the nonequilibrium
value of 22 TWyr/yr. In fact, harvesting this potential would be most prac-
tical at locations where cold water is warmed. These are regions of up-
welling, with smaller available temperature differences and corresponding
lower heat-to-electricity conversion efficiencies.
We are faced with a dichotomy between less than 1 TWyr/yr of electricity
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recoverable from possibly nonperturbing sources of OTEC and over 20
TWyr/yr of electricity that might be associated with large perturbations were
OTEC deployed to exploit a natural energy storage reservoir, instead of
simply diverting a natural power flow. We selected 1 TWyr/yr as the proper
value to use for estimating the technical potential of OTEC for a number of
reasons, not the least of which is that we shy away from schemes that would
draw on the heat stored in all of the tropical ocean surface. Even 1 TWyr/yr
would be a gigantic undertaking. And in view of the need to study the
systematic side effects of going further, it appears to be a prudent upper
limit at least for a few generations.
OTEC is an almost perfect example of the difficulties of arriving at
responsible estimates for the global technical potential of renewable energy
sources. It highlights the need for much more intimate knowledge of the
hydrosphere, the atmosphere, and the ecosphere before these systems can be
tapped on a grand scale. The problems of environmental disruption seem to
depend as much on the amount of energy tapped as they do on the type.
For some of the natural flows, the problems are more complex than they
are for most types of manufactured energy.
Tidal Energy
From the total of 3 TWyr/yr of dissipated tidal power, a very small fraction
is accessible for operating turbines: Only a few coasts have a form that
would allow for the transformation of the kinetic energy of the global tide
wave into sufficient tidal levels. In the few favorable coastal areas, the
scarcity of basins for intermediate water storage-that is, natural bays that
can be closed off by dams-reduces the technical potential of tidal power to
a very low level on a global scale-about 0.04 TWyr/yr (Wick and Schmitt
1977; ASA 1975)
Ocean Currents and Waves
The contribution from ocean currents and waves is expected to be very small
(0.005 TWyr/yr). As noted, the kinetic energy of ocean currents is only
0.2 TWyr/yr, and this kinetic energy plays a major role in shaping climates.
Any significant harvesting of it therefore cannot be considered.
There are many schemes proposed for harvesting the energy of waves,
particularly in the United Kingdom, where wave power is estimated as high
as 8 to 9 GWyr/yr. The devices present problems, since they must be able to
convert energy, with high efficiency, from 3 meter waves, while still being
able to withstand the onslaught of 30 meter waves. This observation pertains
essentially to all coasts where wave power has significant potential. No de-
vices with this capability are yet in the offing.
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USE R-ORI ENTED RENEWABLES
An important characteristic of renewable energy sources is that they allow a
degree of user orientation and individual self-sufficiency; they can be col-
lected and used directly at the point of collection. This characteristic applies
principally to local uses of direct solar heat and biomass, and, to a lesser
degree, to both hydroelectric and wind power. The user-oriented potential of
direct solar heat was not accounted for in our estimate of the technical
potential of renewable resources, although user-oriented applications were
considered in estimating the individual potentials of biomass, hydroelec-
tricity, and wind power.
User-oriented renewable energy sources are not limited to use in the devel-
oping regions and could also contribute greatly to the energy needs of an
affluent society. In assessing their potential, we relied on the results of the
case study, Distributed Energy Systems in California's Future, by the U.S.
Department of Energy (1978). An objective behind this study was to get the
maximum out of distributed, but not necessarily only noncommercial,
energy sources. The study concluded that despite a twofold population
increase and an increase by a factor of 3.1 in gross state economic product,
California could become nearly self-sufficient in energy by 2025 by produc-
ing 0.13 TWyr/yr from biomass, wind power, solar heat, geothermal sources,
and hydroelectricity. According to the California study a considerable con-
servation effort would be the prerequisite for achieving this energy self-
sufficiency. Moreover, all biowaste from present forestry and agriculture,
50 percent of all noncommercial forests, and conversion of bush and grass-
land into wood plantation, as well as the installation of wind energy facilities
over 6 percent of the state's land area, would be required, in addition to
exploitation of the state's considerable hydroelectric and wet geothermal
potential. Virtually all of the biomass would have to go for the production
of liquid fuels that would enter the commercial distribution system for use
as motor fuels and industrial feedstocks. Still, a shortfall of 0.023 TWyr/yr
in liquid fuels persisted, and the suggestion was made to harvest "kelp farms"
off the California coast in order to alleviate this situation. Central solar
power plants would not be used; rather, electricity needs could be covered
by integrating hydroelectric, wind, and wet geothermal energy into relatively
large utility networks. This would be possible in spite of the projected rise of
electricity's share in all energy end uses from the current 10 percent to 29
percent in 2025. Because of uncertain economics, PV systems were not
considered.
In the California study, user orientation of renewable sources was ob-
servable only with regard to the use of insolation in the form of direct solar
heat. The cogeneration of electricity was indicated whenever a solar heat
source would be required to produce high temperature heat or steam. But
not all of the produced electricity would be consumed locally; some would
be distributed through the utility networks. Based on these findings, we
assumed that in addition to the solar heat produced, one-third of the cogen-
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erated electricity would be user oriented. We therefore ended up with an
estimate of 0.052 TWyr/yr of solar heat and 0.002 TWyr/yr of solar elec-
tricity as user-oriented renewable energy sources that would be used either
by the individual or the community that collects it. These numbers are, of
course, for California only. What has to be considered here is the user-
oriented contribution of direct solar heat to meeting the energy demands of
all seven world regions defined in the IIASA study.
There is a rather quick but robust calculation that can provide a useful
figure of orientation for the overall potential of user-oriented solar insola-
tion. It is based on the observation that an area comparable to the available
"roof surface" per capita should be indicative in assessing this potential,
where the definition of "roof surface" is extended to include side walls and
surfaces on which collectors could be mounted in the immediate neighbor-
hood of the user. For the developed parts of the world-that is, regions
I, II, and III-40 m2 per capita turns out to be an accurate estimate of
available roof area. Assuming that of the yearly average solar insolation in
the middle latitudes, only about 40 W1m2 can actually be collected, one
arrives at a figure of 1.6 kWyr/yr per capita for user-oriented direct solar
heat. Based on an expectation of a total population in these three regions of
roughly one and a half billion people by 2030, we reach a potential of 2.4
TWyr/yr for user-oriented direct insolation. This value, it turns out, is
quite close to that which was derived from a more careful extrapolation of
the results of the California study-2.1 TWyr/yr of user-oriented solar heat
and 0.08 TWyr/yr of cogenerated electricity.
For the developing parts of the world-that is, regions IV, V, VI, and
VII-it is conjectured that most of the population lives in climates where
there is little need for comfort heating in homes and offices. We therefore
estimated a user-oriented direct solar heating potential in these regions of
0.1 TWyr/yr, with virtually all the solar energy going for hot water heating
and excluding industrial possibilities for using solar heat. Thus, taking both
developed and developing regions together, we obtain a global estimate of
2.2 TWyr/yr for the potential of user-oriented direct solar application.
We are now in a position to summarize how much of the 15 TWyr Iyr of
secondary energy from renewables has user-oriented applications in addition
to the 2.2 TWyr/yr of direct solar heat. Table 6-2 shows that biomass has
the largest potential. From the total of 6 TWyr/yr biomass available for
harvesting, 1 TWyr/yr could be collected locally and used in the form of
subsistence fuels such as charcoal and biogas, primarily in rural areas. In
addition, user-oriented applications of charcoal and biogas in small-scale
industry would amount to about 0.15 TWyr/yr, while local collection and
use of forest products would contribute another 0.8 TWyr/yr. Thus, from
the 6 TWyr/yr of biomass potential, 4.05 TWyr/yr would be left over for
commercial applications.
The local generation and use of hydroelectric and wind electricity poten-
tial would be much smaller-about 0.05 TWyr/yr of electrical equivalent
secondary energy each.
We observed limitations on the use of harvested renewable resources at or
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Table 6-2. User-oriented supplies of renewable resources.
Technology
Type
Insolation
Biomass
Hydroelectricity
Wind
Totals by
Source Type
Insolation
Biomass
Hyd roelectric ity
Wind
Total
Quantity
Application Energy Forms (TWyr/yr)
Domestic and industrial Low to medium quality
heating heat 2.2
Self-generated electricity
(cogenerated) Electricity 0.08
Subsistence fuel a Charcoal, biogas 1.0
Small-scale industry Charcoal, biogas 0.15
Forest products Industrial fuel 0.8
Rural electricity Electricity 0.05
Rural electricity Electrical equivalent 0.05
Totals by Application
(TWyr/yr) Category (TWyr/yr)
2.28 Electricity or equivalent 0.08
Comfort and process heat 2.2
1.95 Secondary industrial solid fuel 0.8
Other secondary fuel 1.15
0.05 Electricity or equivalent 0.05
0.05 Electricity or equivalent 0.05
4.33 Total 4.33
a Although charcoal is the dominant secondary form, the "biomass" total for subsistence fuel also
includes the more versatile form, biogas, as well as miscellaneous uses of wood, straw, and crop resi-
dues as fuel.
near their point of collection. Yet user orientation that allows the users
to guarantee their own supply seems to indicate that the resource would
actually be used and that the potential would be realized whenever possible.
Taking all the sources together, these tabulations indicate that, like the
fossil fuels, renewable energy sources collectively have a promise for the year
2030 of the same order of magnitude as that of nuclear power. But, again
like fossil fuels, the promise of the renewables does not continue to grow in
the period after 2030 in the way that it does for nuclear power. One should
neither underestimate the renewables, nor overstate their case. The 15
TWyr/yr of potentially realizable secondary energy from renewable resources
and the 2.2 TWyr/yr additional energy from user-oriented direct solar heat
applications must be looked upon as a figure to be used for exploring limits.
BIOMASS AND/OR COAL AS LIQUID FUEL
Earlier we alluded to the possible role for biomass in liquid fuel production;
we now elaborate on this subject. After the "cheap" oil has run out, the next
obvious step for getting a continued supply of liquid fuels is to use "dirty"
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oil. Following that step-or perhaps avoiding it-is the synthesis of liquid
fuels from coal if environmental factors are favorable. But if we recollect
that coal, too, is ultimately a depletable resource, albeit a very large one, we
can speculate about what might happen when the coal runs out or is not
used. At that point, the only available source of chemically reduced carbon
would be biomass.
If eventually, why not now? Could biomass supplant coal sooner? Should
we be looking harder at liquid fuels from biomass as a more desirable route
than coal? We do not see any clear indication as to the preferable route.
There are advantages both to coal and to biomass.
Coal's advantages are all intrinsically technological. Indeed, they are the
same as those that led to the replacement of wood by coal during the Indus-
trial Revolution, as was described in Chapter 3. The advantages of biomass
are generally environmental and thus reflect more recent global concerns.
Vitiating the advantages of coal are two factors. First, the existing infra-
structure of coal use is a decaying one. New life must be breathed into coal
mining, coal hauling, and coal burning. Case studies dealing with the re-
vitalization of coal use have shown that institutionally coal must be treated
as a new industry. Second, with the shifts from burning coal directly to using
it as a synthesis chemical, the amount of necessary preprocessing increases.
The advantages of biomass cannot be taken for granted either. Very large
land areas are needed for a harvesting effort capable of ultimately providing
up to 6 TWyr/yr of liquid fuels globally. Added to the needs of humanity for
food and natural fiber, fully one-third of the biomass grown on land would
then be under cultivation.
Even if we assume for biomass, as is recommended for coal, that allo-
thermal methods be used so that the maximum of process heat and hydrogen
is derived from nuclear and solar energy origins, then about 25 percent of all
forests would have to be harvested. On the the other hand, the use of auto-
thermal methods, such as fermentation or processes that rely on wood burn-
ing to produce heat and charcoal for further steps, would require a much
larger number (about 40 percent). Harvesting even 10 percent of forest
growth requires taking a step from ecological responsibility (always neces-
sary) to ecological engineering. Time would be needed to achieve capabilities
necessary to harvest 40 percent (or even 25 percent) of all forests in a truly
benign way. For example, the introduction of fast-growing monocultures in
an attempt to improve biomass yields and to achieve true "cultivation" of
energy crops is an ecological risk that requires long experience to evaluate.
Our rather superficial study of how to make liquid fuels from biomass
suggests that forests, rather than fields, are the more likely source and that
chemical synthetic process routes (e.g., destructive distillation and oxidative
hydrogenation to methanol) are more attractive than anaerobic fermentation
routes (e.g., the alcohol route). In both these judgments, the chief concern is
to have maximum yields of liquids so as to minimize both land requirements
and particularly the intrusion of energy harvesting on land needed to grow
food and fiber, to provide recreation, and to preserve natural habitats.
The wood-charcoal dichotomy for synthetic liquid fuel production should
be studied in more detail. In particular, the conversion of wood to liquid
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fuels should be treated as a separate area of research involving both systems
aspects and process development and under these circumstances, we cannot
recommend for coal or for wood. Perhaps the biomass harvest would not be
sufficient, but even if it were, we can expect different regions and countries
would opt for one or the other: Coal supplies, the suitability of forests for
exploitation, and the demand for imported liquid fuels would vary from
place to place. And of course, we cannot discount the contribution of field
crops such as sugar cane or grains to local liquid fuel supply or that of biogas
to local gas supplies. There are and will continue to be opportunities of time
and place for these sources, even though they are unlikely to loom large in
the total energy picture.
Finally, in a philosophical sense, we should recognize that biomass and
coal are part of a grand continuum-living biomass to dead biomass to peat
to lignite to coal.At each step of the chain there is both a loss of carbon and
a concentration of carbon. In looking for ways of substituting biomass for
coal, we are really posing a challenge to human cleverness. Can we be more
efficient than nature has been in turning biomass into concentrated energy
supplies?
CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are numerous opportunities for renewable energy sources to be de-
ployed successfully. The major question is not whether these exist, but
how much they can actually contribute to the total energy demands of
the world.
We assessed the upper limit, as determined solely by technical constraints,
of renewable energy sources at 15 TWyr/yr of secondary energy and an addi-
tional 2.2 TWyr/yr of direct solar heat collected and used locally. This large
resource of natural energy flows could be harvested, given reasonable exten-
sions of current engineering capabilities. We outlined how each of these
sources could be utilized in the future and have stretched our thinking to see
a possible role for biomass in liquid fuels production.
Collectively, the potential of renewable energy sources is comparable to
that of fossil resources, of solar energy, and of nuclear power in 2030,
although it does not grow in the period after 2030 in the way that the
nuclear and solar potentials do. Each and all of these supply options could
provide large amounts of energy in the future, although none is homogenous
and the realization of each of these potentials is contingent upon, among
other things, technological progress. But renewable energy sources are
distinct in that their potential is large only if we consider the sum of smaller,
individual sources. To be sure, individually the contribution of most of these
sources would not be significant, and it would be all too easy to dismiss
them. But by so doing, we would err in not seeing a valuable, supportive role
for these nondepletable sources.
Our estimates of what can be realized for renewable energy sources
presupposes the fulfillment of two major conditions. First, they must be
used in conjunction with other energy supply systems that would still be
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needed to provide reserve supplies and baseloads in grids and/or to supply
poorly endowed regions and districts. This will ensure stability and resilience
of the total energy system. Second, the use of renewable sources represents a
large potential ecological disturbance; To consider relying on them to pro-
vide a substantial fraction of our energy supplies is to contemplate under-
taking active ecological management of an awesome scale. We could no
longer describe ourselves as simply caretakers of our environment-"re-
designers" would be a more accurate term.
Considering, for example, that the average density of wood production in
the global forests was 0.2 W/m 2 in 1975 (Revelle 1975), using biomass at a
level of even 6 TWyr/yr would correspond to managing 30 million km 2
of forests. Extending our consideration to include all the renewables dis-
cussed in this chapter, 15 TWyr/yr would correspond to an area of 75
million km2 (0.2 W/m2 is, in fact, a good rough estimate of the average
density for the renewables collectively, excluding direct solar insolation.)
If this land area is compared to the 13 million km 2 of land currently devoted
to agriculture, the enormity of such an undertaking becomes clear. It means
managing the habitats of thousands of species, and it means dealing with
more familiar problems on an unprecedented scale-problems of soil erosion,
managing water systems, the stabilization and management of the nitrogen
cycle and the phosphorus cycle, and the decreasing resistance of cultured
plants against pests. It means operating a worldwide herbarium.
Whether we will be in a position to accept the responsibilities of the task
is hardly clear. At the very least, a global ecological monitoring and control
system would be required, and this, in turn, would have to be based on much
improved knowledge of how the natural energy flows affect the globe-a
knowledge that can be gained only by a commitment to large-scale research
in the pertinent disciplines.
Thus, although each individual energy option, be it fossil, nuclear, hard
solar, or the collection of renewables, promises much more energy than
current global requirements, realistically, probably none of the opportunities
will be fully realized in the next fifty years. In Chapter 8, where we present
the results of two global scenarios for the year 2030, along with their under-
lying quantitative analysis, we will show to what extent these various supply
opportunities might contribute realistically to the future global energy
system. But before turning to that analysis, we next consider in detail the
particular constraints that might prove most severe in limiting the degree to
which the technical potentials of the fossil, nuclear, solar, and renewable
energy options can be realized.
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7 CONSTRAINTS: THE THINGSTHAT HOLD US BACK
In exploring the potential of each of the supply options, we observed that in
reality it was highly unlikely that we could drive any of these supply systems
to their theoretical limits, for we were continually made aware of the prob-
lems that could arise as these systems gained momentum. Collectively, we
dealt with these as constraints. Simply stated, any endeavor, no matter how
benign seeming, encounters real limits or negative feedbacks.
Moreover, all large systems exhibit inertia at all stages, owing to physical
resources, capital acquisition, social acceptance lags, social and political in-
frastructures, and the like. If any and all of these systems were pushed too
far, their effects on our land, water, materials, manpower, and climate could
perhaps assume such large proportions as to limit the growth of the systems.
Concomitant risks, as well as benefits, would also be magnified as these sys-
tems grow in size and numbers to the point where the risks would have to be
viewed comparatively, so that societies could choose among them. It is a
foregone conclusion that any and all systems and human activities pose some
risk.
Thus, in the spirit of science, we looked at theoretic limits, and at the
same time, in the spirit of practicum, we look at how some of the world
might respond to those proposed systems and their extensions. Wherever
possible, we quantified these constraints and used them in the design of our
two scenarios for global energy demand and supply by the year 2030, which
we report on in Chapter 8. For example, the buildup rates of new energy
technologies entered directly into our scenarios.
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Here, we summarize four types of constraints that we believe act as reins
on society's capabilities for energy supply. These are market penetration,
climate, WELMM (Water, Energy, Land, Materials, and Manpower), and risk.
One important constraint is omitted here-that imposed by economics. The
cost of energy supplies according to various criteria is, of course, important
for determining which option to adopt and to what extent. We treat eco-
nomic parameters as a major criterion of balancing supply and demand in
Chapter 8.
Large-scale changes in global energy consumption patterns do not occur
overnight, and time thereby becomes a significant (if not the most crucial)
constraint on any new type of energy system that is to be deployed. There-
fore, we look first at "market penetration."
MARKET PENETRATION: THE CONSTRAINT OF TIME
Throughout our examination of the potential of various energy supply op-
tions, time was found to be the factor limiting the full deployment of any
system. Public and private support can advance development up to the point
of prototype and demonstration plants; thereafter, a different set of factors
is responsible for allowing a new energy technology to take over and re-
place an older, established one.
In our studies of the patterns of how new energy technologies may arise
to substitute for others, we used a method that embraces the entire global
system of primary energy consumption, testing this against three hundred
individual cases concerning different energy subsystems in sixty different
data bases encompassing thirty countries, over a long historical period from
1860 to 1975. Our findings reveal a regular pattern in the substitution of
one source for another over decades.
According to Cesare Marchetti and Nebojsa Nakicenovic (1978) of IIASA,
forms of primary energy resemble the behavior of different technologies
competing for a market. Broadly speaking, they are commodities competing
in the market in the same way as, say, steel production technologies and
household detergents. We are indebted to the pioneering work of E. Mans-
field (1961) and to the many extensions of his theory of technological sub-
stitution, mostly notably that by J.c. Fischer and R.H. Pry (1970).
One of the problems of analyzing periods of one hundred years or more is
posed by the underlying inconsistencies and gaps in the recorded data. Still,
our substitution model is robust in that it produces stable estimates of so-
called "takeover times" that are relatively constant for any given system and
that extend over several decades.
The substitution rates that are evident with the substitution model can be
characterized by the notion of takeover time-that is, the hypothetical time
it would take a certain energy form to increase its market share from 1 to 50
percent. In general, the smaller the region or the country, the shorter the
takeover time. For the European member countries of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it has taken roughly
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thirty years for a new energy source to conquer 50 percent of the market.
For the United States, the figure is seventy to eighty years, while for the
world as a whole, about one hundred years are needed.
Figure 7-1 illustrates the remarkable regularity of the substitution process
in the global primary energy market for five major resources-wood, coal,
oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy. The outline in Figure 7-2 of the primary
energy substitution pattern for the United States brings order to the welter
of statistical data for the period 1860-1974. One sees that the process is
smooth and rather fast until 1920: Coal peaks around that date, and oil
about forty years later. If the projection had been based on data covering
only a few decades around the year 1900, both of these peaks could have
been anticipated much in advance. Thus, the peaks should not be associated
solely with events such as wars, economic depression, or the recent oil
embargo; for most of the other cases examined, these events produced only
small deviations from the long-term substitution paths.
What cannot be explained by our model is the drop, during the Depression
years, in the relative consumption of coal below the long-term substitution
path, nor can we account for the corresponding increase in the use of oil
while natural gas consumption remained essentially unaffected. Interest-
ingly, by the 1940s these irregularities are "absorbed," and the overall sys-
tem retains the long-term substitution patterns established at the beginning
Figure 7-1. Global primary energy substitution. Logarithmic plot of the transformation
f/(l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model estimates of
historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the logistic model
substitution paths.
- ----- .-
WOOD ~ COAL
.... ~ ~
"-~ ~
..d ............ JV~
~ /' /-
, ~ /NAT.GAS
~
--
A ./ ..........
OIL/ / ...............
, A fi NUCLEA~A
f I( 1-f)
10'
10'
10°
10-
1850 1900
YEAR
1950
FRACTION (f)
0.99
0.90
0.70
0.50
0.30
0.10
0.01
2000
102 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD: Paths to a Sustainable Future
Figure 7-2. Primary energy substitution, United States. Logarithmic plot of the trans-
formation f/(l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model esti-
mates of historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the logistic
model substitution paths.
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of the century, in spite of a perturbation that lasted some twenty years.
We view this as an indication of the strong internal structure of the substi-
tution process and of the rigid timetable that the system follows, largely in-
dependent of outside influences.
Related to takeover times is the concept of "buildup rates." As we studied
the dynamics of how new technologies replace old ones, we observed that
the new technology generally requires a long time to capture a sizeable part
of the total energy supply market. The buildup rate may be defined as the
exponential growth rate of the new technology in absolute terms as it grows
from 1 to 10 percent of the market it serves. Table 7-1 gives the market
penetration rates and the buildup rates of the five primary energy sources
identified above. The buildup rates in this table have been estimated from
model parameters rather than from historical data because of the often er-
ratic behavior of the actual data when new technologies are just beginning to
satisfy a share of supply. In the United States, for example, the buildup rate
for nuclear power has been especially fast.
We consider it worthwhile to use our substitution model for exploring the
market penetration constraints affecting the evolution of two "new"
primary energy technologies in future energy systems-namely, solar and
nuclear power. Both the starting points and the growth rates of these energy
technologies were assumed exogenously for this exercise. The results are il-
lustrated in Figure 7-3 and summarized below.
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Table 7-1. New technology buildup rates.
Penetrationa Buildupb
Rate Rate
Technology (%/yr) (%/yr)
World primary energy supply Oil 4.9 6.8
Natural gas 4.8 6.8
U.S. primary energy supply Oil 5.3 7.7
Natural gas 4.5 7.0
OECD-Europe primary energy supply Oil 10.0 13.3
Natural gas 15.7 20.7
Nuclear 6.9 10.4
U.S. inputs to electricity supply Nuclear 31.0 36.0
apenetration rate is the annual growth rate of the market shares f(t) expressed as Qn f(t)/(1 - f(t).
bBuildup rate is the exponential growth rate of the new technology in absolute terms as it grows
from 1 to 10 percent of the market it serves.
• Nuclear power would begin to penetrate the primary market in 1979 at a
commercially significant rate of 2 to 3 percent and, by 2030, would have
increased its share to 40 percent.
• The entrance of solar energy into the market on a commercially signifi-
cant scale would begin only in 2000, and assuming a growth rate the
same as that for nuclear energy, solar would have a market share of
7 percent by 2030.
Figure 7-3. Global primary energy substitution, 1860-2030. Logarithmic plot of the
transformation f((l-f) where f is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are model
estimates of historical data; scattered lines are historical data; straight lines show the
logistic model substitution paths.
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Figure 7-3 also indicates that natural gas would take on an ever-increasing
share, reaching a peak of almost 60 percent around 2015 and declining there-
after. We do not find it too surprising that natural gas would hold such a
high share at the beginning of the next century, since both conventional
and unconventional gas reserves are large, and it is not inconceivable that
the problem of long-range transportation of gas could be resolved by that
time. Then too, as we point- out later in Chapter 8, if there were a mora-
torium on the use of nuclear energy, gas would be called upon to play
an even larger role than these figures project.
What do these figures tell us about solar and nuclear energy in the decades
ahead? In our consideration of the nuclear option in Chapter 4, we saw that
there would probably be an upper limit to the deployment of nuclear energy
due to the problems of building up the nuclear system to the point where it
could contribute more than 47 percent of primary energy. Accordingly, a
40 percent contribution by nuclear energy by the year 2030 based on our
market penetration technique is within this range and thus consistent with
these projections.
For solar energy, a 7 percent contribution in 2030 is probably much less
than many people would hope for from this resource. We note, however,
that a 7 percent solar contribution to a low energy demand world of, say,
22.4 TWyr/yr (as projected in the IIASA Low scenario) would be the equiva-
lent of 1.6 TWyr/yr or 22 million barrels of oil per day (mbd), which is the
total oil produced in 1975 in the Middle East and Northern Africa. This is a
large undertaking when viewed in absolute terms.
We do not regard these observations as definitive forecasts. Yet they
do tell us something about what to expect of the global energy system.
Regional or local systems might more easily be made to behave differently.
In sum, the substitution model reveals the very ponderousness of the
energy system-that is, the regularity of its evolution. This tends to confirm
that because of the long lead times for introducing innovations and the
long response time of the energy system, decisions taken today would have
their full effect only in the decades to come.
CLIMATIC IMPACTS OF ENERGY ACTIVITIES
Energy and climate interact in several ways. The by-products of energy con-
version-such as waste heat and carbon dioxide (C0 2 )-can influence climate.
In the other direction, climate influences the demand for energy-for ex-
ample, changes in temperature affect requirements for heating and cooling.
Also, climate can influence the supply of energy, especially with respect to
solar power, wind energy conversion, and hydroelectric power.
The impact of energy systems on climate has received increasing attention
recently as awareness of man's potential to alter the earth's climate has de-
veloped, as knowledge of the complexity and sensitivity of the climate sys-
tem has increased, and as local and regional changes have been observed
because of pollution. For example, temperatures in winter in urban areas
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are generally 2 to 3°C warmer than those in the surrounding countryside.
Increased levels of CO2 and other particles in the atmosphere, coupled
with other energy-related effects on wind, nave formed a haze over many
of the large metropolitan areas that is decreasing the amount of sunshine
they receive. Likewise, urban industrial pollution is believed responsible
in large part for increased amounts of rain and snow in surrounding areas,
even at distances of, say, 1000 km.
So far only local and regional meteorological changes have been ascribed
to man's energy activities. But there could also be a global climate problem
associated with increased levels of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere
if fossil fuels continue to play a dominant role in energy systems. The
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is known to be increasing and, through
the so-called greenhouse effect,a may be affecting the climate system.
It would therefore be unwise to dismiss the possibility of undesirable and
perhaps irreversible changes in the global climate pattern in light of the
large-scale use of energy technologies projected for the coming decades.
Our examination of the various energy supply options showed that only
two primary sources-namely, fossil fuels and nuclear power-have the
potential for meeting a large fraction of the global primary energy demand
over the next few decades, though looking farther into the future, there is
the potential for solar power and the other renewable sources to gradually
begin to cover a significant portion of demand. An understanding of the
possible climatic implications of large-scale deployment of each of these
resources is therefore important for determining which strategy should be
deployed and at what level. For the different options we considered the
possible climatic impacts of (l) substantial increases in the atmospheric con-
centration of CO2 and of other gases and particles, (2) large-scale waste
heat releases, particularly when concentrated in certain areas, and (3)
major changes in the surface characteristics of the earth. Before we report
on our investigations, it may be useful to describe the interactions of energy
and climate and to define the climate system (see the accompanying boxed
material and Figure 7-4).
Gaseous and Particulate Releases into the Atmosphere
Fossil fuel combustion produces gaseous and particulate substances that
could interact significantly with the climate system. These include CO2 ,
nitrous oxide (N2 0), methane (CH4 ), ammonia (NH3 ), freons, and other
compounds that have potentially deleterious effects. All of these were con-
sidered, with the question of the effects of the buildup of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere receiving the most attention.
aThe gas is virtually transparent to incoming solar radiation but absorbs longwave radiation coming
from the earth's surface and reradiates some of it back to the surface. This is referred to as the green-
house effect, although the analogy is not perfect; it is more like a "blanket effect." An increase in the
concentration of the gas in the atmosphere would give an increased earth surface temperature with all
other factors remaining constant.
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As can be seen in Figure 7-4, the climate system consists of the at-
mosphere and four subsystems-the ocean, the cryosphere (ice and
snow), land, and the biosphere. The arrows in the figure indicate how
these components interact through a wide variety of processes (e.g.,
evaporation from land and ocean surfaces into the atmosphere, wind
stress on the oceans). Historical data indicate that climate has varied
and continues to vary on time scales ranging from short periods (season-
to-season, year-to-year) to geologic time (millions of years).
Energy conversion systems can influence the climate system in three
ways. First, all energy, after passing through various conversion pro-
cesses, is ultimately released to the environment as waste heat. Second,
the burning of fossil fuels adds certain gases and particles to the at-
mosphere. These can either alter the amount of solar radiation that is
absorbed, scattered, or emitted by the atmosphere or by the earth's
surface, or they can alter the amount of other gases in the atmosphere.
Third, large-scale changes in the characteristics of the earth's surface,
such as its reflectivity, roughness, moistness, or the temperature of the
ocean surface, could cause climatic changes.
Figure 7-4. The climate system. Reproduced from Understanding Climatic Change,
1975, with the permission of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
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We used a carbon cycle model and a climate model, hypothesizing several
different energy strategies for the future use of fossil fuels for the period
up to the year 2050. The results of our studies are subject to many uncer-
tainties, owing mainly to lack of information about how much CO 2 could
result from the destruction of the biosphere (e.g., from deforestation).
Nevertheless, they do point to the magnitude of the CO 2 problem.
For one of these strategies, in which fossil fuels supply all of the world's
energy consumption of 50 TWyr/yr by 2050 (see Figures 7-5 and 7-6), the
average global temperature increase was 2°C by the year 2030 and 4°C by the
end of 2050. For another strategy, global energy consumption by 2050 was
set at 30 TWyr/yr, with fossil fuel use peaking around the year 2000 and
declining thereafter to the level of 3 TWyr/yr by 2030 and solar and/or
nuclear energy being used to fill the supply gap (see Figures 7-7 and 7-8).
In this instance, there would be only a 0.5°C global temperature increase,
beginning after 2030.
In order to gain perspective on how large a change this would be and what
possible climatic effects it might have, we compared these changes with
average global temperature changes over historical and prehistorical periods.
An increase of 0.5°C would be perceptible, whereas a warming of 1°C would
be equivalent to the increase in the earth's temperature that occurred after
Figure 7-5. Hypothetical 50 TWyr/yr fossil fuel strategy. Source: Based on data from
Niehaus and Williams (1979).
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Figure 7-6. CO2 emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and temperature change
for 50 TWyr/yr fossil fuel strategy. Source: Niehaus and Williams (1979).
C02Emis~
'\ •....
Atm. C02 Concentration /1 .......</
·T~;;;p~;~;;L·~;;~~:-. I,,,,
,-+-,L ,-""
-,- ---- --
>E
:5: 1500 7.5
40
20
60
o
2050
C02 Emission
(109 tC/yr)
80
20201980
Year
1940
o
1900
o
Temperature
change (oCl
2000 10.0
c:
.2
-Ctl...
~ 1000 5.0
c:
o
U
N
o
uE 500 2.5
:(
the last glacial period some 5500 to 6500 years ago; a 2 to 5°C increase
would be equivalent to the temperature increase during the last interglacial
period, about 125,000 years ago. Of particular concern was our observation
that a warming of 4°C could lead to the situation where the ice covering the
lands in polar regions would melt, with resulting increases in sea levels that
would flood most of the world's coastlines. The changes at regional levels
will be much larger in certain areas, with resulting changes in precipitation
patterns and particularly in regional agricultural practices. Although these
results may be welcomed in certain areas, they are likely to be viewed
negatively in many more places.
The release of particulate material, especially that of sulfur and nitrogen
compounds to the atmosphere, is also of concern, and has been observed to
affect local condensation and precipitation patterns as well as the albedo of
clouds. But until more data are available, it is difficult to determine what
effects they might have on global climatic patterns.
Waste Heat Releases
Although present understanding of the climate system is not sufficient to
reliably predict potential climatic changes attributable to waste heat releases
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Figure 7-7. Hypothetical 30 TWyrfyr solar and nuclear strategy. Source: Based on data
from Niehaus and Williams (1979).
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associated with different energy strategies, there are three methods for esti-
mating these impacts. First, one can look at how the climate system has re-
sponded to natural anomalies and "predict" the impact of manmade per-
turbations by analogy. For example, the response of the climate system to
large-scale anomalies in sea surface temperature could be taken as an analogy
for the response to a widespread area of waste heat release. Or, on a smaller
scale, the local meteorological effects of an ocean island heated by the sun
could be taken as an analogy for the local effects of a power station.
A second approach is to use information on climatic history. For example,
climatic areas in the past when the world was warmer than at present could
provide the basis for scenarios of future climates due to manmade warming.
Unfortunately, both of these approaches suffer from a lack of data and from
questions of interpretation.
A third approach is to use models of the climate system to examine the
sensitivity to manmade perturbations. A hierarchy of climate models exists,
ranging from simplified models that essentially describe the energy balance
of the system to complicated models that numerically describe the three-
dimensional atmospheric circulation. It is models such as these that formed
the basis for the results described here.
The amount of total waste heat released in 1975 as a result of the use of
110 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD: Paths to a Sustainable Future
Figure 7-8. CO2 emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and temperature change
for 30 TWyr/yr solar and nuclear strategy. Source: Niehaus and Williams (1979).
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some 8.2 TWyr/yr of primary energy globally is about one-ten-thousandth of
the solar energy absorbed by the earth's surface. Of course, with the pro-
jected doubling of the world's population over the next fifty years, more
energy would be consumed, and larger waste heat releases would occur. In
order to determine the effects of such increases on climate, we used a general
circulation model that simulated the impact of heat inputs on atmospheric
circulation and thereby on climate patterns. The model explored incremental
annual energy releases globally, ranging from 30 to 300 TWyr/yr with the
energy being released in limited geographical areas (440,000 km 2 ) located in
the oceans of the northern hemisphere.
The results of our atmospheric model studies, and those of others
(Kromer, Williams, and Gilchrist 1979; Llewellyn and Washington 1977;
Murphy et al. 1976; Washington 1971, 1972; Williams, Kromer, and Gil-
christ 1977a, 1977b, 1979), suggest that waste heat is a nonproblem on the
global scale, in that it is unlikely to perturb the global average climate state
in the foreseeable future. Only when extremely large amounts of heat (sev-
eral hundred terawatts) are released in small areas do any significant changes
begin to appear. Thus, we conclude that with a primary energy consumption
level of 30 to 50 TWyr/yr, there appears to be little or no ground for concern
regarding the global climatic impact of waste heat release. This is not to say
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that regional changes would not occur with waste heat emission from an
energy supply of 20 to 50 TWyr/yr.
Large-scale Solar Energy Deployment
If solar energy is to meet a large fraction of man's energy needs at some time
in the future, it would be able to do so mostly through the use of large,
centralized hard solar systems such as those based on STEC and PV applica-
tions. Although soft solar energy conversion systems, such as wind, wave
power, hydroelectric power, biomass, and OTEC can be used locally in
favorable situations, they are expected neither to contribute greatly to the
global energy requirement nor to affect the global climate.
From a review of the sparse literature and from our experiments (jointly
with the Stanford Research Institute) on possible climatic impacts of STEC
facilities, we feel safe in saying that the full-scale deployment of both STEC
and PV systems will probably lead to regional climate changes, such as more
humid air, increased precipitation, and increased cloud cover over cities.
Again, certain regions would benefit from these altered climate patterns,
while others would find such changes a hardship. More research is required
on a range of STEC capabilities and their effects on different climatic con-
ditions in different regions in order to provide factual guidelines for regional
planning, especially of agricultural activities.
The global scale climatic impacts of STEC and other large solar systems
are of concern for a more distant future, since large solar systems will proba-
bly not reach a high level of deployment-say, in the tens of terawatt level-
until sometime in the latter half of the next century. This applies to both the
hard systems mentioned in Chapter 5 and the soft ones included in our dis-
cussion of renewable energy sources in Chapter 6.
Policy Implications
Probably the most severe climate problem is the buildup of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere. In view of the present uncertainties in quantifying the
effects of this gas, it seems premature to recommend only energy strategies
that actively discourage the use of fossil fuels. Still, it would be unwise to
build future energy strategies that continue to rely greatly on the uses of
fossil fuels. A prudent policy, in our opinion, would be to maintain flexi-
bility by having sufficient nonfossil options incorporated in the global
energy supply system over the next few decades so as to allow expansion
from that base, if necessary, as the effects of carbon dioxide become better
known. A period of five to ten years is needed, and can probably be af-
forded, for vigorous research to narrow the uncertainties sufficiently, in
order to be able to decide whether there should be a major shift away from
fossil fuels because of the climatic implications.
112 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD: Paths CO a Sustainable Future
CONSTRAINTS ON BUILDING BIG SYSTEMS:
THE WELMM APPROACH
Another way of appreciating the magnitude of the tasks of building large
energy systems is to trace all the stages of their development from raw re-
source to final energy use. To be sure, the value of an energy technology can-
not be determined solely on the basis of resource availability. Energy res-
sources generally go through at least one stage of processing from their
primary state to the final state where they can provide the desired energy
service at the user end.
Resource processing involves the use of other resources, as we illustrate
here for the case of coal. The mining of coal can interfere with surface or
underground water resources. Water is also required at a later stage for re-
claiming the land that has been disturbed. Energy in the form of, say, elec-
tricity or motor fuel is also required for coal mining, to blast and remove
the overburden and/or the coal and to transport the coal. Whether coal ex-
traction is underground or, still more, open cast, a severe burden is imposed
on the land used and on the landscape, although such disturbances are be-
coming more temporary. Materials handling is another problem that is en-
countered with coal mining, not only for the handling of the coal (or
mineral) being gained but also for the overburden, the sterile rocks, and the
like. The deeper the deposits exploited by surface mining, the larger the
amount of materials to be handled, in addition to the water. And of course,
all these operations call for manpower.
What has been briefly shown here for one operation-mining-and for one
energy resource-coal-is applicable, at different levels, to other operations
of all activities in the energy chain-that is, transportation, conversion, dis-
tribution, utilization-or to other energy resources, be they oil, gas, uranium,
or renewable resources such as solar, tides, and wind. Although the use of
processed energy resources calls for the use of other natural and human re-
sources, it should not be such a burden on these other resources that it
would create acute shortages and thus constrain the growth of the energy
technology.
We categorized these constraints collectively under the acronym WELMM
that denotes a systems analytic method for identifying the requirements of
Water, Energy, Land, Materials, and Manpower for different technologies
and energy resources exploration and for determining their availability in
different parts of the globe. Two types of data bases were used, one detailing
WELMM requirements for the buildup and operation of typical energy facili-
ties, such as coal mines, oil fields, and power plants; and the second con-
taining information on the potentially available WELMM categories of re-
sources in different geographical areas.
Electricity Generation
WELMM comparisons at the global level were done for several electricity
supply chains (Griibler and Cellerier 1979) and for different production
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processes for synthetic liquid fuels (Grenon, Merzeau, and Griibler 1979).
The results of these studies are examined in detail in the following sections.
A WELMM comparison was made of electricity-generating chains, each
chain being defined as a set of energy facilities needed to extract, upgrade,
transport, and convert the primary energy into electricity. Nine chains were
compared for producing the same amount of electricity, 6.1 TWh/yr, each
with a thirty-year life span: Four chains produce electricity from coal, three
from nuclear power, and two from solar power. The major characteristics of
these chains are given in Table 7-2 and summarized below.
Coal 1 and Coal 3 reflect the present status of the technology, whereas
Coal 2 and Coal 4 represent an advanced technology and meet environmental
standards. Coal 1 and Coal 2 operate with an underground coal mine, and
Coal 3 and Coal 4 operate with a surface mine with a stripping ratio of 2: 1.
The power plant in each of these cases is a unit of 1000 MW(e) of installed
capacity.
One of the LWR chains is an extreme case because of the assumed low
uranium ore content, but we considered this the maximum amount of
uranium that could be extracted. For the LMFBR chain, we assumed that
only a small amount of uranium would be extracted and that most of the
fuel supply would come from depleted uranium in enrichment plants and
from the plutonium produced from the spent fuel from LWRs. The trans-
portation of uranium was not taken into account. The three nuclear chains
comprise power plants each with 1000 MW(e) of installed capacity. The two
solar chains, each with STEC plants with installed capacities of 100 MW(e),
differ in terms of solar radiation-that is, the southern France type and the
California type.
Results of this WELMM analysis are shown in Table 7-3 and Figure 7-9,
the latter presenting information on the cumulative land requirements and
the former on the materials (nonenergy plus energy) required to build and
operate these nine chains for thirty years. These cumulative requirements,
based on the aggregated data, offer insight into possible constraints for
developing future electricity supply strategies.
The solar chains are the largest land-consuming chains by far-especially
Solar 1, with a southern European direct solar radiation of 1500 kWh per m2
per year. The smallest land consumer is the LMFBR chain. The land require-
ments for the solar chains are large, mainly because of the heliostat fields of
the STEC modules. The land impacts are also considerable in the LWR 2
chain and in the four coal chains.
The STEC system would be the most demanding in terms of its require-
ments of land and construction material. Indeed the materials required
to construct the two solar chains are more than one order of magnitude
higher than those of the other chains because of the large quantities of
concrete, sand, rocks, and other materials that would go into the con-
struction of heliostat fields and towers. Yet the solar chains require prac-
tically no materials for their operation. Both the LMFBR and the LWR 1
chains show the best results if one compares the total material requirements
(for construction plus thirty years of operation) for the various chains. The
favorable results of the LWR 1 chain can be attributed to the assumed use of
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Table 7-2. Characteristics of the electricity-generating chains (6.1 TWh/yr,
30 year life span).
Coal 7 Coal 2 Coal] Coal 4
Mining
U.S. western underground coal mine,
seam thickness 1.5 m
U.S. western surface coal mine, seam
thickness 9.2 m
Preparation Coal preparation plant
Transport
Power plant
Electricity
storage
Reprocessing
Waste
storage
Rail, 900 km
1000 MW(e), load
factor 70%, con-
ventional
Negligible
Slurry pipeline,
900 km
1000 MW(e), load
factor 70%, fluidized
bed, environmentally
controlled
Negligible
Rail, 900 km
1000 MW(e), load
factor 70%, con-
ventional
Negligible
Slurry pipeline,
900 km
1000 MW(e), load
factor 70%,
fluidized bed, en-
vironmentally
controlled
Negligible
high grade uranium ore. Only the LMFBR would appear to be practically
independent of such resource constraints.
As is also evident from Table 7-3 and Figure 7-9, the LMFBR would be
the least demanding in terms of land and materials requirements, followed
closely by the light water reactor, provided that the fuel requirements of
these reactors could be met by high grade ores (LWR1). The land and
material-handling requirements for the operation of LWRs with poor quality
uranium ore (LWR2) may even surpass those of equivalent coal-based sys-
tems. Of course, these are general features that would be different in dif-
ferent locations, and a complete assessment would have to consider the pre-
cise geographical location of the various facilities.
Synthetic Fuels
We also considered, in a preliminary way, the WELMM constraints associated
with the production of synthetic liquid fuels by means of (l) coalliquefac-
tion, (2) oil shales extraction, and (3) tar sands extraction. In our discussion
of fossil resources in Chapter 3, we observed that each of these technologies
relies on a large reserve. But if deployed on a large scale, each would con-
siderably strain the available water and land resources, pose several material-
handling and waste disposal problems, and require relatively higher amounts
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LWR 7
60% surface,
40% under·
ground,O.203%
U30S
LWR 2
Underground
shale mine
LMFBR
Cha ttanooga
0.007% U30S
Solar 7 Solar 2
Uranium mill, enrichment, fuel
fabrication
Uranium mill,
fuel fabrication
Negligible Negligible Negligible
1000 MW(e), load factor 70%,
thermal efficiency 33%,3.2%
235 U fuel
1000 MW(e), load
factor 70%, thermal
efficiency 40%, UF6
tails and natural
uranium fuel
28 X 100 MW(e),
STEC, direct radi-
ation, 1500 h/yr
1500 kWh/m 2 /yr
14 X 100 MW(e)
STEC, direct
radiation, 2700
h/yr, 3000
kWh/m 2 /yr
Uranium reprocessing Uranium and plu·
tonium reprocessing
6 hours on site thermal
Low level waste storage, temporary (maximum 100 years),
high level waste storage
Table 7-3. Material requirements for construction and operation of elec-
tricity-generating chains (10 3 tons).
Nonenergy Energy
Materials Materials
Other Operation Operation
Metals for Materials for (cumulative (cumulative
Construction Construe tion 30 years) 30 years) Total
Coal 1 43 151 8287 79,000 87,480
Coal 2 65 140 23,566 84,000 107,770
Coal 3 44 142 4000 79,000 83,186
Coal 4 67 130 23,230 84,000 107,430
LWR 1 41.8-56.6 192.7 132 2700 3066-3080
LWR 2 43.4-58.2 192.7 132 119,300 119,668-119,683
LMFBR 33 276.3 na 800 1103
Solar 1 844.3-1930.4 3298-6778 na 0 4142-8708
Solar 2 666.4-965.7 2005-3390 na 0 2671-4355
na-not available.
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Figure 7-9. Cumulative land requirements for energy chains producing 6.1 TWh/yr
electricity. The importance of the seam th ickness of opencast mining is indicated as an
example for Coal 3 and 4. For explanation see Table 7-2.
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of skilled manpower than have been experienced with conventional oil
production.
We examined these production methods from two perspectives-first, the
conventional method of surface mining and, second, extraction by means of
underground liquefaction and gasification where the energy resource remains
in the deposit and so-called in situ techniques are used for extraction. For
coal liquefaction, we assumed the use of the currently popular Fischer-
Tropsch method. Unfortunately, our comparative analysis was hampered
by the fact that only a few projects of this type have been constructed thus
far or are in the final design stages. Still, we judge that all three methods for
liquid fuel production would have high WELMM requirements. Water and
manpower resource requirements best illustrate this statement.
Figure 7-10 shows estimates of water requirements for the different tech-
nologies. In order to compare their relative impact on water resources, the
production of one cubic meter of synthetic fuel was chosen as a reference.
Coal liquefaction seems to require the largest amount of water, since for the
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Figure 7-10. Water requirements for different synthetic liquid fuel processes compared
to enhanced recovery of conventional oil. Sources: (a) Bechtel Corporation (1975, 1976,
1977); (b) and (c) Crawford et al. (1977); (d) Resources Management Consultants Ltd.
(1978); (e) Syncrude Canada Ltd. (1971, 1973); (f) Bechtel Corporation (1975, 1976,
1977), Hittman Associates Incorporated (1974,1975); (g) Synfuels Interagency Task
Force (1975).
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Fischer-Tropsch synthesis process, water is considered a chemical feedstock.
For tar sands, the major part of the water consumption occurs at the conver-
sion stage because of the current method of "hot extraction." One disadvan-
tage of this process is that most of the water discharged with the tailings in
the tailing pond contains solid particles and therefore cannot be recycled nor
can it be discharged into a river because of the presence of bitumen. For oil
shale, the critical steps are the waste disposal and oil shale upgrading, during
which 60 percent of the water is consumed.
Manpower requirements were also judged a potential bottleneck to the
large-scale synthetic liquid fuel production, as can be seen in Table 7-4.
While oil extraction from conventional fields in northern Alaska requires
only forty to fifty people to operate and maintain a 25,000 ton per day
operation, extracting tar sand deposits of 20,000 tons of oil per day would
require some 2000 people for operation and maintenance, and some addi-
tional 10,000 people during the construction phase of these plants. Coal
liquefaction, using the Fischer-Tropsch process, would require a full-time
staff of 7400 people to produce 5500 tons of fuel per day.
As we noted in Chapter 3, the investments needed to build up a new coal
industry would be large in both physical and human terms. The fact that
larger numbers of miners would be needed is evident from the experiment
Table 7-4. Manpower requirements for different synthetic liquid fuel
processes.
Design and Total
Construction Workforce Workforce for
Manpower at Peak Operation and
Requirements Construction Maintenance
Projects (person-hours) (number of persons) (number of persons)
Tar sand, SYNCRUDE, open pit
mining (125,000 bbl/d)a 43 X 10' 7500 2500
Tar sand, in situ process
(141,000 bbl/d), Imperial
Projectb 55 X 10' 9930 2036
Oil shale, open pit mining
(100,000 bbl/d)c 8.7 X 10' 2200 1800
Oil shale, underground mining
(100,000 bbl/d)c 8.7 X 10' 2200 2362
Coal liquefaction, underground
mining, Fischer-Tropsch process
(40,000 bbl/d)d na 11,000-15,000 7400
Coal liquefaction, open pit mining,
hydrogen coal process
(25,000 bbl/dJe 7.0 X 10' na 820-1,000
na-not available.
Sources: (a) Syncrude Canada Ltd. (1978); (b) Resources Management Consultants Ltd. (1978);
(c) Project Independence (1974); (d) Hoogendoorn (1975; 1978); (e) Bechtel Corporation (1976)
and Synfuels Interagency Task Force (1975).
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of the SASOL project in South Africa, where 3700 people are employed in
the mines to supply the coal for liquefaction (Hoogendoorn, 1975; 1978).
Undoubtedly, the influx of such large numbers of workers into remote areas
will strain the present infrastructures' ability to provide transportation,
housing, and other social services, and their upgrading would generate their
own increased WELMM requirements.
These preliminary findings indicate that coal liquefaction using current
methods would be the least favorable of the three processes. From a
WELMM perspective, the adoption of less water-intensive processes is a pre-
requisite for large-scale coal liquefaction. Similarly, in situ technologies
would have to be mastered before unconventional oil could be deployed on
a large scale, mainly because of the large land requirements that go along
with current methods.
The relative differences among these three technologies as to WELMM
constraints are not very large, and local conditions would naturally have to
be considered. For example, the water requirements for exploiting oil shales,
per unit of oil produced, are estimated to be lower than those for tar sands;
yet water scarcity in the state of Colorado, where major oil shales resources
exist, may turn out to be a serious problem for exploiting its vast shale beds.
By contrast, water does not now seem to pose any problem in the Canadian
region of the Athabasca tar sands.
RISKS OF ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
For people to be able to choose intelligently the kinds of energy technolo-
gies they prefer and decide what systems are the most appropriate, they
must know something about how the use of these technologies will affect
their lives. Choices made in the dark are not choices at all. Yet it is difficult
to appreciate the differences among energy technologies in terms of their
real risks, as well as their benefits, because experts are often at odds and
because people have different value judgments.
How one compares cancer incidence to the incidence of black lung dis-
ease, or a near-term increase in power blackouts to a long-term increase in
global atmospheric CO2 will depend on one's personal values or preferences.
These value judgments may be colored by positive or negative belief sys-
tems about deploying certain technologies. For example, a general faith
in science or in technological progress will predispose a person to accept
the technical judgment that the probability of, say, a catastrophic nuclear
accident is comfortably small, while a person's distrust of the "system"
and its proponents would predispose him to believe that such a statement
was intentionally misleading and corrupt.
To be sure, differences between perceptions and realities constitute just
one element-albeit an important one-of the sociopolitical problem of
making choices about energy technologies. There are other factors th~t add
to the complexity of the problem, most notably a lack of data and made-
quate evaluation technologies for defining the nature of the risks and for
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providing decisionmakers with tools for incorporating the findings of risk
analyses into energy strategies.
All human activities have some degree of risk, whether perceived or not.
That realization, in a crude sense, was the starting point for our risk assess-
ment project, begun six years ago jointly with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Our goal was to establish categories and to define
concepts related to risk assessment in order to set up a framework for more
formal research in this field. We distinguish three elements in our risk assess-
ment framework illustrated in Figure 7-11-risk estimation, risk evaluation,
and risk management. Since risk estimation is by far the most studied aspect
of the assessment process, we limited our research on this subject.
Before we report on the findings of our studies of the risks of various
energy technologies, it may be helpful to consider the goals and methods
used for each of the three elements of risk assessment. In brief, risk estima-
tion makes use of one or two possible methods. For events of concern that
are infrequent or have associated with them major consequences, it is neither
possible nor desirable to estimate risks by just waiting for sufficient histori-
cal data to accumulate. Put another way, we can no longer base the develop-
ment of a technology on trial and error, which is equivalent to hypothesis
and experiment in science. With the implementation of larger technical sys-
tems on a global scale, man has entered the domain of "hypotheticality,"
where it is no longer acceptable to correct a hypothesis by the outcome of
an experiment. This applies both to accidents in large, modern technical in-
stallations such as LNG terminals or nuclear power plants and to routine
emissions from well-established technologies such as CO2 emissions from
fossil-fueled power plants.
For these sorts of risks, a second approach estimates low frequency risks
that, in principle, can be predicted, usually by extrapolating statistical data.
Examples of such methods are fault- and event-tree analyses, as well as
Figure 7-11. Risk assessment framework.
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computer simulation models for determining failure rates of various facility
components (e.g., pumps, automatic control systems, pipes, valves, vessels).
Methods falling into this second category have certain shortcomings. For
one, only those failures and event sequences that can be envisaged by experts
can be included. Another limitation is that human failures, especially under
stress, are difficult to quantify, and most studies of this sort rely essentially
on expert judgment. Since the probability of many event sequences is as low
as one in a million per year, there are no historical data with which to verify
the analytic results.
Once the risks associated with different energy technologies have been
identified and quantified, the problem is one of comparing the risks, first,
with each other and, second, with other important energy system attributes
such as investment and operating costs and reliability of supply. But such
comparisons are difficult because the risk and attributes of concern differ
in many ways. They may differ fundamentally in nature-for example,
nuclear proliferation risks versus the risk of more frequent power blackouts.
Or they may have different probability distributions-for example, the rela-
tively low probabilities associated with a serious nuclear accident versus
certain CO 2 increases due to the burning of fossil fuels. Or the may affect
different populations-for example, occupational risks versus public risks or
risks to the current generation versus those to future ones.
These factors, as well as the values or judgments people bring to the evalu-
ation process, underscore the fact there is no single, objectively correct pro-
cedure for evaluating risks. Still, there are a variety of techniques that can
increase our understanding of how to systematically apply one's own values
to a complex, multidimensional choice and how to analyze the values held
by others and possibly to incorporate such values in energy policy decisions.
These techniques include procedures for measuring and analyzing public
attitudes toward energy systems, as well as preference-based evaluation
procedures known variously as decision analysis, risk-benefit analysis, and
multiattribute utility measurement.
Risk management refers to the organizational and political aspects of the
environmental management of energy systems. It involves the pragmatic
problems that arise when competing groups, which most likely disagree on
both the estimation and evaluation of risks, actually try to negotiate and im-
plement an energy strategy. Since risk evaluation techniques often involve
the political decisionmaking process, the line between risk evaluation and
risk management is not always sharp. We studied standard setting, an im-
portant part of risk management, focusing on the dynamics of regulatory
agencies setting standards for energy systems.
We now discuss these three aspects of risk analysis in more detail, bearing
in mind the difficulties of drawing clear lines between them, as shown in
Figure 7-11. Specifically, the approach one takes to estimating or quantify-
ing risks suggests implicitly how one intends to evaluate these. For example,
to assign dollar costs to human lives indicates that one is primarily interested
in the economic effects of consequences.
For our discussion, we refer to methods that have been developed by
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others and by us in order to quantify the risk of energy supply systems. Our
intent is to review the state of the art of risk analysis. But it would be pre-
sumptuous on our part to suggest that current methods are adequate to
tackle the question of what is an "acceptable risk." The numbers given here
are not definitive; rather, they serve to illustrate techniques and to represent
the type of calculations that are being done today. What they do suggest,
however, is the magnitude of the challenge facing sociopolitical institutions
that wish to successfully manage the risks that would go along with higher
levels of global energy use.
Quantifying Health Risks of Energy Systems
Risk studies generally use the average risk of acquiring a fatal disease as the
yardstick .for determining acceptable risk levels. Although the risks of many
technologIes can be reduced to this level, this method has its drawbacks. Not
only do average values vary among people and circumstances, but averages
may also mask important differences in the probability distributions of the
accidents from which they were derived.
We adapted an approach by L.D. Hamilton and A.S. Manne (1977) that
estimates the human health risk associated with energy systems and con-
siders time lost on the job because of illnesses and injuries from occupational
accidents. For perspective on the level of human health effects from energy-
related accidents, we note that in the United States in 1975, between 2000
and 19,000 deaths and between 29,000 and 48,000 illnesses could be traced
to electricity generation during that one year period.
Table 7-5 gives estimates of human health risks associated with 1 GWyr of
electricity production annually for five primary energy sources-coal, oil,
natural gas, nuclear energy (LWRs), and solar energy (STEC). These data
cover not only the construction and operation of the power plant but also
the extraction, processing, and transport of the energy fuel and the waste
products. The estimates are based largely on statistics published by the U.S.
Department of Labor and on various assessments reported in the literature.
In certain cases, such as the public health effects of sulfur dioxide, particu-
lates, and radiation exposure, the data are based on a linear, nonthreshold
extrapolation from high level, acute exposures. But because of a lack of
quantitative or even good qualitative data, we could not estimate certain
power plant emissions. Although mercury, nickel, arsenic, and vanadium, or
some of their compounds, are known to be toxic to humans and animals, we
could not include in the table estimates of the impacts of the release of the
first three elements from coal-fired plants or of the vanadium from oil-fired
plants. Similarly, it was not possible to include estimates for the effects of
radioactive emissions from fossil fuel combustion, of the emissions of
methane and other hydrocarbons from oil- and gas-fired plants, and of oil
lost in spillage.
Figure 7-12, based on data from Table 7-5, illustrates the health effects
in both the occupational and public sectors resulting from accidents at the
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Figure 7-12. Person-days lost annually due to supplying 1 GWyr(e) from eaeh of five
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STEC plants: For coal-fired plants the number is less (16,000 to 22,000
person days); and for LWR plants 2000 person-days would be lost because
of occupational accidents.
For both coal and oil systems, most of the occupational accidents occur
during the fuel supply and transportation processes, while for STEC plants
they take place during the construction phase. For LWR plants, worker in-
juries result from accidents during plant construction and in the extraction-
processing-reprocessing end-at an almost equal level.
For the public at large, the largest health risks come from accidents in
transporting all of these five energy sources. Additionally, the sulphur diox-
ide emissions from both coal- and oil-fired plants affect public health. There
are, of course, large uncertainties in these estimates that we hope will even-
tually be narrowed down by improvements to the data base.
There is yet another possible way to evaluate risks that assigns a monetary
value to human life and considers this in determining production costs. While
this may seem to be a harsh appraisal of human life, it is standard procedure
for insurance companies and courts in awarding payments for health dam-
ages. On the basis of available, albeit limited, information and experiments,
we compared the human health risks associated with five of the primary
energy technologies, assigning monetary equivalents to these health effects.
As was the case with electricity generation, our study revealed that coal-fired
plants present the largest risk of accidents and diseases to occupational staff
as well as to the public. The risks associated with nuclear energy (LWRs)
amount to only a small fraction-less than 6 percent of those relating to coal-
fired plants.
These results may appear surprising. Coal has long enjoyed wide public
acceptance, in spite of historical data pointing to its ill-effects. Yet many
people view nuclear power plants as being associated with much greater risk
than the other energy technologies. In a survey conducted on heterogeneous
sample of the Austrian public (Thomas et al. 1980), we observed a large
discrepancy between the results of risk-benefit calculations, as mentioned
above, and the public perception of these risks. The dialogue between those
holding opposite views was often so emotionally charged that people seemed
to be talking past one another. Among the energy technologies considered,
the group perceived solar and hydroelectric power systems as having the
lowest risks, with fossil fuels having only a slightly higher level of perceived
risk. The largest disagreement concerned the use of nuclear energy. When
we looked further, to the beliefs underlying the attitudes of the pro- and
antinuclear groups, we found that psychological anxiety-inducing aspects
and certain sociopolitical factors caused both groups to hold negative opin-
ions about nuclear energy. However, in the case of the pro group, they were
able to override these negative beliefs by stronger, more positive beliefs
stemming from a number of other factors.
Thus, the risk evaluation process faces a dilemma: Public opinion does not
reflect risks evaluated on purely technical considerations. Psychological
factors and attitudes toward matters that are related only slightly to risk
seem to affect peoples' perception of risk. It appears that the general pu blic
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is very concerned about the possibility of large accidents, even though the
probability of their occurrence is quite small. Yet low frequency, high con-
sequence events generally contribute minimally to the aggregated risk.
One possible way to resolve-or at least to defuse-this conflict is to re-
duce any type of risk below a desirable level by incurring additional safety
efforts and investments. To be sure, any technology can be made safer, but
at an expense. One might ask, How safe is safe enough? Expenditures for
safety in energy systems-and especially for nuclear energy systems-are
approaching the level where the desired reduction in the risk is offset by ad-
ditional risk in producing the safety equipment.
Since economies have limited resources that need to be directed toward
the most cost-effective alternatives, the problem is one of determining thcse
alternatives. Not only would the price of the electricity generated be higher
because of the cost of producing such safety equipment but, as explained
above, additional costs would be incurred as a result of worker injuries and
deaths from accidents at the plants manufacturing the safety equipment.
Studies of safety measures conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany
(Black, Niehaus, and Simpson 1979) showed that for each billion dollars
of machine tool products and electrical equipment produced, there would
be 8.2 deaths due to occupational accidents and to accidents in commuting
to and from the job. The number of person-days lost was 52,000.
We used these figures to estimate the "true" costs of producing safety
equipment. The production of $30 million of safety equipment would be
associated with one death or with 600 person-years of work. We cite this
figure here only to give orientation about what might be considered the
reasonable maximum limit for safety expenditures and to show, albeit in
a simplified way, how the cost effectiveness of risk reduction could be
measured.
Risk Management
The estimation and evaluation of potential risks are prerequisites to the
difficult task of translating the analytic results into policy and regulatory
decisions. For risk management, standard setting has emerged as the most
practical method for reducing environmental risk and hazards. It has also
become a constraint for industrial operations, as well as a driving force,
particularly for technical development. In the energy sector, standards are
used to shape long- and short-term decisions, ranging from those about
plant operation to long-term planning of optimal energy supply mixes.
What environmental burdens of energy systems could be tolerated, and
what should be the criteria for limiting them at both the individual and
societal level? We tackled these questions, first, by reviewing three case
studies of past standard setting for radiation standards, chronic oil discharge
standards, and noise standards respectively. The initial purpose of the case
studies was to learn about critical similarities and dissimilarities among
different procedures for resolving conflicts among regulators, energy facility
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developers, and the public exposed to environmental risks. For example,
discharge standards for oil production platforms in the North Sea focused on
the technical characteristics of the engineering equipment intended to pro-
tect the environment. In the case of noise standards for Japanese trains, it
was the frequency of complaints, not the details of train design, that was
the explicit subject and focus of the standards. Based on such insights, two
quantitative models of simplified standard setting procedures were developed
and used to study the setting of standards for atmospheric carbon dioxide,
for train noise, and for chronic discharges from offshore oil platforms. The
objective behind these models was not to determine what standards should
be set, or even how standards should be set. Rather, it was to better under-
stand some of the biases implicit in different possible standard setting
processes. For example, the specific standards advocated by regulators,
developers, or members of the public will depend not only on personal
preferences, but also on what alternative regulatory mechanisms are con-
sidered, possible monitoring and inspection procedures, and the possible
sanctions available for punishing violators. And adjusting a standard setting
procedure can change not only the relative importance of the views held by
different parties, but also the relative importance of these other factors-
the set of regulatory alternatives considered, the enforcement procedures,
the available sanctions.
The modeling efforts and the insights they produced were necessarily
preliminary. Although societies have been managing risks for thousands of
years, both the risks requiring management and the analytic study of risk
management have developed significantly during the last ten years. The
principal conclusion offered here is that the current understanding of how
societies manage risks and how they might better manage risks is still very
primitive, but nonetheless suggests that there is much to be gained from
pursuing further study and improving the level of understanding.
CONCLLI DING REMARKS
In this chapter we have examined four types of constraints on society's capa-
bilities for supplying energy. From our exploration of the various energy
supply options, it would appear that the energy problem could be resolved
over the long term. However, as our considerations on constraints indicate,
the exploitation of any or all of these options on a large scale would bring
us into the realm of global impacts that could limit the further deployment
of these technologies.
The task we now face is to be more vigorous in our efforts to define the
interaction between these supply potentials and their limitations and thus to
provide insights that might be useful in the design of global energy strategies
over the long term. In the next chapter we report on our approach to synthe-
sizing the potentials, limitations, and demand aspirations into two plausible
scenarios of how the global energy picture might evolve over the next fifty
years.
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8 BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND:THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In Chapters 3 through 6 we explored the potentials of different energy
supply options under the most optimistic of assumptions. And in Chapter 7
we examined the sorts of constraints that could limit the extent to which
those potentials could be exploited. Our intention was to stretch our think-
ing to the limits to determine the technical characteristics of each option
that would ultimately determine its attractiveness in competition with the
others. And, by so doing, we would be able to identify major side effects
that could accompany the aggressive deployment of any of the options. It
is only on the basis of such material that one can realistically examine how
our current energy system might evolve over the next fifty years, and it is
to these issues that we turn our attention in this chapter.
The quantitative analysis reported here combines an array of real-world
constraints in order to build up (starting with details) a range of plausible
energy futures. This is done regionally and has as a goal the balancing of
energy demand and supply within the assumed constraints. The two sce-
narios and three alternative cases discussed here could be considered the
pragmatist's guide to a range of plausible, global energy futures over the next
fifty years.
In Chapter 10, we go beyond this and report on our explorations of some
of the paths that may be taken over a longer time horizon to reach a truly
sustainable energy world that is built around nondepletable resources. The
material in that chapter and that presented here are complementary. The
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former seeks to explore the bounds of the possible; the latter seeks to balance
constraining factors in order to identify the plausible. Chapter 10 defines a
long-term goal; the current chapter charts a path with no explicit goal.
However, the implications of what is reported in this chapter may lead to a
more rapid development of the energy systems that are outlined later.
Since the objective of our analysis of supply and demand was to be
realistic, we were necessarily led to the use of mathematical models. Gen-
erally, there are three types of mathematical models that lend themselves to
such work. The first type, which is built upon the physical and chemical laws
of nature, describes a large part of reality precisely. The second category
includes econometric models~that is, the intelligent processing of time series
data. These models also describe reality, but usually not with the same pre-
cision as those in the first category and with a time horizon of only two,
three, or four years. The third type of mathematical model is that identified
with the writing of scenarios, and it is this approach that we adopted for our
study. Briefly, our set of mathematical energy models included models that
were developed at IIASA and, in a few instances, some that were brought to
IIASA and adapted for specific purposes.a
In writing scenarios, we were in no sense attempting to make predictions.
Rather, we viewed scenario writing as a way to organize our thinking about
available information: Specifically we insisted rigorously on two criteria-
internal consistency and global comprehensiveness.
AN OUTLINE OF THE SCENARIOS
The purpose of the scenarios is to detail realistically the engineering and
economic consequences that might follow from two different sets of reason-
able assumptions. The results should be interpreted carefully. The numbers
are meant to provide insights and to help in meeting the intellectual chal-
lenge of grasping the dominant characteristics, trends, possibilities, and
constraints on global and regional energy considerations. They are not pre-
dictions, and should serve only as guidelines for determining what is feasible
over the coming five decades, assuming there are no social and political
constraints.
We analyzed energy supply and demand through many iterations and
interpretations that finally led us to envisage a range of plausible global
energy futures. These two benchmark scenarios are labeled "High" and
"Low," the former referring to a situation in which the demand for energy is
relatively high, the latter to one in which demand is relatively low. And we
investigated three alternative cases, with necessarily less detail than the two
scenarios. These cases comprise one in which there is a worldwide nuclear
moratorium, one in which there is an all-out effort to develop nuclear
energy, and one incorporating strong energy-saving measures for achieving a
very low level of energy demand. By altering certain assumptions, we were
aA description of the IlASA set of energy models is given in Appendix C.
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able to use these three cases to test the sensitivity of our results and to
achieve additional measures of technical feasibility.
As noted in Chapter 2, we assumed an essentially surprise-free world-no
global-scale disasters, no sweeping scientific and technological discoveries.
These things could happen, but they were not considered in the design of
our scenarios. We did not want to rely on them, nor could we in fact predict
their occurrence.
Since it is neither possible nor desirable to write scenarios for some 150
nations, we chose instead to study seven world regions, as described in Chap-
ter 2. These regions were analyzed both for their differences and for their
roles in the overall future global energy situation. This enabled us both to
preserve broad national similarities within each region and to treat major
energy trade patterns among regions.
We began our analysis by postulating two basic development variables
for each of the seven world regions to the year 2030-population growth,
and economic development as measured by growth in the gross domestic
product (GDP). We made two sets of estimates in order to suggest the range
of likely developments over the next fifty years.
Our assumptions about population growth for the seven world regions,
which are given in Table 8-1, are based on the projections of Nathan Keyfitz
(1977), of Harvard University, who envisages a doubling of the world's
population from the current four billion to eight billion by the year 2030.
More difficult to predict than population are economic growth rates because
of many determining factors such as technological progress, know-how,
and skills of all kinds. Instead, one has to make assumptions. For both
scenarios, we assumed declining economic growth rates throughout the study
period. Further, we recognized that developing countries would be limited in
Table 8-1. Population projections by region, High and Low scenarios (106
people).
Population
Base Projection
Year
Region 7975 2000 2030
I (NA) 237 284 315
II (SU/EE) 363 436 480
III (WE/ J ANZ) 560 680 767
IV (LA) 319 575 797
V (Af/SEA) 1422 2528 3550
VI (ME/NAf) 133 247 353
VII (C/CPA) 912 1330 1714
World 3946 6080 7976
Note: 1975 data are midyear estimates from United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
January 1978.
Source: Keyfitz (1977).
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their growth potential to one or two percentage points above the growth
rates of the developed countries (Hicks et al. 1976). This implies that for the
next few decades, the developing countries will still be tied to the rest of the
world economy through trade and other relations. We consider it unrealistic
to assume high economic growth rates in the developing world while the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
have a low or even a zero growth rate.
When constructing the scenarios, we found that growth rates are generally
restricted by the conditions required for interregional consistency and the
balance of energy demand and supply. Thus, if one connects the 1975 and
2030 points by an exponential curve (the decline of growth rates therefore
not being expressed), one obtains a 3.4 percent rate of economic growth for
Table 8-2. Historical and projected growth rates of GDP, by region, High
and Low scenarios (%/yr).
Historical Scenario Projection
7950- 7960- 7975- 7985- 2000- 2075-
Region 7960 7975 7985 2000 2075 2030
A. High Scenario
I (NA) 3.3 3.4 4.3 3.3 2.4 2.0
II (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.5
III (WE/JANZ) 5.0 5.2 4.3 3.4 2.5 2.0
IV (LA) 5.0 6.1 6.2 4.9 3.7 3.3
V (At/SEA) 3.9 5.5 5.8 4.8 3.8 3.4
VI (ME/NAt) 7.0 9.8 7.2 5.9 4.2 3.8
VII (C/CPA) 8.0 6.1 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.0
World 5.0 5.0 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.7
I + Ilia 4.2 4.4 4.3 3.4 2.5 2.0
IV+V+Vla 4.7 6.5 6.3 5.1 3.9 3.5
B. Low Scenario
I (NA) 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.0 1.1 1.0
II (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 2.0
III (WE/JAn) 5.0 5.2 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.2
IV (LA) 5.0 6.1 4.7 3.6 3.0 3.0
V (At/SEA) 3.9 5.5 4.8 3.6 2.8 2.4
VI (ME/NAt) 7.0 9.8 5.6 4.6 2.7 2.1
VII (C/CPA) 8.0 6.1 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.0
World 5.0 5.0 3.6 2.7 1.9 1.7
I + lila 4.2 4.4 3.1 2.1 1.3 1.1
IV+V+Vla 4.7 6.5 5.0 3.8 2.9 2.6
apresented for purposes of comparison with data of WAES (1977) and of other global studies
that exclude centrally planned economies.
Note: Historical and projected values of GOP in constant (1975) U.S. dollars are given in Chant
(1980).
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the High scenario and a 2.4 percent rate of growth for the Low scenario.
Disaggregated in time and space, the picture is as explained in Table 8-2.
Some suggest that we are being too conservative in our estimates and that
national economies will grow faster than we envisage. Then too, others
maintain that our growth rates are too high. Our intent was to hew to reality
as we picture it. To be sure, economic growth rates lower than what we
projected could ease the energy problem, but in our opinion they would
exacerbate other problems.
HOW MUCH ENERGY WILL BE NEEDED?
(The Problem of Energy Demand and Conservation)
Quite simply, in a finite world, exponential growth must ultimately stop.
Over the previous twenty-five years, global primary energy demand has
grown at a surprisingly consistent 4.8 percent per year. A 5 percent per year
growth in global energy use, if continued over the next fifty years, would
necessitate an increase in one year (2030) of 75 percent of our base year
figure of annual global primary energy consumption (8.2 TWyr/yr). And at
this rate, by 2037, the growth in energy use in that year alone would exceed
the total amount of primary energy consumed in 1975. The question then is
not whether energy growth will slow down, but when, at what level, and in
which world regions? What are the implications of such a slowdown?
For estimating energy demand, we found it necessary to first determine
the appropriate methodological approach. The econometrical method has
been widely used for estimating energy demand by considering elasticities-
that is, the ratio of relative increases of demand with relative increases of
prices or income. Provided there is a good statistical base, it is possible to
extract such elasticities and to base a mathematical approach on it that fore-
casts energy demand evaluation over a period of a few years. But for our
analysis, we chose to look ahead fifty years and to consider not only those
world regions that have a good statistical data base but also those regions
wqere that is not the case. Thus, we opted for a different approach that
accounted for the physical end uses of energy (final energy) for the econ-
omy as a whole and in the private sector as well. This led us to consider how
the use of energy would affect the lifestyles of people, and how technologi-
cal progress could be expected to improve the efficiency of energy usage,
among other things.
We examined in great detail the four factors that influence energy de-
mand-population growth, economic growth, technological progress, and
structural changes within economies. However, in this book we have chosen
not to devote a separate, more qualitative chapter to energy demand but to
consider it within the framework of our quantitative analysis of supply and
demand. By accounting quantitatively for these demand factors we were able
to apply certain schemes-as, for example, to study energy use and GDP
ratios and to test the appropriateness of our scenario assumptions.
It may be helpful to look at some globally aggregated data for the use of
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commercial energy across the various sectors, as given in Table 8-3. The
amount of final energy used in 1975 was 5.7 TWyr/yr. Of this amount, the
household service sector held a share of 26 percent, the industry sector 45
percent, transportation 23 percent, and feedstocks some 5 percent. By
including transportation and conversion losses, we come to a primary energy
consumption of 8.2 TWyr/yr.
We complete the picture by looking at energy demand in the deVeloping
regions, as revealed by the data in Table 8-4 for regions IV and V. In 1975,
in region IV, as much as 35 percent, and in region V some 61 percent, are
based on noncommercial energy sources such as wood and agricultural
wastes. This distribution is important not only in terms of supply but equally
for considerations of the end-use technologies selected, since the efficiency
from noncommercial sources is usually very low, often much less than 5
percent. Therefore, as efficiencies improve a completely new feature of
energy demand in the future is expected to evolve for the developing regions
(IV, V, VI, VII) somewhat independently along the lines governing energy
demand in developed regions (I, II, III).
Table 8-3. Global commercial energy use in 1975 (TWyr/yr).
Cool Oil
Distrib-
uted
Gas Electricity Heat Hydro a Nucleoro Total
Transportation
Industryb
Househol d-service
Feedstocksc
Final energy
Transportation and
distribution losses
Secondary energy
Inputs to electricityd
and distributed heat
Other lossese
Primary energy
0.045
0.729
0.285
o
1.059
0.038
1.097
1.069
0.091
2.257
1.272
0.722
0.547
0.298
2.839
o
2.839
0.534
0.455
3.828
o
0.620
0.382
o
1.002
0.097
1.099
0.359
0.049
1.507
0.016
0.359
0.249
o
0.624
0.091
0.715
-0.734
0.019
o
o
0.170
0.048
o
0.218
0.010
0.228
-0.277
0.049
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
0.497
o
0.497
o 1.333
o 2.600
o 1.511
o 0.298
o 5.742
o 0.236
o 5.978
0.119 1.567
o 0.663
0." 9 8.208
dHydro- and nuclear-generated electricity are given in terms of fossil primary energy input equiv-
alent.
blndustry includes agriculture, construction, mining, and manufacturing.
cFeedstocks include nonenergy use of fuels. (Natural gas used to make fertilizers is included
in "industry.")
dThe inputs to electricity generation are primary equivalents of the sources; these figures include
primary sources used in cogeneration facilities. (The -0.734 figure under "electricity" represents
the secondary (busbar) electricity generated from the several primary sources.)
e"Other losses" include all primary to secondary losses (e.g., primary transport, oil refining);
they also include bunkers (0.21 TWyr/yr of oil in 1975)-energy used in international shipments
of fuel.
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Table 8-4. Energy in two developing regions, 1965 and 1975.
7975
Total Rural Fraction
Population (10· )
Region IV (LA)
Region V (Af/SEA)
GDP (10' $)
Region IV (LA)
Region V (Af/SEA)
Total primary energy
(including noncommercial) (TWyr/yr)
Region IV (LA)
Region V (Af/SEA)
Share of oil
Region IV (LA)
Region V (Af/SEA)
Share of noncommercial energya
Region IV (LA), of which
Wood
Agricultural wastes
Region V (Af/SEA), of which
Wood
Agricultural wastes
319 0.40
1422 0.78
Share of
Total Agriculture
340 0.12
340 0.36
7965 7975
0.278 0.447
0.442 0.672
0.46 0.51
0.15 0.24
0.35 0.24
0.28 0.18
0.07 0.06
0.61 0.51
0.41 0.34
0.20 0.17
aNoncommercial energy is expressed here in terms of its calorific heat content and not as a re-
placement equivalent of fossil fuels. The efficiencies of use of noncommercial and commercial fuels
are quite different.
Table 8-5 shows the aggregate results of final energy use for the seven
world regions and their differences with respect to historical trends. Both
scenarios provide for a degree of energy conservation, with the level being
higher in the High scenario and for the developed regions.
Energy would be saved in the developed regions through more fuel-
efficient automobiles, better insulated buildings, and greater efficiencies in
using energy in the industrial sector. The extent of such improvements in
final energy use for all regions can be seen in Figure 2-3 of Chapter 2, which
shows the ratio of final energy use to GOP or, in other words, the overall
energy intensiveness of the past and that embodied in the scenarios. Energy
intensiveness in the developed regions decreases in line with the historical
trends. The ratio for all of the developing regions increases initially, but
flattens off and eventually starts to decrease in the case of regions IV and VI.
A certain regularity can therefore be observed in the different trends
that is characteristic of our demand scenarios. That is, those regions build-
ing up their industrial base require more energy than those regions that have
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Table 8-5. Final energy in the two scenarios compared to final energy
calculated with historical elasticities (2030).
High With Differ- Low With Differ-
Scenario Historical cf a enceb Scenario Historical cf a enceb
Region (GWyr/yr) (GWyr/yr) (%) (GWyr/yr) (G Wyr/yr) (%)
I (NA) 3665 6921 47 2636 4036 35
II (SU/EE) 4114 5355 23 2952 3850 23
III (WE/]ANZ) 4375 6037 28 2987 3761 21
IV (LA) 2640 4385 40 1656 2481 33
V (Af/SEA) 3173 6900 54 1876 3121 40
VI (ME/NAf) 1638 2590 37 868 1015 16
VII (C/CPA) 3196 8849 64 1589 3536 55
World 22,801 41,037 44 14,564 21,800 33
aCalculated using historical (1950-1975) final energy-to-GDP elasticity (cf) for each region.
bCalculated as final energy, using historical cf minus IIASA scenario projection divided by final
energy using historical cf.
achieved a relatively high level of industrialization. The significance of this
fact will become evident when we turn our attention later in this chapter to
the role of liquid fuels in supporting development.
Globally, the use of final energy per capita increases from a 1975 figure of
1.46 kWyr/yr to 2.86 kWyr/yr in the High scenario and to 1.83 kWyr/yr in
the Low scenario. For the developed regions consumption would grow
relatively slowly and would be more rapid in the developing regions, although
moderated somewhat by high population growth rates in the developing
world. Still, the present inequities in energy use among regions would abate
only slightly by 2030, as shown by the data on per capita final energy use
in Table 8-6. Regions are distinctly different. For example, in developed
region I, final energy was being used in 1975 at a per capita level of 7.89
Table 8-6. Per capita final energy consumption, two scenarios, 1975-2030
(kWyr/yr,cap).
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 7.89 9.25 11.63 7.95 8.37
II (SU/EE) 3.52 5.47 8.57 4.98 6.15
III (WE/JANZ) 2.84 4.46 5.70 3.52 3.90
IV (LA) 0.80 1.7 5 3.31 1.28 2.08
V (Af/SEA) 0.18 0.42 0.89 0.32 0.53
VI (ME/NAt) 0.80 2.34 4.64 1.76 2.46
VII (C/CPA) 0.43 0.93 1.87 0.64 0.93
World 1.46 1.96 2.86 1.58 1.83
Note: The figures are average rates of final energy use, averaged over the population and the year.
BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 139
kWyr/yr; for the Low scenario, we arrived at a modest per capita increase by
the year 2030 of 8.37 kWyr/yr. To be sure, this is not a large increase, essen-
tially implying zero energy growth per capita for this region over the next
fifty years. The increase in the High scenario is only slightly higher. Never-
theless, energy continues to be used there at a prodigious rate.
Looking at developing region IV, where final per capita energy con-
sumption in 1975 was only 0.8 kWyr/yr, we see that in the High scenario
this level increases substantially to 3.3 kWyr/yr per capita, exceeding the
1975 per capita consumption level of developed region III. This projection
therefore reflects our high expectations for overall development in Latin
America over the coming decades.
We found it useful to evaluate the demand scenarios by several indicators.
One was the ratio of final energy use to GOP, as shown in Figure 2-3 of
Chapter 2. Another indicator was the final energy elasticity with GOP,
which is shown in Table 8-7. It is interesting to consider how the developed
regions might achieve lower elasticities, while the elasticities of the develop-
ing regions may be consistently higher. Again this indicates that it takes
more energy per dollar value added to build an economic infrastructure than
to operate and upgrade it.
Table 8-7. Final energy-GDP elasticities {Efl 1950-2030.
Historical
7950- 7975- 7985- 2000- 2075-
Region 7975 7985 2000 2075 2030
A. High Scenario
I (NA) 0.84 0.31 0.43 0.53 0.48
II (SU/EE) 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.53
III (WE!JANZ) 0.84 0.77 0.65 0.58 0.51
IV (LA) 1.21 1.07 1.01 0.97 0.90
V (At/SEA) 1.42 1.20 1.08 1.05 1.01
VI (ME/NAf) 1.17 1.12 1.07 0.95 0.81
VII (C/CPA) 1.53 1.10 1.02 1.02 0.96
World 0.87 0.69 0.73 0.78 0.77
B. Low Scenario
I (NA) 0.84 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.46
II (SU/EE) 0.68 0.54 0.57 0.50 0.41
III (WE!JANZ) 0.84 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.49
IV (LA) 1.21 1.10 1.03 0.95 0.88
V (Af/SEA) 1.42 1.19 1.12 1.14 1.06
VI (ME/NAf) 1.17 1.21 1.11 1.01 0.93
VII (C/CPA) 1.53 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.90
World 0.87 0.64 0.73 0.79 0.74
Note: Historical values were computed by linear regression (see Chant 1980). Values for the
projection period result from the scenario data.
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Table 8-8. Two supply scenarios, primary energy by region, 1975-2030
(TWyr/yr).
High Scenario Low Scenario
Region 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
I (NA) 2.65 3.89 6.02 3.31 4.37
II (SU/EE) 1.84 3.69 7.33 3.31 5.00
III (WE/JANZ) 2.26 4.29 7.14 3.39 4.54
IV (LA) 0.34 1.34 3.68 0.97 2.31
V (At/SEA) 0.33 1.43 4.65 1.07 2.66
VI (ME/NAt) 0.13 0.77 2.38 0.56 1.23
VII (C/CPA) 0.46 1.44 4.45 0.98 2.29
-
Total a 8.21 b 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39
aColumns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
blncludes 0.21 TWyr/yr of bunkers.
The bottom line of any traditional energy accounting is total primary
energy use, and within that total, the various energy sources must be identi-
fied. We therefore consider global primary energy, disaggregated by regions
as shown in Table 8-8. By the year 2030, the total global demand for
primary energy is roughly 36 TWyr/yr for the High scenario and 22 TWyr/yr
for the Low scenario. This compares with 8.2 TWyr/yr of 1975. Thus, be-
tween 1975 and 2030, the demand for primary energy globally increases by
a factor of 4.4 and 2.7, respectively, for the High and Low scenarios; on a
per capita basis there is a 2.2- and 1.3 5-fold increase, respectively, in globally
primary energy demand.
The projections for primary energy demand also point to continued
inequalities in energy use. The ratio of primary energy use in the developing
regions, compared with that in the developed regions, shows only a slight
improvement. The ratio improves by a factor of 3 from 0.23 to 0.75 in the
High scenario and by a factor of 2.6 from 0.23 to 0.6 in the Low scenarios.
Realistically, one must expect the growth of energy demand, at least in the
developing regions, to continue increasing beyond the year 2030, for reasons
of both population growth and economic growth. Thus, any supply option
must be evaluated against a yardstick of 2 to 3 TWyr/yr if a contribution of
about 10 percent of the 20 to 30 TWyr/yr of the total global demand is to
be envisaged.
Extreme Energy Conservation
It is possible in principle to design scenarios of extreme energy conservation.
Balancing supply and demand can be achieved either by going to the extreme
on the supply side, which means facing all the troubles of enhanced supply,
or by going to the extreme on the demand side, which means encountering
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all the hardships of enhanced energy-saving measures. But in either situation,
we must first understand what is meant by the term "extreme."
We explored this issue by examining an extremely low case of energy
demands, which was proposed by Dr. Umberto Colombo, a member of the
Club of Rome and director of the Italian Atomic Energy Commission. In
1978, he proposed an alternative scenario-a simple doubling of the 1975
rate of global primary energy use of some 8 TWyr/yr to some 16 TWyr/yr
by 2030. (This proposed doubling of energy use compares to the projected
scenario increases of factors of 4.3 (High) and 2.7 (Low) by 2030.) With
the doubling of population envisaged for this period, this would lead to a
constant global average primary energy use per capita. But the energy use per
capita distribution among regions would change. Growth for some-namely,
the developing world-would imply decreases for other regions, specifically
regions I and III. Later in this chapter, we delve further into the issues not
only of demand but also of supply for this very low case.
LIQUID FUELS: AN ENERGY PROBLEM
WITHIN THE PROBLEM
The "energy problem," viewed with a sufficiently long-term and global
perspective, is not so much a general energy problem: Strictly speaking
it is a liquid fuels problem-or, more precisely, an oil problem. Thus, the
problems of balancing global supply and demand for liquid fuels pose a
unique challenge.
In our scenario writing we restricted the use of liquid fuels to their most
essential purposes only-that is, as transportation fuels and as feedstocks for
the chemical industry. While in 1975 some 64 percent of the world's total
liquid fuels went to supplying the transportation sector and the chemical
industries, the scenarios project that 92 percent (High scenario) and 88 per-
cent (Low scenario) of all liquid fuels in 2030 would be used for these two
purposes only.
Nevertheless, as Table 8-9 shows, inspite of vigorous measures to conserve
liquid fuels, these fuels still represent the major component of energy use in
the scenarios in 2030. Over the next fifty years, liquid fuel use would grow
at a rate of 2.4 percent per year for the High scenario and 1.6 percent for the
Low scenario, compared to a growth of 2.5 percent per year (High scenario)
and 1.7 percent per year (Low scenario) for all final energy.
It is relatively more difficult to conserve liquid fuels in the developing
regions than in the developed regions for several reasons. Whereas liquid fuel
use, as a share of total final energy, is projected to decline (from 56 to 46
percent) by 2030 in the developed regions, its share would increase slightly
(from 48 to 50-54 percent) in the developing regions. Liquid fuels are easy
to transport and store, and meet demand flexibly. High degrees of storability
and transportability also mean a minimum of required infrastructure, which
is of utmost importance for the developing world. In short, liquid fuels
serve the purposes of development and industrialization rather well. Thus,
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Table 8-9. Shares of electricity and liquid fuels in final energy.
Base High Low
Year Scenario Scenario
7975 2030 2030
Regions I (NA) and III (WE/JANZ)
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 3.5 8.0 5.6
Electricity (%) 12 21 21
Liquids (%) 56 46 46
Region II (SU/EE)
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 1.3 3.7 2.6
Electricity (%) 10 23 20
Liquids (%) 34 32 30
Regions IV (LA), V (At/SEA),
VI (ME/NAf), and VII (C/CPA)
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 1.0 10.6 6.0
Electricity (%) 6 13 13
Liquids (%) 48 50 54
World
Final energy (TWyr/yr) 5.7 22.8 14.6
Electricity (%) 11 17 17
Liquids (%) 50 45 46
Motor Fuel and Feedstocks in
Liquid Fuel
Final demand (%) 64 92 88
wherever possible, the developed regIOns should conserve liquid fuels by
using them only where essential, and there more efficiently, leaving the
world's oil supplies for the developing regions.
HOW CAN NEEDED ENERGY BE SUPPLIED?
Unless the preceding considerations of future energy demand are very wrong,
they would lead quickly to a simple, far-reaching observation: Energy, and
particularly liquid fuels, must be supplied in enormous amounts over the
next fifty years.
Here, in considering energy supply, we recall an observation made in
Chapter 2 about the various time phases of energy. When we began our
analysis, we anticipated only one major energy transition, which would be
completed within fifty years. But by 1978-1979, as our analysis developed,
we realized that the transition to a sustainable global energy system built
around nondepletable resources would not happen within this time horizon.
Instead, we saw that there was not enough time to build up the infrastructure
of nonfossil energy systems to allow them to contribute sufficiently to
global energy supply in 2030. Thus, during the next fifty years, we would
have to turn more and more to costly and difficult, albeit unconventional,
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fossil resources to carry us through until 2030. This major change in supply
patterns-from conventional to unconventional fossils-would probably
occur before the end of the century.
The relative shares of primary energy supply by source, in the High and
Low scenarios, for the world by the year 2030 are shown in Figure 8-1.
Although one can observe a somewhat constant share of gas and a decline in
the share of oil, the oil and natural gas era would not be over. By 2030, they
would still provide large amounts of energy-two and a half times their 1975
levels in the High scenario by 2030-but a large fraction of this oil would be
unconventional oil.
Coal production, after growing slowly until the end of this century, would
expand rapidly thereafter, as coal begins to play its strategic role as a raw
import for producing synthetic liquid fuels. Indeed, it is because of coal-
based synthetic liquids that the demand for oil can be reduced. Coal would
therefore have to be set aside for this purpose and not be used as before for
electricity generation. This, in turn, would be possible because nuclear
energy would take over large portions of electricity generation.
In fact, nuclear energy would meet effectively all new non-peak-Ioad
electricity demand in the developed regions, in both scenarios. Hydroelectric
power can be seen to hold a somewhat constant share of primary energy
supply over the period, while other renewable energy sources, including
hard solar energy, would have a rather low share. This is more an outcome of
cost considerations rather than a statement of the potential or desirability of
such renewable energy sources.
In both scenarios, two major technologies appear on the energy scene
around the year 2000 that influence the supply situation significantly. These
are the production of synthetic liquid fuels and the fast breeder reactor.
Synliquids should be interpreted as synthetic hydrocarbons of any kind-as,
for example, the two liquid fuels, methanol and gasoline, or even the gas,
Figure 8-1. Global primary energy, two supply scenarios, 1975-2030.
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methane. But in the scenarios, because of the pressing demand for energy
in liquid form, we emphasized the production of synliquids. b
According to the High scenario, by 2030 only 61 percent of the liquid
fuel demands would be met by crude oil. The remainder, 39 percent, would
come from synthetic liquid fuels made from coal. The level of demand for
liquid fuels is the engine for change in these scenarios, especially after the
year 2000, when most of the major changes in energy supply patterns are
expected. In combination with this, a ceiling on oil production would have a
large impact on the extent and time of oil alternatives: As imports become
restricted, alternatives would appear sooner and to a greater extent. Thus,
some 56 percent of the coal needed at this time would be used to produce
synthetic fuels.
The significance of the breeder reactor can be grasped when we consider
the large changes expected in the mix of sources for generating electricity.
For example, the use of liquid fuels would be restricted to the chemical
industry and for transportation activities. Coal would be reserved more and
more for producing synthetic fuels. And, unfortunately, gas would probably
not be able to substitute globally, since the problems of transporting it over
long distances would, according to our assumptions, not be resolved by that
time. Thus, around the year 2000, nuclear energy would be called upon to
produce some 30 percent of secondary electrical energy in the High scenario
and some 20 percent in the Low. These are, of course, global figures that
would vary according to different regions.
The disaggregation of global primary energy supply by source, in absolute
terms, which is given in Table 8-10, shows a prodigious consumption of
resources, particularly of fossil fuels. Do we have enough energy resources?
Typically, the answer is, Yes and no.
Initially, we were somewhat naive and thought that assessing the resource
situation would be relatively straightforward. But as our explorations of the
various supply potentials indicated, this was not the case. We discovered that
the traditional categories of resources-that is, the cheap and easy conven-
tional ones-were not the only ones we would have to consider. Fossil fuel
resources are a good example of why we had to look also at the categories of
tomorrow and consider not only the amount of resources but production
limits as well.
Traditional wisdom has it that 1000 TWyr is a good indicative figure for
global fossil resources, and this is consistent with 1091 TWyr which is
the global total of what might be referred to as conventional fossil resources.
The 560 TWyr of category 1 coal listed in Table 8-11 are the equivalent
of some 600 billion tons of coal, which is essentially the conventional com-
bSince neither nuclear nor solar energy systems could be built up to the level at which they could
supply large amounts of energy by the year 2030, we were led in the scenarios to assume the produc-
tion of synthetic liquid fuels by the autothermal process. This would mean the use of three to four
times more coal and the concomitant environmental problems than would be incurred with the
allothemal method. Chapter 3 gives more information on these two methods for coal-based synthetic
fuel production.
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Table 8-10. Global primary energy by source, two supply scenarios,
1975-2030 (TWyr/yr).
Base High Scenario Low Scenario
Year
Primary Source a 7975 2000 2030 2000 2030
Oil 3.83 5.89 6.83 4.75 5.02
Gas 1.51 3.11 5.97 2.53 3.47
Coal 2.26 4.94 11.98 3.92 6.45
Light water reactor 0.12 1.70 3.21 1.27 1.89
Fast breeder reactor 0 0.04 4.88 0.02 3.28
Hyd roe lectri city 0.50 0.83 1.46 0.83 1.46
Solarb 0 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.30
Otherc 0 0.22 0.81 0.17 0.52
Total d 8.21 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39
aprimary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or refining processes-for
example, coal used to make synthetic liquid fuel is counted in coal figures. (For definition of energy
types, see Figure 1-1.)
blncludes mostly "soft" solar-individual rooftop collectors-and also small amounts of centralized
solar electricity.
C"Other" includes biogas, geothermal, and commercial wood use.
dColumns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
ponents of coal resources. The situation is similar for oil, with 264 TWyr,
and for natural gas, with 267 TWyr.
When one includes the higher cost categories shown in the table, one gains
additional resources amounting to a threefold increase. That is, not 1000
TWyr but 3000 TWyr is the more appropriate figure. But these additional
resources are not of the same nature as the first 1000 TWyr. The difficulties
that go along with category 2 and 3 resources are significant, making them
more costly not only in monetary terms but also as to their environmental
and social impacts.
The Oil Era is Not Over
Let us look first at the oil situation, since this is the most critical problem.
In Figure 8-2, for the High scenario, we see that known reserves of conven-
tional oil in the world's market economies are almost exhausted by the year
2010. This is essentially the man in the street's perception of the energy
situation, and in this respect, he is correct. We therefore had to search for
new reserves of conventional oil, Mexico being a case in point. But in our
scenarios we accounted for all the Mexicos to come, and still oil production
did not go above the level of 25 million barrels per day. We were then forced
to turn to unconventional oil sources, such as the Athabasca tar sands in
Canada and the Orinoco heavy crude oils in Latin America, recognizing the
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Table 8-11. Summary of estimates of ultimately recoverable resou rces by
cost category (TWyr).
Resourcea Coalb Oil Natural Gas Uranium
Cost
Category c 2 2 3 2 3 2
Region
I (NA) 174 232 23 26 125 34 40 29 35 27
II (SU/EE) 136 448 37 45 69 66 51 31 d 75
III (WE/JANZ) 93 151 17 3 21 19 5 14 14 38
IV (LA) 10 11 19 81 110 17 12 14 1 64
V (Af/SEA) 55 52 25 5 33 16 10 14 6 95
VI (ME/NAf) <1 <1 132 27 d 108 10 14 1 27
VII (C/CPA) 92 124 11 13 15 7 13 14 d 36
World 560 1019 264 200 373 267 141 130 57 362
a For oil, gas, and coal, see estimates given in the text (translated here into units of TWyr); for
uranium, see estimates given in Chapter 4.
b For coal, only a part of the ultimate resource (-15 percent) has been included, because the
figures are already very large for the time horizon of 2030 and because of the many uncertainties
about very long-term coal resources and production technologies.
cCos t categories represent estimates of costs either at or below the stated volume of recoverable
resources (in constant 1975$).
For oil and natural gas: Cat. 1: 12$/boe
Cat.2: 12-20$/boe
Cat. 3: 20-25$/boe
For coal: Cat. 1: 25 $/tce
Cat. 2: 25-50$/tce
For uranium: Cat. 1: 80$/kgU
Cat. 2: 80-130$/kgU
A subcategory of oil, 1 A, exists only for regions I (NA) and IV (LA) and includes oil available at
production costs of $12 to $16/boe. Also, a subcategory of gas, 0, exists only for region VI
(M~NAf), with gas available at $2/boe.
No estimate was made.
Sources: Ashley et al. (1976); Eckstein (1978); Grenon (1977); Grossling (1976); Institute of
Geological Sciences (1978); Lambertini (1976); Meyer (1977); Oil and Gas Journal (1978); O'Shaugh-
nessy (1976); Penner and Icerman (1975); Perrine (1978); Uhl (1977).
new geopolitical patterns that would develop when the unconventional oils
began to play such a major role.
But even turning to unconventional oil sources was not enough, and some-
time around the year 2000, large-scale coal liquefaction would become a
necessity, yielding a total oil production outside region VI that still would
not meet the minimum demand for liquid fuels required even for essential
uses. Oil imports from region VI would still be needed, and it is indeed one
of the crucial assumptions of our analysis that region VI would continue to
have a production ceiling of 33 million barrels of oil per day. This ceiling is
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Figure 8-2. World oil supply and demand (excluding centrally planned economies),
High scenario, 1975-2030.
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some 50 percent greater than the 1975 oil production of this region and
about 30 percent above its 1977 production rate. Region VI is not quite the
same as OPEC. The difference between region VI oil production rates and
capacities and OPEC oil production rates and capacities is detailed in Table
8-12. We were led to conclude that the worldwide struggle for oil would
continue, and that only some time after the year 2030 could this situation
change.
As Figure 8-3 shows, in 1975 there were two net oil-consuming regions
(regions I and III), three oil supplier regions (regions IV, V, and VI), and two
regions that are relatively energy self-sufficient (regions II and VII). But in
order to have a feasible match between demand and supply in 2030 in our
High scenario, we assumed that regions I, II, IV, and VII would be self-
sufficient in oil supply. At that time, only region VI would be an oil ex-
porter, with regions III (a developed region) and V (a developing region)
competing for these oil exports, creating a set of political implications some-
what different from those of today. Significantly, as can be seen from Table
8-10, the production and consumption of oil in both scenarios goes up, not
down, compared with 1975. While the relative share of oil declines, the
absolute numbers increase.
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Table 8-12. Region VI (ME/NAf) oil production rates and capacity and
assumed production ceiling (mbd).
Production Rates
OPEC member countries
non-region VI OPECa member countries
OPEC and region Vl b countries
non-OPEC region V IC countries
Region VI
of which exported
7975
27.19
- 5.82
21.37
+ 1.05
22.42
21.23
7977
31.53
- 6.52
25.01
+ 0.99
26.00
24.64
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
UAE
Algeria
Qatar
Estimate of other region V If countries
Region VI
Estimated Long-Term Region VI "Ceiling":
Production Capacities
7975 7977
DOE PIW
Estimated Estimatee
10.7 10.8
6.5 6.8
3.0 2.6
2.9 3.0
2.3 2.5
2.3 2.3
1.3 1.0
0.6 0.7
1.4 1.4
31.0 31.8
33.6
aNon-region VI OPEC countries are Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria, Gabon, and Indonesia.
bEight OPEC member countries are in region VI-six in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
UAE, Iran, Iraq, Qatar) and two in Northern Africa (Algeria and Libya).
cSeven countries in the Middle East-Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Yemen and Yemen
(Democratic)-and one in Northern Africa (Egypt).
d U.S. Department of Energy estimate, International Energy Indicators, April 1979.
epetroleum Intelligence Weekly (1979).
f llASA estimate.
Coal
The trend toward larger resource consumption is even more pronounced in
the case of coal, from 2 TWyr/yr in 1975 to 12 TWyr/yr by 2030 in the High
scenario and 6.5 TWyr/yr in the Low scenario-an increase of almost six
times in the High scenario and three times in the Low scenario. Although it
could be argued that producing 12 billion tons of coal per year is an impos-
sible task, the question that must be asked is, If not coal, what other primary
energy source could assume the burden instead? Relieving the pressure on
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Figure 8-3. Oil trading between regions, High scenario, 1975-2030.
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one resource would only increase the pressure elsewhere. Or one might
argue that the High scenario is impossible altogether, that only the Low
scenario should be considered or perhaps even the conditions of the very
low, 16 TWc demand case should be the target. However, for such considera-
tions, it is important to understand the implications of lower energy use
levels, especially in the developing parts of the world. Again, if we insist on
being globally comprehensive-and we do-there is no escape.
The high coal figures come on top of the above-considered production of
oil from shales and tar sands. Although this may appear impossible by
today's yardstick, the global energy problem is of such a dimension that
solutions will also have to extend beyond the realm of tradition. In any
event, one would expect coal to be in short supply sometime around the
CThroughout the discussion we will refer to the very low demand case-in which primary energy
use in 2030 reaches only 16 TWyr!yr-as the "16 TW case." Strictly speaking, although this is in
violation of our convention restricting the use of the TW unit to the description of energy facility
capacitities, it is less cumbersome and we hope less confusing for the reader.
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year 2000. (The fact that the autothermal method of coal liquefaction and
gasification is assumed in the scenarios to be used at this time would only
aggregate the tight coal supply situation.) Also, the possible global climatic
impacts of burning fossil fuels and of thus releasing large amounts of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere would have to be monitored. The related CO 2
buildup for the two scenarios is illustrated in Figure 8-4.
Energy from Gas
In the scenarios, we cautiously assumed that gas would not be transported
intercontinentally. This is not to say that we do not hope for the technolog-
ical progress in gas transportation discussed in Chapter 3, but here again, we
hewed to real world constraints, and considered gas to be of regional sig-
nificance only. Its contribution, while increasing in absolute terms, would
remain somewhat constant in relative terms. The resource situation would
allow for higher energy contributions from gas, but only for a couple of
decades given present knowledge. Where 837 TWyr is the total recover-
able oil (categories 1, 2, and 3 in Table 8-11), 538 TWyr is the total re-
coverable gas (categories 1, 2,and 3), its share of conventional resources
(category 1) being 267 TWyr.
Nuclear Power
Nuclear power in our supply scenarios is represented on a medium scale. The
share of 8.1 TWyr/yr in the High scenario and 5.17 TWyr/yr in the Low sce-
nario relate to 4.8 TW(e) and 3 TW(e) of installed capacity by the year 2030.
To be sure, this is considerably below the 10 TW(e) of installed capacity that
we considered an upper limit for exploring the nuclear option in Chapter 4.
But as we observed there, in order to achieve 10 TW(e) of installed capacity
by 2030, there would have to be a worldwide and lasting effort beginning
now to develop nuclear power.
For our scenarios, we saw that there is just not enough time to build up
the nuclear industry to a level higher than that projected. Likewise, we
realistically envisaged the use of LWRs of current design initially and the
large-scale introduction of the fast breeder reactor around the year 2000.
Hard and Soft Solar Energy
From our explorations of the potential of hard solar power in Chapter 5,
we saw that material requirements and their concomitant capital invest-
ments were too large to allow solar to be a major global energy source before
2030. Likewise, we concluded in our quantitative analysis that the produc-
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Figure 8-4. CO 2 emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and temperature change,
High and Low scenarios.
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tion capacity of solar power would be negligible at 2030 and would not
reach substantial levels until after the year 2030.
What is left is the soft version-local uses of solar energy. While such
power might very well be of local significance over our study horizon, on a
global scale, its contribution would be limited. For example, the total roof
area per capita could amount to 40 m2 , but on average globally only one-
fourth of this area might be suitable for collecting solar power. With 40 m2
of effective solar power being harnessed in the low temperature domain,
one would obtain 400 W per capita or, for eight billion people, a total of 3.2
TWyr/yr. This back-of-an-envelope calculation does not take into account
such problems as low temperature storage or costs or special local condi-
tions. The argument is sufficiently robust to conclude that such soft solar
power does not match the scale of global energy demand. It turns out to be
a valuable, but limited, contribution. In the scenarios, the contribution of
soft solar is small-0.5 TWyr/yr (High) and 0.3 TWyr/yr (Low).
Other Renewable Energy Sources
In addition to solar power, there are renewable energy sources with a some-
what local character that invite special consideration. Indeed, because local
conditions are different and sometimes unique, there are important local
opportunities that do not become explicit in a global study. Often these
sources are referred to as "soft." But since we are interested here in bal-
ancing global supply and demand, we shall view these resources through the
global lens only.
Although renewable energy sources are in principle available on an in-
finite basis, their commercial use has been limited thus far by generally
unfavorable economics. This may change as costs of traditional energy
supplies rise. Also, the difficulties of exploiting, harvesting, transporting,
distributing, and using renewable energy sources are today generally greater
than for fossil fuels. Nonetheless, some renewable sources are in wide use-
notably hydroelectric power in both the developed and the developing
regions and biomass as a noncommercial energy source in some developing
regions. Large-scale, centralized hydroelectric capacity plays an important
role in the scenario projections and is used at the level of 1.5 TWyr/yr in
both scenarios. In addition, small-scale hydroelectric power facilities and
wind converters may have useful applications in certain favorable locations.
These potentials are not incorporated explicitly in the supply schemes of the
High and Low scenarios, but are assumed to be implicitly covered in the
shares of hydroelectric power projected for the deVeloping regions.
Other renewable energy sources that might also be used are biomass, wet
geothermal, and commercial fuelwood. Together, these energy forms con-
tribute 0.8 TWyr/yr (High) and 0.5 TWyr/yr (Low) to global supplies. These
numbers refer to the commercial uses of such sources, which are constrained
by competitive economics of energy supply technologies. These global
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figures therefore exclude noncommercial uses, although we recognize their
importance in satisfying energy demand in many developing countries.
AN EXPLORATION OF EXTREMES: THREE CASES
In developing our scenarios we probed three extreme cases in order to gain
insight into the meaning and implications of the more plausible course of
events. Once we had quantified the High and Low scenarios, three additional
alternatives were explored. These included two supply cases-a Nuclear
Moratorium case and an Enhanced Nuclear case-and a very low, 16 TW
demand case.
At least two broad and polarized views on future energy supply problems
exist today. One view maintains that nuclear energy is unsafe, uneconomical,
and/or unnecessary. Another view contends that with long-term oil replace-
ment as the highest priority, nuclear energy-not nuclear energy solely for
electricity production-can be called upon to contribute to liquid fuel sup-
ply. One view would put a stop to the expansion of nuclear capacity or, at
an even greater extreme, close down all existing capacity; the other view
would accelerate nuclear growth.
The very low case of 16 TWyr/yr, which represents a simple doubling of
the 1975 world primary energy consumption of 8.2 TWyr/yr, also represents
an essential redistribution of energy usage patterns and calls for significant
conservation and radical changes in how people live. The implementation of
such an energy strategy, which has proponents around the world, carries
many weighty implications for all regions and should likewise be explored.
Highlights of our three cases studies are presented here, especially in the
accompanying tables and charts. The energy supply system implications of
these two perspectives are sketched here. Table 8-13 summarizes the main
defining parameters of the Nuclear Moratorium and Enhanced Nuclear cases.
Table 8-13. Summary definition of two alternative supply cases.
Assumptions
FB Ra buildup
LWRb buildup
Oil production limits
Coal prod uction
limits
Centralized solar
electric (STEC)
Nuclear Moratorium Case
(based on Low
scenario 5- demand)
None
No new installations
Higher than Low scenario
Higher than Low scenario
2000 onwards (all regions)
Enhanced Nuclear Case
(based on High
scenario's demand)
1995 onwards (all regions)
Same as High scenario
Same as High scenario
Coal consumption is "minimized"
Unchanged
aFast breeder reactors or other advanced converter reactors.
blight water reactors or other conventional reactors.
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The Nuclear Moratorium Case
The Nuclear Moratorium case is based generally on the Low demand sce-
nario, with the additional constraint that no new (post-1979) nuclear ca-
pacity is ordered. To accommodate this, the nuclear moratorium case allows
(by assumption) higher fossil fuel annual production rates than the Low
scenario, including a higher ceiling on regional coal production, and allows
an earlier buildup of centralized solar electricity generation.
A nuclear moratorium in the future would almost certainly have its great-
est impact in the developed regions 0, II, and II!), where nuclear energy's
contribution is expected to be the largest. In these regions, in the Nuclear
Moratorium case, even if annual coal production is allowed to rise to the
level of the High scenario, there would still not be enough coal to completely
replace nuclear electric capacity. The balance would therefore have to be
met by centralized, large-scale (hard) solar, with solar having to contribute
some 6 percent to total primary energy by 2030. In the Low scenario, hard
solar would not contribute noticeably to primary energy needs before 2030.
The overall primary energy supplies for the Nuclear Moratorium case and
for the Low scenario are presented in Table 8-14. Coal and solar energy
would largely fill the "nuclear gap"; gas and especially oil may have limited
capacity for expansion over the Low scenario estimates. Yet natural gas
could hold a greater potential for contributing to the liquid fuel problem
than is reflected in the Nuclear Moratorium case.
A methane-to-methanol scheme, for example, could unlock what are
thought to be vast natural gas resources in many regions of the world as a
substitute for tight oil supplies. This would be quite apart from simply ex-
pending the gas trade-by means of liquefied natural gas (LNG), for example.
But gas as a source of liquid fuels more closely meets market needs. A possi-
ble boost to such uses of gas may come if coal production limits were lower
than those assumed here, with consequently less coal available for liquefac-
tion. This prospect would seem to be plausible.
Fossil fuel consumption figures show coal use increasing significantly
Table 8-14. Primary energy, Nuclear Moratorium case and Low scenario,
2030 (percent of total primary energy).
Energy
Form
Coal
Oil
Natural gas
Nuclear
Hydro-geothermal
Solar and other renewable sources
Total
Low
Scenario
29
22
15
23
7
4
100
Nuclear
Moratorium
Case
39
24
20
7
10
100
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from the Low scenario to the Nuclear Moratorium case, with gas use growing
only moderately. Oil production is already near conceivable upper limits
in the Low scenario, so little additional capacity can be called upon for the
Nuclear Moratorium case.
The sources for electricity generation, with no new nuclear capacity, shift
moderately among load regions. Coal-fired plants that would operate in the
peak and intermediate load regions in the Low scenario would take over the
nuclear-based load share in the Nuclear Moratorium case. Solar energy and
gas would then provide peak load power.
Coal inputs to power production would be so great under the conditions
of the Nuclear Moratorium case that the coal available for liquefaction
would actually be less than in the Low scenario-in spite of raised coal pro-
duction limits in the Nuclear Moratorium case. As a result, the share of syn-
thetic liquid fuels from coal in global liquid fuel supply drops from 39
percent (Low scenario) to 33 percent (Nuclear Moratorium case) by 2030.
The amounts of fossil resources remaining in 2030 in the Low scenario
and the Nuclear Moratorium case (Table 8-15) show the effects of the larger
fossil fuel consumption of the latter: Resources are seriously depleted, leav-
ing uncomfortably small amounts for post-2030 needs. Time, then, becomes
an increasingly constraining factor also in this case.
One observes two main features of these Nuclear Moratorium case results.
First, primary energy needs can be met for the period up to 2030 without
new nuclear capacity (for a low energy demand). Fossil fuel supplies would
be depleted more alarmingly; solar electric would expand at its maximum
rate; gas would become a more important fuel of the future (with even
greater potential). But needs could be met-that is, up to the year 2030.
However, the second important point is that the price would be high. Large-
scale exploitation of fossil fuels carries environmental, climate, cost, and
social burdens. These could be critical, and the choices are not easy ones.
The Enhanced Nuclear Case
The Enhanced Nuclear case is based generally on the High scenario, with a
somewhat tighter constraint (by assumption) on fossil fuel supplies (particu-
larly coal) and with a somewhat earlier introduction of breeder reactors.
Here, in fact, the case introduces nuclear energy at its maximum possible
rate, partly to make possible the use of the generated heat to produce a
liquid fuel.
This expanded nuclear option is conceived as a long-term scheme to make
use of an essentially infinite heat supply, from nuclear breeders and/or from
advanced converter reactors such as high temperature reactors. This heat
source could generate hydrogen, either through electricity generation and
then electrolysis or directly through thermochemical means. The hydrogen
could be combined with coal to produce methanol, making breeders a source
of liquid fuel. This option would use coal much more efficiently than other-
wise for producing synthetic fuels.
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Table 8-15. Fossil fuel consumption, Nuclear Moratorium case and Low
scenario.
Resource Type Nuclear
and Cost Low Moratorium
Categorya Scenario Case
A. Percent of Original Resources Remaining at 2030
Coal
Category 1 65 44
Category 2 100 100
Oil
Category 1 21 14
Category 1 A 24 27
Category 2 86 90
Category 3 100 100
Gas
Category 1 51 32
Category 2 96 96
Category 3 100 100
B. Years of Resource Remaining After 2030 (expressed in 2030 annual production rate)
Coal
Category 1 52 30
Category 2 158 136
Oil
Category 1 11 7
Category 1 A 2 2
Category 2 27 25
Category 3 62 54
Gas
Category 1 30 15
Ca tegory 2 39 28
Category 3 38 27
dCos t categories represent estimates of costs at or below which the stated volume of resources
are recoverable (in constant 1975 US$).
For oil and gas: Cat. 1: 12$/boe
Cat. 2: 12-20$/boe
Cat. 3: 20-25$/boe
Forcoal: Cat. 1: 25$/tce
Cat. 2: 25-50$tce
For uranium: Cat. 1: 80$/kgU
Cat. 2: 80-130$/kgU
A subcategory of oil, 1 A, exists only for regions I (NA) and IV (LA) and includes oil available at
production costs of $12 to $16/boe. Also, a subcategory of gas, 0, exists only for region VI
(ME/NAf), with gas available at $2/boe.
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In addition to supplying an alternative source of liquid fuels, the Enhanced
Nuclear case seeks to minimize fossil fuel production in general and coal pro-
duction in particular. In spite of the increased nuclear capacity, in this case,
global coal production would be reduced by just 2 TWyr/yr by 2030. This
coal production is not unimportant. And the modest reduction somewhat
conceals the rather major changes in global coal trade. A reduction of 500 to
1000 million tons per year of coal production and export from each of
regions I and II could be seen as a major benefit of a regional enhanced
nuclear strategy for the otherwise coal-importing region III.
The Enhanced Nuclear case increases the role of nuclear energy to 29 per-
cent of total primary energy supply by 2030, compared to 23 percent for
the High scenario (see Table 8-16). This seemingly modest increase is all but
that; it means roughly an additional 1000 GW(e) of installed nuclear ca-
pacity by 2030. These extra 1000 (or so) power plants need to be sited,
built, and integrated into national grids. The analyses of the nuclear option
(Chapter 4) indicated that, globally, this expansion (and more) could be
done, although regional and national singularities would make the task a
challenging one.
The unsettling depletion of fossil resources apparent in the scenarios and
in the Nuclear Moratorium case is just slightly abated in the Enhanced Nu-
clear case. This case would stretch cheap (category 1) coal resources by just
six years and more expensive (category 2) coal by eight years. Gas resources
are depleted somewhat faster in the Enhanced Nuclear case than in the High
scenario, but their exploitation is, in any case, regarded as more market
limited than supply constrained. The Enhanced Nuclear case adds some six
years to the High scenario projections of resources remaining after 2030 for
all four categories of oil taken together. By 2030, the supply of liquid fuels
in the Enhanced Nuclear case would be a mix of crude oil, methanol, and
synthetic liquids produced from coal.
As with the Nuclear Moratorium case, there are perhaps two main features
of the Enhanced Nuclear case results. First, nuclear capacities could be ex-
panded beyond the High scenario estimates and could contribute to the
liquid fuel supply problem-pending, of course, the successful development
Table 8-16. Primary energy, Enhanced l\luclear case and High scenario,
2030 (percent of total primary energy).
Energy High Enhanced
Form Scenario Nuclear Case
Coal 34 29
Oil 19 17
Gas 17 17
Nuclear 23 29
Hydro-geothermal 4 4
Solar and other renewable sources 4 4
Total 100 100
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and commercialization of methanol-producing technology. Second, one ob-
serves that the achievement of this potential could not be as large, by 2030,
as one might hope. Realistically, in our scenarios we were led to project a
nuclear contribution between 5.17 TWyr/yr and 8.1 TWyr/yr by 2030 and
not our exploratory trajectory of 17 TWyr/yr as given in Chapter 4. The
reasons are legion and have to do with constraints in each region on expected
nuclear buildup, availability of cheaper alternatives, and so forth. Global
projections of "maximum potential" capacity miss these regional considera-
tions. For example, the methanol from breeders option may be an attrac-
tive one for region III but less so for coal-rich regions I and II or, particularly,
for oil-rich region IV.
The 16 TW Case: Zero Per Capita Growth
Energy supply systems for the High and Low scenarios and for the two al-
ternative supply cases just discussed would be impressively difficult to build.
While it is maintained here that it could be done, that the necessary energy
supply systems could be established, it seems worthwhile to consider a popu-
lar alternative to large supply schemes-that is, much lower energy use than
that projected in the High and Low scenarios. The alternative being pro-
posed is to restrict global energy use per capita to the present rate of 2
kWyr/yr-or, quite simply, to stop growing completely.
Lower energy demand, of course, would ease the pressure on energy
supplies. It would also ameliorate somewhat the environmental impacts of
ever-increasing energy use, and (perhaps most compellingly) it would offer
a bonus of time-time to develop oil alternatives or to discover some viable
and sustainable energy source. But a serious question is whether or not it is
feasible in the context of continuing global economic growth and stability.
Table 8-17. Assumptions on GOP growth rates, 16 TW case and IIASA
scenarios (%jyr).
High Scenario Low Scenario 76 TW Casea
Region (7975-2030) (7975-2030) (7975-2030)
I (NA) 2.87 1.68 } 1.70III (SU/EE) 3.91 2.99 2.09 2.37 2.00
III (WE/]ANZ) 2.93 1.88 2.04
IV (LA) 4.37 3.48 3.94
V (Af/SEA) 4.32 3.27 } 3.34 }
VI (ME/NAf) 5.09 3.57 3.24 4.79 3.84
VII (C/CPA) 3.77 2.64 3.44.
World 3.44 2.37 2.50
aSource: U. Colombo communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978.
Notes: Figures are average real GOP growth rates over the period 1975-2030. The IIASA scenarios
assume declining growth rates; the 16 TW case assumes constant average growth rates over the
fifty-five-year period.
BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159
A major premise of the 16 TW case is that requirements for energy in the
developed regions would decline, as economies mature and population
growth rates decline, while energy growth in the developing regions would
continue to increase, although probably slowed by resource availability dif-
ficulties. The next fifty years would be the critical period, after which global
energy use may well stabilize.
The population projection for the 16 TW case is identical to that for the
High and Low scenarios, and the GOP assumptions differ only slightly be-
tween the 16 TW case and the Low scenario (Table 8-17). Somewhat greater
economic growth was assumed for developing regions in the 16 TW case than
in the Low scenario and a slightly higher overall global growth as well. But
it seems fair to say that the 16 TW case is, in general terms, similar to that of
the Low scenario. Large differences are noticeable with respect to energy-
saving measures and their impacts on current lifestyles, with the 16 TW case
calling for more drastic conservation.
Table 8-18. Major assumptions for the 16 TW case compared to the Low
scenario.
Region I (NA) Region III (WE/jANZ)
Base
Year
/975
Low /6 TW
Scenario case
2030
Base
Year
/975
Low
Scenario
2030
/6 TW
case
Macroeconomics, lifestyle
Manufacturing (% of GDP)
Services (% of GDP)
Basic materials (% of manu-
facturing-VA)
Machinery and equipment
(% of manufacturing-V A)
Intercity passenger transportation
Distance traveled per person
per year (1000 km)
Persons per car
Distance driven per car per year,
intercity (1000 km)
Bus (% of public transportation)
Train (% of public transportation)
Plane (% of public transportation)
Dwellings
Electrical use for appliances
(1000 kWh/dwelling)
Useful energy for air conditioning
per dwelling (1000 kcal)
Dwelling with air conditioning (%)
24.5
64.8
24.8
43.2
10
2.0
7.0
15
5
80
3.85
4472
39
23.8
65.8
23.2
47.0
15
1.9
7.8
12
5
83
6.25
5800
50
20.0
69.6
20.0
50.2
10
2.0
5.0
30
20
50
3.85
4472
20
33.6
48.5
33.0
42.0
7.5
5.21
5.0
35
50
5
1.95
o
29.7
55.0
29.4
47.1
10
3.20
5.6
29
56
15
4.50
3000
20
20.0
64.7
20.0
55.0
7.5
4.0
5.0
35
60
5
2.20
o
Note: These assumptions are selected from an array of changes. They both represent the largest
changes and have the most energy-reducing impact. In some instances (e.g., automobile efficiency or
home insulation), the assumptions for the Low scenario were regarded as sufficiently rigorous so that
only rather minor further improvements could be introduced into the 16 TW case.
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Any increase in the per capita energy demand in the developing regions
would therefore require decreases in the demand in the developed regions. It
is along such lines that, for the year 2030, target values of primary energy of
8 kWyr/yr per capita in region I and 3.2 kWyr/yr per capita in region III
were obtained. The corresponding 1975 values are 11.2 kWyr/yr per capita
in region I and 4.0 kWyr/yr per capita in region III.
It is crucial that such decreases be made consistent with the assumed posi-
tive GOP growth of 2 percent per year. To that end, a number of assump-
tions had to be made, each of which is somewhat arbitrary, to ensure that
the overall brackets of decrease in energy demand and of increase in GOP are
met. Such assumptions relate to the structure of an economy, as well as to
lifestyles.
For the Low scenario, only a slight adjustment to the assumed GOP
growth rate of 2 percent per year was necessary. The situation is entirely
different for the 16 TW case. In Table 8-18, such major assumptions are
compared with those of the Low scenario. It appears that the targets of the
16 TW case can only be met by drastic changes in economic conditions and
lifestyles, in addition to technological improvement: There, the manufactur-
ing and basic materials sectors would go down, while the services sector and
the share of machinery and equipment within the manufacturing industry
Table 8-19. Final energy results, 16 TW case and Low scenario (absolute
fjgures in GWyrjyr).
Region I (NA) Region 11/ (WEIJANZ)
Low Low
See- 76 TW Percent See- 76 TW Percent
Base
nario Re- Base nario Re-case case
Year due- Year due-
7975 2030 tiona 7975 2030 tiona
Total Final Energy 1871 2656 1819 -32 1589 3143 1723 -45
By sector
Transportation 541 688 410 -40 313 716 394 -45
Industry 757 1327 818 -38 805 1588 725 -54
Household-service 573 641 591 -8 417 839 604 -28
By fuel type
Substitutable
fossil fuels b 921 964 789 -18 801 1012 607 -40
Centrally supplied heatC 0 0 0 n.a.d 0 103 68 -34
Soft solar 0 74 61 -18 0 71 46 -35
Electricity 228 547 265 -52 201 640 285 -55
Motor fuel 597 804 510 -37 381 864 518 -40
Coke and feedstocks 125 267 194 -27 206 453 199 -56
apercentage reduction is the reduction from the Low scenario to the 16 TW case, as a percentage
of the Low scenario.
bsubstitutable fossil fuels are substitutable (mostly heat) uses of oil, gas, and coal.
cCentrally supplied heat is heat produced by district heat and cogeneration facilities.
d Not available.
BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 161
would go up. Intercity transportation would remain at 1975 levels, despite
the assumed 2 percent per year GDP growth. For region I, bus services would
double and train services quadruple, whereas air traffic services would be
reduced. The energy needed for appliances in people's homes would remain
essentially at the present level, but air conditioning would be cut down
significantly (in region I) or not be used (in region III).
After additional assumptions have been made that are not shown in the
table, one can proceed to envisage further improvements on the technology
side. The final energy demand that then results is explained in Table 8-19.
For both regions I and III, the reductions in energy use are given in per-
centages of the Low scenario requirements, which, as one should note, al-
ready incorporate significant shares of energy conservation. Over and above
these, the reductions range from 8 percent (region I) to 56 percent (region
III), resulting in 32 percent and 45 percent decreases in the total final energy
demand.
Thus, the developed regions would have to reduce or phase out com-
pletely their use of electricity for heating purposes, greatly improve effi-
ciency in all energy end uses, and shift their economies move toward services
and away from energy-intensive heavy industries and toward less energy-
intensive industries.
REGIONS ARE DIFFERENT
So far we have emphasized the global trends evidenced in our scenarios. But
regions differ-often quite distinctly. We now focus our attention on the
features of the energy situation in each of the seven world regions.
Features of Region I, North America
The character of the North American energy future is dominated by three
considerations-a post industrial, mature economy, "slowdown"; substantial
energy savings because of technological advances and some restructuring of
economic activities; and a rapid buildup of a coal liquefaction industry to
replace domestic and imported oil. None of these changes, except possibly
the last, is expected to produce profound or sweeping changes in lifestyles
of North Americans.
The North American economy is projected to grow at real rates declining
to 1 to 2 percent per year after 2015, from more than 3 percent per year
in the 1950s and 1960s. Per capita GDP growth rates would be somewhat
lower. People's traveling and other energy-consuming activities are expected
to saturate, meaning that aggregate growth would be slower.
People are likely to use public transit more; live in better insulated homes;
live more in apartments, townhouses, or condominiums; consume a less
energy-intensive mix of industrial products. They would still commute to
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jobs, take vacations, drive automobiles. An all-bicycle or an all-high-rise
apartment future is not likely.
Energy conservation will be important. Automobiles averaging 35 miles
per gallon (mpg) in 2030 rather than the 17 mpg of today, homes 40 percent
more efficient in terms of heat loss, and solar collectors attached to 50 per-
cent of all post-1975 single family dwellings would be the main ingredients
of this conservation program.
Oil use would be cut back wherever possible. Nonetheless, liquid fuel
demands would grow sufficiently to require major exploitation of synthetic
liquid fuels-from shales or from coal. Coal production is projected to reach
1.5 to 2.7 TWyr/yr by 2030,3.1 to 5.6 times its 1975 level. Some 55 per-
cent of this production would go to a synthetic liquid fuel industry (in the
High scenario).
The environmental, labor, water, and transportation issues surrounding
coal production in the United States cast some doubt about rapid coal pro-
duction increases. Yet the liquid fuel demands seem irreducible, and the
coal resource is available. The world would need the coal-based liquid fuel
supply that region I could export. By 2030, in the High scenario, region I
would produce 750 CWyr/yr of coal for export, either as coal to produce
synthetic liquid fuels elsewhere or as synthetic liquid fuels produced in-
ternally. The major global alternative to coal liquids would seem to be shale
oil-also an export from this region.
Primary energy use would grow from some 2.65 TWyr/yr in 1975 to more
than 6 TWyr/yr in the High scenario (4.4 TWyr/yr in the Low) by 2030. Of
this, the dominant sources would be nuclear energy and coal. In 1975,
nuclear energy and coal together were 0.55 TWyr/yr (21 percent), while oil
and gas together provided 1.93 TWyr/yr (73 percent). In 2030, nuclear
energy and coal together would give 2.9 to 3.9 TWyr/yr (65 percent), while
primary oil and gas together would total just 1.2 to 1.8 TWyr/yr (27 to 30
percent). The supply mix of the future seems to be driven toward coal and
nuclear energy, based on the aggregate of supply constraints and market
restrictions. With greater flexibility in these constraints, a conceivable big
energy source for the future in region I could well be natural gas.
Features of Region II, The Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe
In the centrally planned economies of this region, the energy future would
be shaped by a clear intent to expand industrial production and productivity
while minimizing oil use wherever possible. Central economic management
seems necessary to do this, as does the successful development of the energy
riches in inhospitable Asian portions of the region.
Economic growth rates are expected to be high-higher than in other de-
veloped regions, yet lower than the rates of the 195 Os and 1960s. The
growth rates of both scenarios give CDP per capita levels 40 to 100 percent
higher in this region than today's level in region I. Much of the GOP in
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region II would be industrial output, as it is today. Slow population growth
makes labor supply a major constraint on economic growth prospects.
Industrial productivity gains are expected to be the main source of energy
savings. Soviets and East Europeans already drive small, fuel-efficient cars
(and relatively few cars); they generally do not lead as energy-intensive life-
styles as do consumers in region I or in region III.
The shift away from a reliance on oil has three main elements. First, com-
munities would be sited so as to maximize public transit use and minimize
automobile travel. Second, oil would not be used in power plants-these
shifting more to gas (now), coal, and nuclear energy. And third, district heat
and combined heat and power capacity would be rapidly expanded for build-
ings and industrial heat supplies.
The intent thus to minimize liquid fuel use and to exploit the vast gas and
coal resources of Soviet Asia for district heat and power supplies leads to the
expectation that the Soviet Union will not become an oil importer in the
foreseeable future. Some oil exporting from the Soviet Union to Eastern
Europe would most likely continue, and expanded net exports of gas and
coal from the region as a whole could occur.
The greatest shift in region II among primary energy sources would be
toward nuclear energy and, to a certain extent, toward coal. In the High
scenario, nuclear power provides 33 percent of total primary energy by
2030; coal adds 38 percent. Oil production, as a share of total liquid fuel
supply, declines substantially in these estimates as coal liquefaction largely
takes over liquid fuel supply. Gas production remains high, at over 1 TWyr/yr
in 2030 or 16 percent of total primary energy in the High scenario. These
primary energy trends look, in the aggregate, very much like those of region I.
This is perhaps instructive, since the underlying energy demand structure and
mix of economic activities in the two regions are very different.
Features of Region III, Western Europe, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Israel
Region III is a highly heterogenous region. Though all these countries are
industrialized to varying degrees, they differ considerably in their energy
resource endowments. Today the region as a whole depends extensively on
imported oil. This dependence is likely to continue in the coming decades,
even as the region's economic growth slows and indigenous coal and (to a
lesser extent) domestic oil resources are developed. A strong reliance on
nuclear power for electricity production could free domestic coal resources
for synthesis of liquid fuels; ultimately, nuclear breeding may be a viable
source for hydro~en for liquid fuels in this capital-rich but basically energy
resource-poor regIOn.
Growth in GDP would likely decline as these national economies mature
and as population stabilizes. By 2030, real annual economic growth could
be as low as 1 or 2 percent per year. At the same time, these economies
would continue to shift toward services. In 2030, GDP per capita levels
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would exceed (by 20 to over 100 percent) those in region I in 1975. Yet the
region is not likely to take on entirely North American lifestyles. Extensive
use of public transit systems would continue, air conditioning use would
remain rather small, and electricity use for home appliances would not reach
1975 U.S. levels. High energy costs have affected, and would continue to
affect, the specific development paths for this region.
Because of its high costs, energy is currently being used more efficiently
in region III than anywhere else. The potentials for energy savings through
technical fixes are smaller there than in region I. Still, various measures can
reduce energy demand growth-by dampening tendencies of increased auto-
mobile travel and by building even more energy-tight buildings.
The high oil import dependence of this region would cause it, in these
projections, to shift strongly away from using liquid fuels, wherever possi-
ble. Yet liquid fuel demand would necessitate 1400 to 2100 GWyr/yr of
secondary liquid fuels by 2030, from just 980 GWyr/yr in 1975. If for the
region domestic oil production were 300 GWyr/yr (High scenario) by 2030,
and if domestic coal production were 1000 GWyr/yr, and if 400 GWyr/yr
of this coal were turned into synthetic liquids, then nearly 1600 GWyr/yr
of coal imports (or, equivalently, 1000 GWyr/yr of synthetic liquid fuel
imports) would be required from regions I and II simply to meet secondary
liquid fuel demands. These imports, coupled with oil imports of 600 GWyr/yr
from region VI in 2030, paint a discouraging picture of continued import
reliance for essential liquid fuels in region III. (The Low scenario would be,
in these terms, more encouraging; no coal imports would be required. But
oil imports from region VI would total 1100 GWyr/yr, instead of 600
GWyr/yr, by 2030 in the High scenario.)
Region Ill's primary energy demand could reach 4.5 to 7.1 TWyr/yr
by 2030, compared to 2.26 TWyr/yr in 1975. Nuclear power represents the
largest single addition to the primary mix, accounting for about 34 percent
of primary energy by 2030 in the High scenario. If domestic oil and, espe-
cially, natural gas were expanded at the highest feasible rate, their contribu-
tion grows to just 1.8 TWyr/yr by 2030 in the High scenario (from 1.49
TWyr/yr in 1975), while their share, together, of total primary energy drops
from 66 to 25 percent for the scenarios. The massive exploitation of coal in
this region, both domestic and imported, still leaves an approximately con-
stant (25 percent) share for coal.
Features of Region IV, Latin America
Oil has been, and will continue to be, the dominant energy source of Latin
America. Adding the recent increased oil resource estimates for Mexico to
the vast heavy crude oil potential in Venezuela and Colombia shows total
oil resources that appear capable of supporting even the high growth pros-
pects of this region.
Like other developing regions, Latin America is projected to have a more
rapid growth in GDP than that of the developed regions. The projected range
is 3.5 to 4.4 percent per year (average) to 2030. These rates are high, by
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global standards, but still show reductions from those of the recent past.
In the High scenario, per capita GDP in 2030 exceeds that in region III in
1975. But the challenges to such development are formidable; Latin America
population could be 800 million in 2030, two and a half times its 1975
population. Providing sufficient services~and jobs-for so many people will
require all the energy and other wealth that the region can generate.
Assuming that some fraction of heavy crude oil can be produced at rela-
tively low cost, then all of the oil production necessary for domestic needs
in the scenarios to 2030 could be provided from resources at $16 per barrel
or less. In the scenarios, total oil production grows from 4.6 mbd in 1975 to
16 to 25.5 mbd by 2030. These are 2.3 to 3.2 percent per year annual
increases in output; from 1975 to 1978 the growth was 2.6 percent per year.
A serious question is whether or not region IV can sustain 3 percent per
year growth over the next fifty years.
The IIASA assessment is that region IV could increase its oil output to
meet domestic needs, but would choose not to export oil. Too rapid rises
in income can be destabilizing; there are signs already that the oil-rich
countries of the region would build up their petroleum industries only at a
carefully measured pace. Also, oil production solely for internal purposes
would be enormous, aside from any production for export. The oil produc-
tion rates for region IV in 2030 in the scenarios equal 30 to 45 percent of
the total global production in 1975.
Major nonoil energy sources in the supply mix of the future are expected
to be hydroelectricity and some other renewable sources-notably com-
mercially distributed wood (e.g., charcoal for industry and households)
and ethyl alcohol from plantation crops (e.g., in Brazil).
The primary energy source mix in the High scenario shows that oil, while
growing in magnitude, would be about constant as a share of total primary
energy, while renewable sources and nuclear energy would grow to account
for some 18 to 23 percent of total primary energy by 2030 (from essentially
o percen t in 1975). Natural gas use could be somewhat market limited in this
region, but the resources base would allow gas to playa larger role than that
in the scenario projections.
Features of Region V, Africa (Except Northern Africa
and South Africa), South and Southeast Asia
Region V would seem to be facing the bleakest energy future of all the
regions. Endowed with neither energy resource riches nor capital wealth
(skIlls, technological know-how), while having large and rapidly growing
populations, the favorable energy options for the long term seem few. In
terms of development objectives for the region, the situation is challenging,
somewhat discouraging, but not hopeless.
Region V is the poorest, in per capita GOP, of all the seven world regions.
According to both scenarios, it would still be the poorest by 2030, in spite
of "vigorous" assumptions made about the regions' economic and energy
prospects-namely, real GOP growth rates averaging 3.3 to 4.3 percent per
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year from 1975 to 2030, higher than the rates in the developed regions. The
development path for this growth would continue the presently observed
shifts toward the industry, service, and energy sectors and a decline of the
agriculture share (from 36 percent of GDP in 1975 to around 16 percent by
2030 in the High scenario). Energy savings are not expected to any appreci-
able extent in region V.
Currently, the region is a net oil exporter, because Nigeria, Gabon, and
Indonesia are exporters and because aggregate liquid fuel demands are rela-
tively low. The scenarios project region V to become a net oil importer
within the next decade; by 2010, imports would be greater than domestic
crude oil production. Coal liquefaction is then expected to provide a small,
but growing, domestic source of liquid fuels.
Although liquid fuels offer a convenience and flexibility of use that makes
them highly desirable for broad development objectives, they are becoming
steadily more expensive. Region V would therefore be wise to tap other
sources where possible. Over the long term, renewable sources should playa
growing role in the scenarios, with biogas and charcoal assumed (in the High
scenario) with an aggressive policy to meet up to 16 percent of household
and industrial final energy needs. All renewable sources combined (including
hydroelectric power) could account for some 20 percent of total primary
energy by 2030 in the High Scenario or even 30 percent in the Low scenario.
Electricity needs, growing at 4.7 to 5.9 percent per year in the scenarios,
would be met by coal, nuclear energy, and hydroelectric power.
Features of Region VI, Middle East
and Northern Africa
To the entire world, oil is the major feature of region VI, but there is much
more to be known and understood in the dynamics of this oil. This world
region includes the large, swing producers of OPEC, in particular Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries dominate
the aggregated region VI.
The swing producers of OPEC, those who can easily expand or restrict
oil output, hold about one-third of the world's oil reserves, and they could
theoretically expand their annual production by several times. Within this
core, Saudi Arabia holds the ability to be quite literally the residual supplier
for the world, varying its production up or down to meet the fluctuations
in demand and supply of the rest of the globe.
With very large oil reserves, it is in the region's self-interest to stretch out
the lifetime of its reserves-to avoid an early, high peak of production fol-
lowed by rapid decline. Oil revenues, optimally, should keep pace with (but
need not exceed) development needs and should continue as long as pos-
sible-that is, until alternative sources of income (new industries, business,
etc.) can be created. The translation of the oil riches of this region into a
broad solar energy capacity (that could last forever) is one of the more
obvious options. The region as a whole would be wise to constrain its long-
term oil output, since oil resources would be seriously depleted by 2030
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with a sustained production rate of just 33.6 mbd (as envisaged in the
scenarios).
CDP growth rates are expected to be high for quite some time. Develop-
ment would come with the growth, and region VI could, by 2030 in the
scenarios, be at CDP per capita levels comparable to those in regions I and
III today. Development also signals growing shares of manufacturing and ser-
vices in CDP and a relative decline in the energy production sector share.
Oil and natural gas together provide about 90 percent of primary energy
in region VI over the scenario period in the High scenario. An assumed quan-
tity of cheap natural gas, used for domestic purposes, leads to gas taking at
least 50 percent of the primary energy market by 2030. Cas could even be
used rather extensively for electricity production.
Features of Region VII, China and Other Asian
Centrally Planned Economies
Of all the regions, the least is known about the energy future of region VII,
at least in the world outside. Here, however, are a few key assumptions and
resulting generalizations.
CDP growth seems likely to be high, but so does population growth. With
the projection of average CDP growth rates of 2.6 to 3.8 percent per year
and of an average population growth rate of 1.2 percent per year, by 2030
per capita CDP could reach levels comparable to those of region IV today.
We expect region VII to be neither a net exporter nor an importer of
energy. But domestic oil resources are not likely to be able to keep pace with
rising demands; coal liquefaction would most likely be needed after the year
2000.
Coal production, required for liquid fuel synthesis and electricity genera-
tion, could reach nearly 3.5 billion tons per year (3.2 TWyr/yr) by 2030 in
the High scenario, from 0.48 billion tons per year (0.45 TWyr/yr) in 1975.
Over 2 billion tons per year of this would be needed simply for synthetic
liquid fuel production. This coal production would exceed that of region I
in 2030.
The main primary energy source for the future in these projections is
coal. Natural gas and nuclear energy could grow noticeably, but still repre-
sent less than 20 percent of primary energy by 2030 in the scenarios.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
What we have presented here are quantitative results for two supply and
demand scenarios and three alternative approaches to balancing global
supply and demand. In all instances we have stressed internal consistency
and global comprehensiveness. We saw no other way. In the end we arrived
at several different approaches that are not meant to define a unique set of
conclusions.
To be sure, no one can predict the future. And, equally surely, there will
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be only one future. Thus, our findings are not predictions of a futuristic
energy world. Our intent has been to indicate the paths that would most
likely have to be followed if we want to be realistic about getting from
today's energy situation to a less problematic one.
Although not definitive, our findings are suggestive. In the next chapter
we reflect on the implications that our findings might have for global energy
strategies.
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9 ADDING IT ALL UP
At this stage, we have completed the presentation of our quantitative anal-
ysis. As stated at the outset in Chapter 2, the numerical results cannot, of
course, define a unique set of conclusions directly useful to energy policy
decisions, but they are suggestive. And it is to these suggestions that we now
turn our attention.
The solution to the world's energy problem is contingent upon many sets
of circumstances that are cultural, technical, political, economic, and en-
vironmental in nature. Formal scientific methods alone cannot resolve the
dilemma of balancing the supply and demand of energy around the globe.
The problem is a complex one. It is, in fact, a typical systems problem, a
question of synthesis.
But it is precisely because of these aspects, and not in spite of them, that
the findings of our study have to be assessed and their implications for
future energy policies determined. Making that distinction is not a totally
objective task.
To have achieved a consensus at this point among the more than 140
scientists who contributed to the study would have been impossible. Cer-
tainly some of the assumptions incorporated in the analysis are controversial,
though we hope realistic. The level of controversy encountered when one
tries to interpret and qualitatively extrapolate the final results is greater
still. But to a large extent, such interpretations are controversial because
they are so important. To shy away from addressing them would be to leave
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our study incomplete in a critical dimension. What we present here-in an
effort to deal with these issues without suggesting that either the member
organizations of BASA, the staff of BASA, or even the staff of the Energy
Systems Program have achieved some sort of heroic consensus-are the
interpretations of one person only-specifically, Wolf Hafele, the leader of
the Energy Systems Program.
They reflect the results of the scenarios described in the last chapter, as
well as the more exploratory aspects of the earlier discussions of supply
options (Chapters 3 through 6) and their constraints (Chapter 7). Moreover,
they reveal an underlying, unifying theme that, while not surprising in hind-
sight, was hardly obvious originally and that has to do with a general pattern
of response to the increasing scarcity and expense of energy resources.
• Balancing energy demand and supply means striking a balance between
energy, capital, labor, and skill to provide a desired energy service.
As we have become ever more aware of the problems of energy resources
throughout the 1970s, we have begun to adapt in ways that effectively make
better use of the limited energy currently available. Sometimes we label
these adaptations conservation; sometimes we call them improvements in
efficiency; sometimes they are referred to as productivity increases. What-
ever we call them, they all involve reducing the energy needed to produce
some service (be it a well-heated sitting room or intercity jet travel) by
replacing it with something else. In some cases this replacement might be in
the form of capital resources (e .g., investing in home insulation); in others
it might be better classified as labor (e.g., periodic tune-ups of an automobile
to increase its gas mileage); and in still others it might best be labeled simply
ingenuity or know-how (e.g., anything from more carefully planned shop-
ping trips to large-scale reconfigurations of industrial processes).
At a personal level, we are all familiar with such substitutions, of capital
or labor or know-how for energy in the production of services. At more
collective levels, ranging from small business enterprises to international
alliances, we are becoming more familiar with them. And what will re-
appear throughout the discussion to follow is the conviction that what
may now seem to us to be perhaps quite sophisticated, energy-conserving
arrangements of our resources of capital, labor, know-how, and energy
indicate only the direction in which we can travel. They in no sense even
begin to suggest the limits of what can be done.
Of particular importance is the notion of investing these resources to
eventually increase the stock available in each category. Again, these ideas
are hardly unfamiliar-investments in education, in research and develop-
ment, in capital equipment, in exploratory drilling all have contributed, and
continue to contribute, to the amounts of capital resources, skilled man-
power, energy resources, and know-how that we can put to use. What is less
familiar is what these same concepts lead us to when applied from a global
perspective contemplating the next half a century and beyond.
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• It could be done.
Our aim when we began our global analysis some seven years ago was to
take a fresh look at the energy problem facing the world over the next fifty
years and to characterize demands, supply opportunities, and constraints as
objectively as possible. Working from the premise that the principal fuels in
use today are finite, we questioned whether civilization would be able to
meet the energy challenge. Based on the analysis of technological and eco-
nomic factors, we conclude that with the technologies at hand or potentially
at hand, and using the world's resources as perceived today, it is possible
to provide enough energy for a world of eight billion people in the year
2030. It could be done! This is not a trivial statement, given the degree of
cultural pessimism that one often encounters.
Contrary to our original expectations, fifty years proved too brief a period
to allow a complete transition from our current fossil-fuel-based energy
system to a truly global sustainable energy system. Rather, what will occur
during the next fifty years is a transition of a less sweeping nature, from
clean fossil fuels to dirty fossil fuels.
Nonetheless, we can go beyond the conclusion that it is possible to pro-
vide for the energy needs of a world of eight billion people in 2030. Spe-
cifically, the analysis did not demonstrate any insurmountable obstacles
to the world's eventually supporting eight, ten, or even twelve billion people
indefinitely. To the contrary, it pointed to several technological features
that might be incorporated in a global energy system supporting such a
world. So, even with respect to a sustainable energy system, our analysis
suggests that it could be done, although the transition to such a system could
not be completed by 2030.
We are faced with two goals that must be pursued simultaneously. First,
we must manage the more immediate transition-that is, we must use the
dwindling amounts of fossil fuels prudently. Second, we must concurrently
manage the initial stages of the more extensive transition with equal wisdom.
In particular, we must build up the nuclear and solar energy industries pro-
gressively so that they are able to assume the role we envisage for them in
the period after 2030.
VARIOUS LEVELS OF ENERGY DEMAND
What has emerged quite starkly from our study is that any way of balancing
demand and supply, whether high, medium, or low, would lead to some
form of hardship. Moreover, energy conservation measures of any degree
would cause unavoidable pain.
• Only radical changes in lifestyles could lead to very low energy demand.
We considered the implications of a very low energy demand world, using
some of the data for the 16 TW case, as discussed in Chapter 8. In a low
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energy demand world, global average energy use per capita would remain at
the current ratio of 2 kWyr/yr. GOP would continue to grow, but only
modestly, at 1.7 percent per year for region I and 2 percent per year for
region II J.a
Fundamental changes would also have to take place in the structure of
economies in order to achieve these values. For instance, in the developed
regions, economies would have to shift more to services, with that sector
contributing as high as perhaps 65 to 70 percent to -the GOP, and there
would have to be a reduction in the level of energy-intensive industries
in these countries. Energy conversion processes would have to be redesigned
to reduce losses in converting primary energy into final forms (e.g., in con-
verting coal into electricity). Both passenger and freight transportation
activities would have to be minimized. Per capita energy demand would have
to be reduced by rigorous insulation of single family houses and more
energy-efficient apartment houses. And much more would need to be done.
Obviously, extreme energy-saving measures would have to be introduced in
almost every sphere of human activity relating to energy, mandating a radical
change in lifestyles of the peoples of all regions.
• The conservation measures implied in our Low scenario are strong, but
are probably more realistic than those of the 16 TW case.
If the world elects to travel a moderate path toward, say, that of a primary
energy use of 22 TWyr/yr (our Low scenario), there are important con-
tingencies that need to be recognized. Energy conservation measures required
at this moderate level, while certainly less than in the 16 TW case, are still
at the limit we consider feasible if present lifestyles and freedom of choice
are to be maintained. In our Low scenario projections for the seven IIASA
world regions (see Table 9-1), we see that there would have to be a satura-
tion in the per capita energy consumption in the regions of the OECO-
basically regions I and III-and only modest increases in per capita energy
consumption in the developing regions (IV, V, VI, and VII).
This observation is supported in part by a comparison of the ratio of final
energy use to GOP for the different regions, as shown in Figure 2-3 of
Chapter 2. The fact is evident that the developing regions, in building up
their economies, require more energy per unit of GOP than those regions
that have an advanced industrial infrastructure. In addition to possible reduc-
tions in energy use in the developed regions, we also envisaged only modest
increases in energy use in the developing regions, pointing to a decreasing
energy intensiveness in general.
• Our High scenario projects economic growth rates that might be con-
sidered moderately satisfactory but that would transfer the hardship to
the supply side.
aThroughout our study, we have assumed declining growth rates. The numbers here are not meant
to indicate constant and, by implication, ongoing growth rates; rather, they link the years 1975 and
2030.
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Table 9-1. GDP growth rate, energy consumption per capita, elasticities,
1975-2030.
A. Primary Energy Consumption per Capita (kWyr/yr,cap), 2030
Region
I (NA)
II (SU/EE)
III (WE/JANZ)
IV (LA)
V (At/SEA)
VI (ME/NAt)
VII (C/CPA)
World
Base Vear
7975
11.2
5.1
4.0
1.1
0.2
0.9
0.5
2.0
High
Scenario
19.1
15.3
9.3
4.6
1.3
6.7
2.6
4.5
Low
Scenario
13.9
10.4
5.9
2.9
0.7
3.5
1.3
2.8
76 TW Casea
8.0
6.2
3.2
2.8
0.7
3.6
1.2
2.0
B. Comparison of Assumptions about GOP Growth Rates (%/yr)
Region
I (NA)
II (SU/EE)
III (WE/]ANZ)
IV (LA)
V (At/SEA)
VI (ME/NAt)
VII (C/CPA)
World
High Scenario
2.87
3.91
2.93
4.37
4.32
5.09
3.77
3.44
Low Scenario
1.
6812.99 2.09
1.88
3.48 }3.27
3.57 3.24
2.64
2.37
76 TW Casea
1.
7012.37 2.00
2.04
3.94 }
3.34
4.79 3.84
3.44
2.50
C. Primary Energy-GOP Coefficient, Ep b
High Scenario Low Scenario 76 TW Case
7975- 2000- 7975- 2000- 7975- 2000-
Region 2000 2030 2000 2030 2030 2030
I (NA) 0.42 0.67 0.36 0.89 a -0.20 0.06
II (SU/EE) 0.65 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.75 0.D1
III (WE/JANZ) 0.70 0.77 0.65 0.73 0.04 0.10
IV (LA) 1.04 0.98 1.06 0.97 0.96 0.82
V (At/SEA) 1.15 1.11 1.18 1.19 1.38 0.90
VI (ME/NAf) 1.16 0.96 1.23 1.10 1.04 0.75
VII (C/CPA) 1.06 1.17 0.98 1.27a 1.12 0.54
World 0.70 0.90 0.67 0.93 0.50 0.34
aSource: U. Colombo communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978.
bThis elasticity, E, is defined by the following relationship:
E(t2) _ { GOP(t2) } E
E(tiJ - GOP(tiJ '
where tt and t2 are two given times, E is energy consumption measured in physical units, and GOP
is gross domestic product measured in real noninflated monetary units. This elasticity is calculated
with respect to primary energy, Ep '
cDerived from U. Colombo's specification of GOP and primary energy consumption growth
(U. Colombo's communication to W. Hafele, 13 October 1978) and is not consistent with method-
ology of IIASA scenarios.
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Finally, we looked at the implications if the world elects to work toward
higher energy demand, on the order of 36 TWyr/yr of primary energy (our
High scenario). Table 9-1 also gives comparative data on the evolution of
growth rates of GOP, energy consumption per capita, and the resulting
elasticities for the seven world regions over the period 1975-2030 for the
two reference scenarios and the 16 TW case.
In the High scenario the world would have taken on the formidable task
of providing energy for a planet that has doubled its population, as well as
doubled the average energy consumption to a per capita level of 4.5 kWyr/yr.
For some people this would mean relief from the hardship of having to live
with very low energy demand, including all the difficulties on the individual
and local group level. Still, these hardships would not be eliminated; instead,
they would be transferred to the supply side, and others would have to learn
to live with the social and environmental problems of supplying large amounts
of energy from unconventional oils or lower grades of coal. To satisfy these
higher energy demands, there would have to be a well-functioning world
market for oil, coal, and probably for gas that would create its own set of
socioeconomic and environmental issues. Nonetheless, these would most
likely stimulate economic growth and technological innovation in the
developing countries.
SOME REALITIES OF THE ENERGY PROBLEM
• The hard-soft controversy is essentially a political issue and not a tech-
nicalone.
In a certain sense, demand is a word that cloaks a great multitude of what,
for lack of a better term, we may call sociopolitical and psychological issues.
It ranges all the way from what people really need for bare survival, to what
they insist upon having, to what they may faintly hope for.
There is an ongoing worldwide debate between the proponents of the
"soft" evolution paths of energy systems and those who would choose
"hard" paths. We consider it worthwhile to examine briefly each of these
positions and their influence on the energy demand situation.
Low per capita energy use favors a way of life without much long-range
transportation and with an emphasis on local affairs and local self-supply.
The economy favors soft products and services, arts and skills, and hand-
crafts, rather than the products of high technology, large-scale production
and distribution systems. The low energy path implies decentralization,
modest technologies, and a deeply conserving, traditional way of employing
resources.
For some people, such a mode of life appears highly desirable and the
panacea to the world's problems; it seems to them resilient, nonaggressive,
and contented. For others, for those who left the farm to go live in the big
cities, such a mode of life seems highly restricting. The relative lack of
physical mobility, and the lack of rich communication and interaction,
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implies a lack of role mobility whereby people can experiment over an ever-
wider range of creative behavior and give expression to innate powers that
might otherwise be stifled.
Of course, there are other human costs associated with each of these life-
styles. In effect, there is no clear-cut case. If one were a utopian, one might
argue for a world divided into two areas, one where people may elect to live
in the decentralized agrarian way, in the style of the millennium, and another
where people might elect to live with the scale of interaction that has been
achieved in the industrialized societies. Indeed, such a world already exists,
is not utopian, and, most importantly, is not by choice!
It was not our intention to clarify such societal visions, which are but
implicit features of the attempt to quantify global energy demand and
supply. Our purpose in addressing the hard-soft controversy was to provide
insights into the problem.
• The demand for liquid fuels is a principal driving force of tbe energy
problem. We have an energy problem within tbe energy problem.
Oil-based liquid fuels have become a mainstay of industrial civilization and
are vital in the early stages of third world development. But as our study
revealed, they will not be as easily available and as cheap to obtain as is
necessary to meet projected demands. This is why many people say that
the energy problem is a liquid fuel problem.
In any world energy strategy, it will therefore be extremely important to
restrict the uses of liquid secondary energy carriers (in all cases, hydro-
carbons) to those uses where nothing else can be substituted for them in a
significant way, at least not much before 2030: This means principally as
transport fuels and as feedstocks for the petrochemical industry. These
sectors alone will challenge the world with a large demand for liquid hydro-
carbons (see Table 9-2). This is not to say that eventually transportation
could not be accommodated by means other than the use of liquid hydro-
carbons. Later, in Chapter 10, we picture a world in which hydrogen could
be the base for the necessary liquid fuels. But since the advent of such a
Table 9-2. Percentage of total use of liquid hydrocarbons for motor fuels
and feedstocks, High and Low Scenarios, 1975-2030.
Base Year High Scenario Lo w Scenario
Region 7975 2030 2030
I (NA) 74 94 91
II (SU/EE) 65 100 100
III (WE/]ANZ) 52 86 76
IV (LA) 69 90 89
V (Af/SEA) 58 91 88
VI (ME/NAf) 74 94 91
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prominent role for hydrogen will probably not happen before 2030, we
must concentrate on what might be done now to reach such a world.
What would be called for would be a reversal of the trends during the
1950s and 1960s when the liquid hydrocarbons were rising to their domi-
nant position in the world market. The situation varies, of course, in different
regions (see Table 9-2): Developed regions I and III, where home heating
had been progressively turning to oil, are now experiencing strong pressures
(economic and otherwise) to brake and turn to other means. In developed
region II, on the other hand, a high degree of district heating has been an
implemented policy for decades.
• The structure of secondary energy demand over the next fifty years will
not change very much, and whatever change that might occur would be
at a very slow rate.
Figure 9-1 depicts the slow and relatively few changes in the global
secondary energy demand shares for the High scenario. Our study came to
Figure 9-1. Global secondary energy demand, High scenario, 1980-2030.
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the somewhat surpnsmg conclusion that the share of the demand met by
electricity would grow much more slowly than we initially expected. In the
High scenario, for example, the share of electricity in global demand in-
creases from 14 percent in 1980 to only 20 percent by 2030.
Of course, there are regional differences: Regions I and III would have
higher rates; still, the trend is not toward an all-electric society by 2030.
This trend is governed chiefly by the high investments that would accom-
pany the application of electricity in other than its most appropriate sectors
of demand.
• Over the next fifty years under any set of circumstances, economzc
growth rates will be limited.
A major qualitative finding of our study is that it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for the world as a whole to exceed annual economic growth
rates of 3.5 percentb because of energy supply characteristics. That is, under
any conceivable set of circumstances, economic growth rates will be limited.
This conclusion stands in contrast to higher projections of several recent
world studies, such as the World Energy Conference (1978), the Workshop
on Alternative Energy Strategies (1977), and the Leontief study (1977) spon-
sored by the United Nations. This concerns us for even though the estimates
for the Group of 77 in the Leontief study are not the results of an analysis
dealing with economic feasibilities, they reflect a declaration of political
will. Indeed, this study (done in 1977) evaluated world trade along the line
of the data from the United Nations Council on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), projecting a global energy demand for the year 2000 of 29
TWyr/yr. This is some 53 and 93 percent more than our projections in the
High and Low scenarios for this year, respectively.
These numbers are irrelevant. What is important is the goals of the devel-
oping countries reflected in the UNCTAD targets. The lower the growth
rates, the higher the probability for economic warfare in ways that are
difficult to anticipate. The global instability apparent in the events of the
late 1970s and 1980 is probably only a forerunner of the unrest that will
surface in the near future.
• Political, societal, and institutional problems will probably make the
situation more grim than has been described in our two scenarios.
It could be done: The energy problem could be solved physically. To reach
this conclusion, we relied greatly on the quantitative analysis of our sce-
narios, as reported in Chapter 8. Still, our overall picture is based on the
accounting of regional differences among the seven world regions. We must
therefore face the political reality of having many more countries in the
world. The situation is complex and certainly less than optimal.
At which points would reality be more grim? For our analysis we have
bOp. cit. p. 172.
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assumed a constant value for the U.S. dollar. What we have not done is to
translate these into real monetary terms, which means incorporating the
effects of inflation and the problem of the balance of payments. Decoupling
the terms of trade from the side effects of these problems is not optimal, but
is consistent with the determination to focus throughout this study on the
factual basis of the energy problem.
As a result of our findings, we see that a further extension into the political
realm might also be an analysis of the stability or, more precisely, of the
resilience of the global energy supply system. The security of energy supplies
is indeed a problem. Oil embargoes would impede growth. Likewise, the
supply situation for natural uranium is being hindered by fear about the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and by the antinuclear movements. In fact,
there is practically no free uranium market today.
For our scenarios, we assumed that over the next few decades, region VI
would set a production ceiling of 33.6 million barrels of oil per day. We
alluded to the relative inelasticity of demand. Eventually, disturbances
in the oil production levels of this region are a possible source of major
global instability. Let us examine this from the standpoint of three world
regions (Figure 9-2). In our scenarios, sometime around the year 2000,
region I will arrive at oil self-sufficiency. Any imports to region I would then
have to be made at the expense (in terms of supply) of region V, which has
the lowest purchasing power even at that time. A similar situation could
exist for region III if it were to import more oil than that projected for this
region in our scenarios. Region III is particularly vulnerable to any instabil-
ities in energy supply-be it for coal or natural gas or oil-because of its
limited indigenous supply situation.
ENERGY SUPPLY
• Fossil fuels will continue to be available but will become increasingly
unconventional and expensive.
Both of our scenarios are fundamentally fossil in nature, which for some
people may seem unrealistic in light of the many statements they hear today
about the world running out of fossil resources. But as we discussed in
Chapter 8, what is at a premium are the cheap, easily accessible fossil fuels
(see Table 8-11.) The world will therefore have to look farther and dig
deeper, which also means that costs will increase, as well as environmental
hazards.
This transition to low grade fossil fuels is nearly a complete reversal of the
trends of the past several decades, when the world turned from coal to oil
because it was cheaper, easier to handle, convenient, and comparatively
clean. In the past, it was normal to have energy investments on the order of
$3000 per barrel of oil per day, or less, for the production facilities of an
oil field. Already, these investments have risen three to six times, with
production capacities at costs of $10,000 to $20,000 per barrel oil per day
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Figure 9-2. Interregional oil trade, High and Low scenarios, primary equivalent, 1975-
2030.
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being more the rule. Such costs begin to reflect the complexity and difficulty
of obtaining oil from areas like the North Sea and Alaska. We probably have
to expect such conditions as the move to unconventionals progresses.
We can look at these investment costs in yet another light. One barrel of
oil per day is equivalent to some 71 kW of caloric power. Presently, produc-
tion costs of $20,000 per barrel of oil per day correspond to $300 per kW of
installed thermal capacity, which relates roughly to $1000 per kW(e) of
installed capacity. Indeed, we came close to this figure in our quantitative
analysis of the capital costs of electrical power generation. Then too, future
abatement measures and control technologies that would have to go along
with the use of low grade fuels may bring investment costs as high as $500
per kW of installed thermal capacity or even higher over the longer term.
Ultimately, in purely economic terms, the use of unconventional oil, for
example, could approximate the use of other primary energy sources, and
oil's inherent advantage would most likely disappear.
The environmental impacts of harnessing low grade fossil fuels cannot be
overlooked here in our discussion, although it is not clear now how large
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Figure 9-3. Schematic vertical section of northern area of the FRG.
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these impacts will be. For instance, to mine for the requisite quantities of
coal, or to extract tar sands and shale oil, will devastate large land areas.
The future coal-mining operation in the northern region of the Federal
Republic of Germany may offer insights into what we might have to expect.
As Figure 9-3 depicts, only the last "bit" of the coal stratum underneath
northern Germany is near the surface and accessible. Mining "only" to the
depth of some 1200 meters would still tap only some 25 billion tons of
coal equivalent. In order to harness the more than 300 billion tons of coal
equivalent that lie dormant in this stratum, it will probably be necessary
to dig as deep as 3000 to 5000 meters. Whole cities, villages, and land-
scapes might have to be destroyed and later reclaimed. The Garsdorf open
lignite pit, regarded as one of the most modern and advanced mining
operations, could then be seen as only a small beginning to such large-
scale operations.
By introducing this example here, we are not trying to actually propose
such operations. Rather, our intent is to paint a realistic picture of what
might happen if the world were to choose to look the other way as more and
more fossil resources were used up in a consumptive manner.
But why, one may ask, are we led to such a high degree of consumptive
uses of resources in our scenarios? Are there, perhaps, some ameliorative
factors that have been overlooked? Although the shaping of our scenarios
was a complex process, two major reasons stand out as instrumental in
driving us to the high fossil consumption.
One reason has to do with capital investments in energy systems. To abide
by the decision to make the reference scenarios as realistic and as "middle of
the road" as possible, we were led intuitively to supply structures with low
investment requirements. This proved to be a "forcing function," making the
world stick with fossils probably much longer than it ought.
The second reason has to do with our estimated fossil fuel production for
the seven regions (see Figure 9-4). Such production figures emerge out of the
reality that neither nuclear nor solar, however forcefully they are pushed,
will achieve a really high share of power needs by 2030. In general, what
Figure 9-4. Domestic fossil fuel production, High scenario, 1980-2030.
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Table 9-3. Cumulative uses of fossil fuels, High and Low scenarios,
1975-2030.
High Scenario Low Scenario
Total
Resource Total Remaining Total Remaining
A "ailable b Consumed Resource Consumed Resource
(TWyr) (TWyr) (yr)c (TWyr) (yrf
Oil
Categories 1 and 2a 464 317 22 264 40
Category 3 373 4 45 0 62
Gas
Categories 1 and 2 408 199 35 145 76
Category 3 130 0 22 0 38
Coal d
Category 1 560 341 18 224 52
Category 2 1019 0 85 0 158
aFor definition of terms and cost categories, see Table 8-11 of Chapter 8.
bTotal resources, including those to be discovered, as of 1975.
cNumber of years that the remaining resource would last if it were consumed at the 2030 annual
rate of fuel use and if all of the resource came from the designated category.
dCoal use includes coal converted to synthetic liquids and gas.
becomes apparent in the study of energy is that total energy production
between now and 2030 is constrained mostly by the time and effort it takes
to build up production facilities, not by the quantities of resources. Table
9-3 points this up: For instance, in the High scenario, only 68 percent of
categories 1 and 2 oil and 61 percent of category 1 coal will have been
consumed by 2030. After 2030, that situation begins to change, and re-
sources become a major constraining feature.
• Renewable energy sources can contribute in an important, albeit limited,
way to meeting demand.
How might local uses of solar power, wind power, water power, biomass,
and the like be integrated into the global supply picture to take some of the
pressures away from the fossil fuels? In Chapter 6 we identified the maxi-
mum technical potential for renewable sources, which is some 15 TWyr/yr of
secondary energy or somewhat less than twice the current global primary
energy consumption. However, harnessing this amount of energy from these
renewable sources has serious implications for the very features that make
these sources so attractive-namely, decentralization and local availability.
A crude but nevertheless good indicator of the possible impacts of large-
scale deployment of renewable sources is their production densities. If we
assume an average production density of 0.2 W/m 2 (Figure 9-5), we see
that some 75 million km 2 of open space would be needed to produce
15 TWyr/yr-whether for the harvesting of wood, wind, or the like. For
perspective, the amount of land being used today around the globe for
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Figure 9-5. Energy supply densities.
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agriculture is some 13 million km 2• Renewables if pushed hard enough could
come into competition with existing land and water uses. To be sure, the
larger the output expected from renewables, the more difficult this option
becomes; similarly, the less that is envisaged for these sources, the more they
would be able to retain their attractiveness.
Of course, this is a general observation that may be more or less true in
the aggregate but that may vary from locality to locality. Still, we maintain
that, realistically, the total contribution from all renewable sources would be
significantly smaller than what is technically possible.
• The oil-exporting countries will continue to dominate the oil market, but
an international coal market must develop as well.
One important feature of our quantitative analysis is the energy trade
links among the seven world regions, primarily for oil, but also eventually
for gas. We developed our thinking somewhat formally along the lines of a
gaming approach, which allowed us to observe important interplays between
suppliers and consumers. Some might consider our assessment rather un-
sophisticated. Perhaps it would have been best to focus directly on world
trade and not only on energy trade, but our goal was to assess a world energy
trade pattern, using identifiable rules.
A salient point is that region VI will continue to dominate the oil market.
Figure 8-2 of Chapter 8 presents one way of seeing this. The world produc-
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tion of oil outside of this region is large and continues to grow after the year
2000, yet the relative inelasticity of demand for liquid fuels allows region VI
to make the crucial difference between an oil glut and an oil shortage. Even
by reducing the use of liquid hydrocarbons to their most essential uses and
by taking into account the contributions of a young coal liquefaction in-
dustry, we still see a dominant role for region VI in the oil export market.
A crucial assumption is that region VI establishes an oil production ceil-
ing of 33.6 million barrels of oil per day, which would permit the stretching
out of the region's resource base. Table 9-4 relates oil production of region
VI in 1975 with that of the other OPEC countries and that of the OPEC
countries not included in region VI.
The world's trading relationships become even more problematic when we
consider how oil exports and imports are allocated among world regions, as
shown in Figure 8-3 of Chapter 8. Although in 1975, developing regions
IV and V were oil exporters, by 2030 both the High and the Low scenarios
envisage a significant oil import to region V. For our two supply scenarios,
we assumed that regions I, II, IV, and VII would be self-sufficient in oil
supply by the year 2030 and that region III would decrease its oil imports
almost by half, thus setting some of the oil free for region V.
The only mechanism that, in these scenarios, could accomplish this change
in the oil picture is the successful deployment of a large-scale coalliquefac-
tion industry in regions I, II, and, especially, III. Coal liquefaction would be
the best means for region III, and to a lesser extent for region I, to hold
down their requirements for imported oil.
In our scenarios, beyond 2010, there is a strong possibility that regions
I and II would become exporters of liquefied coal, possibly to region III,
which even at this time would have to import liquid fuels. Will regions I and
Table 9-4. Oil production in 1975 (thousand barrels per day).
Region VI Countries OPEC Member Countries
(excluding OPEC Region VI and OPEC (excluding region VI
member countries) Member Countries countries}
Bahrain 6.1 Algeria 1020.3 Ecuador 160.9
Egypt 23.3 Iran 5350.1 Gabon 223.0
Syrian Arab Republic 18.2 Iraq 2261.7 Indonesia 1306.5
Jordan 0 Kuwait 2084.2 Nigeria 1783.2
S.P. Lybian Venezuela 2346.2
Lebanon 0 A.j. 1479.8
Oman 34.1 Qatar 437.6
Yemen 0 Saudi Arabia 7.075.4
Yemen, Democratic 0 United Arab
Emirates 1663.8
Total 81.7 Total 21,372.0 Total 5819.8
Total region V I 21,453.7 Total OPEC 27,192.7
Sources; Data for region VI countries from United Nations (1978); data for member countries
of OPEC from OPEC (1978).
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II be willing to provide these exports? In what form? As solid coal or as a
liquid synthetic hydrocarbon? There could be a fundamentally new interplay
between region VI (oil supply) and regions I and II (coal supply) and regions
III and V (demand).
All these factors reinforce the general conclusion that it will not be
market forces but political forces that will govern the quantities and prices
of world oil trade. This, as we see it, is a relatively new situation, in which
new institutional mechanisms are needed to make things manageable. A
vision of the evolution of energy systems on a world scale could provide the
conceptual framework needed to foster such institutions linking different
economic and political groups.
• Coal liquefaction must be installed with a strategic view.
Given the significance of coal liquefaction in balancing demand and
supply of liquid fuels in regions I, II, and III, more needs be said about it
here. Our reference scenarios show coal being used at the rate of 12 billion
tons equivalent per year, most of it devoted to satisfying the internal energy
needs of the various regions and with only moderate amounts left for trading
on the world market. Figure 9-6 shows how the relative shares of global
Figure 9-6. Primary energy (or equ ivalent) demand, High scenario, 1980-2030.
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primary energy change for the High scenario. As oil drops off, coal-based
synthetic fuels rise sharply, with nuclear power and renewables filling the
gaps.
When coal-based synthetic fuels begin to take on such a large role, the
technical processes by which they are produced also become most significant.
We explained how these two processes differ in Chapter 3. Besides using
three to four times more carbon resources than the allothermal method, the
autothermal method leads to the release of three to four times more carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere.
The degree to which the CO 2 problem might be aggravated is suggested
by the estimate that the natural CO 2 content of the atmosphere is equivalent
to the burning of roughly 500 TWyr of fossil fuels. If, however, 1000 TWyr
of fossil fuels are actually burned (see Figure 9-7), one can assume roughly
that 50 percent of the CO2 would remain in the atmosphere, thus doubling
the natural CO 2 content. This is approaching the limits that we consider
prudent, and it is our conviction that the world would be far wiser to adopt
allothermal coal liquefaction methods.
Figure 9-7. Evaluation of conceivable cumulative world energy consumption, 1970-
2030.
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• If nuclear energy is used primarily to supply the process heat in coal
liquefaction, there would be enough coal to produce liquid fuels for
one hundred years or more.
In our enhanced nuclear alternative supply case (discussed in Chapter 8),
we hypothetically explored the use of allothermal methods of coalliquefac-
tion, using a nuclear energy supply close to our trajectory of 17 TWyr/yr
(considered in Chapter 4). To be sure, the burden on coal was greatly re-
lieved, stretching out the lifetime of coal for one hundred years or more.
But for our scenarios, we hewed to the criterion of feasibility over the
next fifty years, and we saw that it would not be possible to build up the
nuclear contribution to the 17 TWyr/yr level by 2030. Thus, over the next
fifty years, until the completion of the final transition to a nonfossil world,
coal will have to be used strategically, implying a minimum primary energy
role and its prudent use for producing synthetic fuels. On the aggregate
level, we envisaged the autothermal method. On the local or national basis,
allothermal coal liquefaction schemes could appear much earlier than what
we considered for the aggregate-as, for example, in region III, when coal
impor~s become less feasible than has been projected in our reference
scenanos.
• If there is a nuclear moratorium, gas resources would be largely ex-
hausted by the year 2030.
Because our scenarios are globally comprehensive and internally consistent,
we decided to hypothetically explore the effects on the energy supply
system if there was a moratorium on the use of nuclear energy. In such a
case, our results show that a substantial burden would be placed on natural
gas to make up for the projected energy shortfall. As shown in Table 9-3,
some 49 percent of categories 1 and 2 gas would be consumed by 2030
in the High scenario, leaving 339 TWyr of conventional and unconventional
gas still in place. But for such gas to be substituted for oil, they would have
to be transported over long distances, which involves the development of
large technical facilities-gas pipelines, special tankers for transporting liquid
gas, and conversion facilities. As we observed in Chapter 3, some of these
technological developments will probably be possible within the next few
decades, and it is likely that the role of natural gas will indeed be more
important than that projected in our scenarios.
All things considered, a nuclear moratorium may seem an interim solution
to the highly polarized situation for the next few decades, but from a long-
term global perspective it would have its price.
CONSTRAINTS
• While the growth of energy investments will be significant, they will
not be a large portion of GDP in the developed regions.
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Table 9-5. Capital cost assumptions for major energy supply and conversion
tech nologies.
Capital Cost
(7975 $/kW{e))
Electric Generation
Coal
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Oil- or Gas-fired
Gas turbine
Other
Coal gasification or liquefaction (autothermal)
Crude oil refinery
480-550
700-920
620
325-350
170
400
50
Ideally, the study of investments should involve an input-output pro-
cedure that embraces not only the energy sector but also all economic
sectors. The pilot model of George Dantzig of Stanford University is a
prominent example of such a procedure, but such models are very data
intensive and their application to the global level is enormously complex.
In our scenarios we examined only direct investments in the energy sectors
and those in the energy-related sectors that indirectly contribute to energy
development. We made a number of assumptions; Table 9-5 gives a summary
of the major ones. We assumed that costs would remain unchanged through-
out the period up to 2030. This led to some rough overall orientations.
Table 9-6 compiles the cumulative investments for the two reference
scenarios and the two alternative supply cases. Comparing the data, we see
that the nuclear moratorium case would call for higher investments than,
say, the Low scenario, which has some 23 percent of nuclear power by 2030.
The absolute size of the cumulative energy investments for the world over
this period would range between $29 and $48 trillion. This is in line with our
propositions presented at the World Energy Conference in 1977. As can be
seen from Figure 9-8, the share of energy investment of 2 percent (in 1975)
Table 9-6. Cumulative energy sector capital cost requirements, 1981-2030
(10 12 $).
High Scenario
Low Scenario
Nuclear Moratorium Case
Enhanced Nuclear Case
Developed
Regions a
28.0
18.8
22.0
28.4
Developing
Regionsb
18.5
10.9
12.0
15.3
World
46.5
29.7
34.0
47.7
aRegions I (NA), II (SU/EE), III (WE/IANZ).
bRegions IV (LA), V (Af/SEA), VI (ME/NAf), VII (C/CPA).
ADDING IT ALL UP 189
Figure 9-8. Share of total energy investment in GDP, High scenario, 1975-2030.
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is typical. For the developed regions, such investments increase and peak at
values close to 4 percent around the year 2015. For the developing regions,
the investments rise more sharply, coming close to 7 percent by the year
2020. For the world as a whole, the investment maximum is 4.5 percent.
What is not so clear is whether such amounts are large or small. The more
we tried to clarify this issue, the more complex it became.
Comparing the figure of 4.5 percent with, say, the total military expendi-
tures in the world today, we see that both are of the same order. Then too,
changes in the saving rates globally have been of the same magnitude over
the past few decades. For example, in Japan during the 1960s, the savings
rate was between 30 and 35 percent, whereas now it is closer to 30 percent.
This difference does not seem to have produced fundamental changes, which
leads us to speculate that the world as a whole could manage energy invest-
ments of a similar order.
But there are further complications that ought to be considered. In our
scenarios, we assumed constantly declining economic growth rates globally
over the next fifty years. When integrated energy investments were com-
pared with integrated GOP, the ratio turned out to be rather low, because of
the pocket of relatively large GOP projected to exist before 2030. Of course,
this ratio would have been higher if we had assumed constant economic
growth rates.
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What is really needed is an analysis of the impacts of energy investments
sector by sector, using the above mentioned input-output techniques for the
whole of the economy, in order to trace the sectoral impacts that are hidden
or averaged out in the aggregate pictures. For the world energy trade situa-
tion, the problem of analysis is particularly complex. We did not undertake
such an extensive analysis. Nonetheless, we observe that the aggregate
impacts globally would not be too large, while the sectoral impacts would
probably be very pronounced.
• Global impact of waste beat is probably a nonproblem.
Climate is a complex and noisy phenomenon, noisy in the sense that there
can be large variabilities in how the climate system behaves, as simulated by
climate models. In addition to changes in averages of such factors as temper-
ature, pressure, and humidity, there are fluctuations-and indeed, changes
in these fluctuations-that make up both the temporal and the spatial
pattern of the climate system. It is how these changes affect the pattern that
interests us.
Using numerical models of global atmospheric circulation, which are
presently the best means available, we simulated the climatic effects of
energy releases of 30 to 300 TWyr/yr from certain geographical locations
and areas. We observed that the thermal pollution effects from such waste
heat releases were not greater than the inherent noise levels of the model.
Nonetheless, the release of very large amounts of energy-say, several hun-
dreds of terawatts-from small, concentrated areas could alter the global
average climate state significantly. When considering the global energy de-
mand levels of our High and Low scenarios (36 TWyr/yr and 22 TWyr/yr,
respectively), waste heat releases would probably not perturb the global
average climate state in the foreseeable future. Of course, this is not to
exclude the possibility of serious effects from waste heat releases in the
vicinity of the release.
• Tbe carbon dioxide buildup caused by fossil fuel combustion is prob-
ably tbe most severe climate issue.
While it is too early to make alarming statements about the specific
climatic impacts of large-scale deployment of any of the major energy
strategies, our study revealed that the impact of the combustion of fossil
fuels on the global climate over the next fifty to seventy years could lead to
global average temperature increases of from 1 to 4°C. Of course, different
regions would experience different effects, and some might benefit from
these changes, whereas others would suffer hardships. For example, in-
creased precipitation (rainfall) in certain areas could result in changes in
regional agricultural practices, with hitherto arid areas flourishing agri-
culturally, while others struggle to adapt their cropping patterns to more
arid conditions. The hydrosphere, too, might undergo changes, with certain
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rivers being enlarged and others being reduced in volume. To be sure, the
implications of these climatic changes are potentially large.
Ideally, the world should begin now to monitor the possible climatic
effects of high atmospheric CO2 levels, in order to be able to ward off
major problems. But reality is often far from the ideal, and no organized
global actions of this nature are in sight. Present knowledge of the climatic
implications of raising the CO2 level is limited, but it appears that between
five and ten years would be needed-and most likely could be afforded-for
vigorous research to narrow down uncertainties.
It may be unrealistic to expect political agreement among nations on the
avoidance of CO2 impacts, in view of the benefits that would accrue for
some. We are faced with the dichotomy of having a highly disaggregated
political power on the globe and the truly global problem of atmospheric
CO2 buildup. Are we doomed to encounter this dilemma? Probably, yes.
Still, we believe it imperative to maintain flexibility in designing energy
supply policies and to restrict the buildup of CO 2 to a prudent level.
• Low density energy collection devices spread over large areas could have
climatic impacts as well.
We examined what might happen to the earth's surface characteristics
(e.g., its heat balance, roughness, and hydrological conditions) as a result
of energy conversion and use. These include large-scale deforestation in
tropical or subtropical areas, large-scale harnessing of energy from the
thermal gradient of tropical oceans, large-scale deployment of windmills, and
even the tens of terawatt scale of unconventional fossil fuel production.
There are indications that such changes are to be expected with disposi-
tions of energy flows on the order of 100 TWyr/yr. Agriculture is a case in
point. Albedo changes of 0.1 seem to take place with the establishment of
farm land. Envisaging 10 million km 2 of land, one arrives at resulting disposi-
tions of energy flows on the order of 100 TWyr/yr. Given the influx of
178,000 TWyr/yr of solar power, one might consider 100 TWyr/yr only a
minute fraction and therefore too small an amount to warrant concern.
But, it does not take much to change the climate pattern, and that is what
matters. For example, precipitation and cloud formation patterns change
upon such dispositions of energy flows. Unfortunately, the state of the art
did not permit us to set upper limits on the uses of these energy collection
devices or to translate our concern into operational constraints.
• The debate on the issues of waste disposal and on the proliferation of
nuclear weapons because of the civilian uses of nuclear power could
limit the buildup of nuclear energy over the next fifty years.
The often heated worldwide debate beclouding these two issues reflects
the level of people's concern about the deployment of nuclear energy, and
as such it has become a constraint. We did not deal with these issues ex-
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plicitly in our study for two reasons. First, a large number of capable and
sizeable grou ps are already studying these problems, and we did not wish
to compete with these efforts. This is not to say that individual members
of our team are not personally involved with or at least well informed on
these matters, but as a group we decided to abstain. In this connection we
note the work of the International Fuel Cycle Evolution (INFCE) that was
carried out in close geographical proximity with, and over the same period
as, our study.
The second, more commanding, reason why we abstained from delving
into these issues is that we view the problems of nuclear waste handling and
proliferation as political issues. Indeed, the establishment of related stan-
dards and regulations is largely a sociopolitical process that was outside our
factual frame of reference.
• Society has not yet developed adequate mechanisms for treating the
risks associated with energy supply technologies.
This is the major finding of our study of the relatively young science of
risk analysis. The lack of data and the inadequacy of both evaluation tech-
niques and decisionmaking formalisms for standard setting add to the
problem of assessing the risk of energy technologies. Our risk assessment
framework, illustrated in Figure 7-11 of Chapter 7, was developed in order
to define certain categories that we hope will add to the discussion of this
subject and permit more formal research in this field.
Our study of public attitudes toward energy-related risks revealed that the
public is generally more concerned with the risks of events that have a low
probability but large consequences than it is with those that have a high
probability but low consequences. Indeed, there is a large discrepancy be-
tween the public's perception of a risk and the best technical judgments of
the risks of using a certain energy technology. Psychological and socio-
political factors were seen to greatly influence how individuals and societies
as a whole view the risks of energy technologies. This finding bears directly
on the political process of establishing the standards and regulations for
energy technologies.
In many ways, standards and regulations are driving forces behind tech-
nological developments. This is in contrast with the past, when the tradi-
tional approach of the engineer was optimization, usually for minimal costs,
while observing only certain constraints. Today the criterion being applied
to a project is whether it can be "carried through" to its completion and
not whether design technologies are optimal in terms of their costs alone.
(In fact, when costs are considered, they are usually regarded as a con-
straint.) More precisely, "carrying through" a project usually means obtain-
ing the necessary licenses and permits. Consider, for instance, a nuclear
reactor designed in country X. Although this reactor is successfully operating
in country X, it may not be licensed for operation in country Y. The reasons
for this seemingly illogical situation lie within the sociopolitical domain. The
decisions on licensing a particular technology are influenced by the many
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different perceptions of reality that are held by the different societies in
different countries.
There is another dimension to the problem of obtaining a license. Lead
times for constructing certain facilities-say, a nuclear power plant-are
increasing. Currently, it is some ten years from the time a decision is made to
build such a facility to its actual operation, with five years usually required
for construction and the other five years for obtaining the necessary licenses
and permits.
Moreover, the fact that regulatory bodies often have difficulty at arriving
at such regulations and standards adds to the complexity of the problem.
Engineers may be confused as to what standards and regulations they should
aim to meet. Several examples come to mind here-nuclear waste disposal,
pressure vessel safety codes, and codes for the design of fatigue ruptures. All
too often, codes, regulations, and standards are contested in the courts,
which are used perhaps inappropriately for de facto legislative and standard-
setting purposes. This can not only increase the uncertainty about what
standards and regulations to apply, but also may inhibit responsible bodies
from functioning properly. Uncertainties are, of course, a fertile ground for
fear, and one can conclude that certain sociopolitical factors foster fear
about possible risks of energy technologies.
One possible solution would be to develop a "language" to overcome
these fears-that is, to create some means for consciously addressing these
fears and, in so doing, of managing the risk by resolving the conflict between
perceived fears and realities. Without such a language, the problem of man-
aging risk is too often reduced to dealing with numerical information about a
technology. Numbers often appear easier to deal with than deep-seated
beliefs, although in the long run, they are not useful. What is a "safe"
radiation rate? One has only to look at the Gofman-Tamplin debates of the
late 1960s and early 1970s about permissible dose rates to grasp the diffi-
culties of resolving such problems by numerical approaches. As we stated
earlier in this chapter, while numbers can be helpful they can hardly be
definitive.
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10 PATHS TO ASUSTAI NABLE FUTU RE
We have concluded that the possibility of a sustainable global energy system
is at least fifty years away. Yet in this chapter we propose to discuss what
the characteristics of such a system might be, and how we, the human race,
might get there from here. To embark on such a discussion is adventurous,
to say the least. The technological landscape in 2030 and beyond will proba-
bly be vastly different from what we know today. It was, after all, only
sixty-six years between the Wright brothers' first flight at Kitty Hawk and
Neil Armstrong's landing on the moon. We cannot predict the future, but we
can at least partly anticipate it, and, perhaps, affect it. Indeed, we can antici-
pate that population will grow and that fossil fuels will be depleted-despite
the fact that we cannot predict the rates with perfect precision. And the in-
vestments we make today, whether in environmental protection or nuclear
research and development, affect profoundly the opportunities we leave our-
selves and our successors in the twenty-first century.
We do not advertise what is discussed as "the solution to the energy
problem." In particular, the presentation is not in the form of a series of
policy prescriptions for either politicians, administrators, entrepreneurs, or
consumers. The intent is to illuminate those possible features of a future
sustainable energy system that can be discerned if we look hard enough at
technologies already available. The discussion is meant to be exploratory and
suggestive. It starts, quite naturally, by considering the essentially inexhausti-
ble primary energy sources.
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PRIMARY ENERGY: CONSUMPTIVE AND INVESTIVE
MODES OF USING RESOURCES
A sustainable energy future can only be one that is not based on the con-
sumption of resources. In light of this, it is one of the striking features of the
supply scenarios of Chapter 8 that they are still very much fossil in nature.
Instead of reducing our use of oil, we realized that we will have to expand it,
and the same observation applies for both natural gas and coal. Somewhat
surprisingly, the fossil resources to do so exist. But as we know, they become
dirtier and dirtier, and in the end, looking beyond the year 2030, this will
lead to unacceptable situations.
It is important to realize that there is a quite different mode of using re-
sources-the investive mode. This mode can best be explained by contrasting
the function of fissile material in the case of the fast breeder reactor to its
function in burner reactors. While today's burner reactors burn the little
stockpile of fissile material that nature has endowed us with, this is not so in
the case of the fast breeder.
There, the fissile material functions as a "catalyst" for the conversion of
fertile material, as explained in Chapter 4. In the end the fissile material
inventory increases, multiplying itself slowly. Consuming only fertile
material is no hardship at all. In view of the extremely high energy yields per
gram and of the exceedingly large amounts of fertile material available, the
deployment of the breeder eventually decouples the energy supply from
resource supply problems. The same reasoning, it should be noted, also
applies to the D-T fusion breeder. The difference between the consumptive
and the investive modes of using fissile material can perhaps best be illus-
trated by repeating the resource potentials-300 TWyr for the consumptive
mode and 300,000 TWyr for the investive mode.
But breeders are not the only example of such investive uses of resources.
Another case in point is solar power. In Chapter 5, we elaborated on the
material requirements associated with solar power-specifically, the need to
install materials at a density on the order of 50 kg/m 2 . Providing 20 TWyr/yr,
assuming energy production at 20 W/m 2 , would require 50 billion tons of
material, mainly in the form of steel and concrete. Yearly production in
1975 was close to 0.7 billion tons for each, so we are talking of large
amounts of materials indeed. In this case, however, it is not so much the
scarcity of such materials but the impacts associated with their production
that is particularly important. But in line with the reasoning considered
here the critical observation is that once the material is invested, energy is
provided without any further consumption of materials.
One can interpret renewable energy sources in a similar fashion. For ex-
ample, extracting energy from wood on a continuous basis necessitates main-
taining forests or plantations as investments. If overharvesting occurs, as
has often happened in the past, the inventory is eventually consumed. But if
care is applied and the harvest rate equals the rate of renewal, the inventory
is maintained.
It is on this basis that we suggest nuclear and solar energy, as well as the
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renewable energy sources, as primary energy supplies in a future sustainable
energy system. This could be a fundamental change in the situation of
mankind.
And it is in sharp contrast to the situation of today, where in our exploita-
tion of the earth's resources (excluding water), we must devote roughly 75
percent of these resources solely to energy purposes. What the optimal mix
between nuclear, solar, and renewable energy sources will turn out to be is
not critical to our discussion here. What is more important is that these
sources exist.
Earlier in our considerations, we elaborated on the various important
characteristics of secondary energy carriers, including their transporta-
bility and versatility and the ease with which grids can be built up. In brief,
they must be user oriented. Thus, the three sources of primary energy men-
tioned above share a common feature that they require conversion into
appropriate forms of secondary energy.
SECONDARY ENERGY CARRIERS: ELECTRICITY
AND HYDROGEN, CLEAN AND COMPLEMENTARY
The use of electricity is already widespread today. The features of versatility
and to an extent transportability most certainly apply to this secondary
energy carrier, as is reflected in the high growth rates of electricity, which are
well above average energy growth rates and well above economic growth
rates. But electricity is not without disadvantages. For example, it is difficult
and expensive to store. To date, the electrical system has scaled its capacity
to peak demand rather than average demand as a means of solving the storage
problem. That is, it has been cheaper to build peaking plants (power plants
used only at those times when electricity demand is much higher than aver-
age) than to store the spare electricity that could be generated when demand
is much less than average. In addition to its storage problems, electricity is
difficult to transport over very long distances. Currently, we rely on chemi-
cal energy carriers, principally in the form of the fossil fuels, in those situa-
tions where favorable storage and transport characteristics are particularly
important. Thus, gasoline-powered automobiles have been preferred to elec-
tric cars, and oil and gas pipelines and tankers are preferable to intercon-
tinental high tension wires. But it is precisely these fossil energy carriers
that are getting scarcer, and while electricity can replace them to some de-
gree, for the reasons listed above we might be better off developing an al-
ternative that is itself a chemical, rather than an electrical, energy carrier.
A possible candidate that has reappeared often throughout this book is
hydrogen. It is attractive for several reasons. First, the technology for con-
verting electricity to hydrogen via the electrolysis of water is rather well
developed. Second, processes for converting nuclear or solar heat directly
to hydrogen without the intermediate step of electricity production appear
promising. Third, hydrogen is much more easily stored than electricity and
might be particularly suited to large-scale storage in depleted natural gas
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reservoirs. Fourth, the pipeline networks and the infrastructure associated
with further large-scale use of natural gas would be especially suited for a
gradual replacement of natural gas by hydrogen. And fifth, when hydrogen
is burned (recombined with oxygen), it produces essentially only water
vapor, thus making its use environmentally attractive. Of hydrogen's dis-
advantages, perhaps the most severe is that it is a gas at standard temperatures
and is therefore not well adapted to the liquid fuels demand of, particularly,
the transportation sector.
But there is another advantage of hydrogen, and this is related to the
transition from clean fossil fuels to dirty fossil fuels. One of the central prob-
lems of this transition is that just when demand is moving progressively to-
ward fuels rich in hydrogen-typically, methane-an ever larger portion of
our reserves will be constituted by fuels poor in hydrogen-typically, coal
and heavy crude oil. In other words, hydrogen is in short supply in even our
current chemical fuel system. Thus, any efforts toward developing hydrogen
as a possible successor to the fossil fuels has the added bonus of more im-
mediately enhancing the usefulness of those fossil fuels that remain.
Using the Carbon Atom Prudently
The fact that, based on current technologies, hydrogen could not immed-
ately satisfy the liquid fuel demand now met by oil, coupled with the fact
that our remaining fossil resources are becoming increasingly hydrogen poor
suggests that we look for combinations of fossil resources with nuclear- or
solar-generated hydrogen that are particularly addressed to the need for rela-
tively hydrogen-rich liquid fuels. Coal liquefaction-more precisely, allo-
thermal coal liquefaction as discussed in Chapter 3-is an immediately
promising option. This refers to processes, existing or proposed, where the
hydrogen and heat needed for the production of methanol (or other appro-
priate synthetic liquid hydrocarbons) from coal come not from the coal itself
but rather from some external source. As mentioned in Chapter 3, such
schemes both conserve coal and release less CO2 , Autothermal processes,
where the hydrogen and heat come from the coal, use three to four times as
much coal and produce three to four times as much CO 2 •
Still, to produce and use synthetic liquid hydrocarbons from coal and
other fossil resources is to consume the store of carbon atoms that are avail-
able in those particularly convenient forms. And while the transportation
sector may no longer need liquid hydrocarbons in one hundred years, it
would be cavalier to presume that we will be able to do without them en-
tirely. The problem then becomes one of recycling carbon, by extracting
CO 2 from the atmosphere and combining such carbon, rather than fossil
fuels, with hydrogen to produce fiquid hydrocarbons.
The simplest way to exploit the carbon reservoir in the atmosphere is to
use the plants that are already continuously extracting carbon dioxide. Much
technology for converting biomass into liquid fuels has been developed, and
here again, external sources of hydrogen and heat can help conserve the car-
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bon resource. There is, of course, a more direct way to conserve the carbon
atoms incorporated in synthetic hydrocarbons, and that is to immediately
capture the combustion gases released when the fuel is burned and then re-
cycle them. Research on such schemes is currently being pursued in the
Federal RepUblic of Germany at the Jiilich Research Center (1974).
Thus we see that while a sustainable energy system based on solar and
nuclear sources of energy and using electricity and hydrogen as secondary
energy carriers might eventually be possible, it is both in our best interests
and within our capabilities to carefully use the carbon atom to construct a
bridge to such a future.
Possible Opportunities
As we have just seen, with a little judicious orchestration of how we use
hydrogen and how we use coal, we can apply them together to alleviate a
liquid fuel demand, in a way that goes beyond the capabilities of either alone.
However, this is not the only way in which some of the technologies that we
have investigated might be particularly productively integrated, and in this
section we draw attention to some opportunities.
Observing that the difficulty of directly storing electricity has led to
generating capacity that is often idle, one can imagine initially introducing
electrolyzers and fuel cells at generating stations, whether fossil, nuclear, or
solar. Such a development would provide both experience with and im-
provements in hydrogen technology, and initially would not be constrained
by hydrogen demand, as there already exists a hydrogen market for am-
monia synthesis and oil refining. If hydrogen were used for storing off-
peak electricity, then the system would be closed. If, further, we were to
introduce the synthesis of methanol (or whatever synthetic liquid hydro-
carbon turns out to be the most appropriate), then the hydrogen market
would be practically unlimited. The methanol produced would help satisfy
the pressing demand for liquid fuels, and the experience gained would help
prepare us for a time when electricity and hydrogen might be the principal
secondary energy carriers.
In line with such possible developments, an additional opportunity should
be mentioned. In investigating various coal gasification and liquefaction
processes-in particular, those allothermal methods using external sources of
hydrogen and heat-it became clear that a by-product of these processes
might be a considerable amount of slag, which would have to be disposed of.
The use of large quantities of low grade fossil fuels would, in addition, create
substantial amounts of ash requiring disposal. If, however, we remember the
concrete requirements calculated in conjunction with building up a solar
capability of 35 TWyr/yr over one hundred years, these quantities of slag
and ash can be considered an important material resource rather than a waste
disposal problem. In particular, when the concrete requirements described in
Chapter 5 were compared with the waste material produced by coalliquefac-
tion and gasification technologies used at the levels incorporated in the High
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scenario of Chapter 8, the orders of magnitude fit. Again, such a comparison
is not definitive-but it is suggestive.
IMPLICATIONS OF A SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SYSTEM
Does the world possess the productive and institutional capabilities, the capi-
tal and material resources, and the discipline to achieve such a goal? What
does it mean to mobilize building programs on such a scale around the world
or to build the productive plants to turn out the dozens of billions of tons of
concrete and steel to build these grandiose new plants? These are chal-
lenging questions that we hope the old and new generations will be able to
tackle. Again, it will take time and material inputs-especially capital. There
will also be institutional barriers of all kinds at all levels to overcome. Above
all, it would demand generally much greater productivity worldwide, and
this would mean increased levels of interregional trading of all kinds-of
labor, of skills, of technologies, of knowledge, of energy, of products, of
food, and so forth.
In capital terms, taking into account the construction of facilities for
energy transmission and distribution, breeder technologies, and solar tech-
nologies, the investment may be on the order of $2 to $3 per watt of
achieved capacity. Thus, even a 20 TWyr/yr energy demand world (which is
lower than our Low scenario) would require an investment on the order of
$40 to $60 trillion (012 ).
In economic terms, we must ask what this investment means as compared
with world investments in energy today. If we take the average per capita
demand of 3 kWyr/yr of our Low scenario in the year 2030, we arrive at a
capital stock requirement for the energy system of $6000 to $9000 for each
citizen of the globe.
If we assume further that the portion of the world's capital stock devoted
to the energy system were 33 percent (compared to 25 percent today), the
$6000 to $9000 per capita capital stock in the energy system translates to
some $18,000 to $27,000 total capital stock per capita. This is indeed a high
investment when compared with 1975 values, particularly for developing
countries. Their per capita average in 1975 was only $380, as contrasted
with $8500 in the developed market economies and $2700 in the centrally
planned economies excluding region VII (Strbbele 1975). The 1975 world
average was $2000 per capita.
If one looks at these figures and envisages the need to raise the average
value to $18,000 to $27 ,000, then one sees that building a sustainable
energy system is hardly a straightforward possibility even within the next
one hundred years. This is why it is so important that the eight billion or so
people living in 2030 be rich, not poor, and much richer than today. That
they be rich does not mean that they discover some new treasure of physical
resources that has been completely overlooked in this book; it means that
they learn how to use the limited resources available more efficiently,
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more ingeniously, more productively. The process is continuous, and it is
cumulative.
The higher our productivity-that is, the more wisely we invest our cur-
rent resources of energy, labor, capital, and know-how-the closer we will
come to transforming the possibility of a sustainable energy system into a
reality. To succeed would be to cross a distinct threshold-to decouple the
world's energy supply from the problem of resource supplies. It is a threshold
perhaps as great as that passed by our distant ancestors when they launched
the era of domestic farming. To cross it is the modern challenge-and it is
not beyond our capabilities.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AGR-advanced gas-cooled reactor
hhl-barrel
hoe-barrel of oil equivalent
BPA-Bonneville Power Authority
BWR-boiling water reactor
C-carbon
°C-degree Celsius
cap-per capita
CF-confinement factor
CH4 -methane
CO2 -carbon dioxide
DOE-U.S. Department of Energy
O-T-deuterium-tritium
FBR-fast breeder reactor
GOP-gross domestic product
GW or GW(e)-gigawatt or gigawatt electric
h-hour
H-hydrogen
HTR-high temperature reactor
HWR-heavy water reactor
I-iodine
IAEA-International Atomic Energy Agency
INFCE-International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
kcal-kilocalorie
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kg-kilogram
km-kilometer
Kr-krypton
kW or kW(e)-kilowatt or kilowatt electric
kWh or kWh(e)-kilowatt-hour or kilowatt-hour of electricity
LMFBR-liquid metal fast breeder reactor
LNG-liquefied natural gas
LWR-light water reactor
mrem-millirem (one-one thousandth of a rem)
m, m 2 , m 3 -meter; square meter; cubic meter
mbd-million barrels of oil per day
mpg-miles per gallon
MPC-maximum permissible concentration
mtce-metric ton of coal equivalent
mtoe-metric ton of oil equivalent
MW or MW(e)-megawatt or megawatt electric
NH3 -ammonia
N2 O-nitrous oxide
Np -neptunium
OAPEC-Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OTEC-ocean thermal energy conversion
Pa-protactinium
ppm or ppmv-parts per million or parts per million volume
Pu-plutonium
PV-photovoltaic
PWR-pressurized water reactor
rem-dosage of ionizing radiation causing same biological effect as one ro-
entgen of X-ray of gamma-ray dosage
SSPS-solar satellite power station
STEC-solar thermal electric conversion
t-ton
tee-tons of coal equivalent
Th-thorium
THTR-thorium high temperature reactor
TVA-Tennessee Valley Authority
TW or TW(e)-terawatt or terawatt electric
V-uranium
VF 6 -uranium hexafluoride
V 308 -uranium oxygen compound called yellowcake
VNCTAD-Vnited Nations Council on Trade and Development
VA-value added
VR-Voronezh reactor
W-Watt(s)
WELMM-acronym of Water, .E:.nergy, Land, Material, and Manpower
yr-year
A THE SEVEN WORLD REGIONS
REGION I: NORTH AMERICA (NA)
Developed market economies with energy resources.
Canada
United States of America
REGION II: THE SOVIET UNION AND
EASTERN EU ROPE (SU/EE)
Developed centrally planned economies with energy resources.
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
205
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Yugoslavia
206 ENERGY IN A FINITE WORLD: Paths to a Sustainable Future
REGION III: WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA,
NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA, AND
ISRAEL (WE/JANZ)
Developed market economies with relatively few energy resources.
Member Countries of the European Community
Belgium Italy
Denmark Luxemburg
France Netherlands
Germany, Federal Republic of United Kingdom
Ireland
Other Western European Countries
Austria
Cyprus
Finland
Greece
Iceland
Norway
Others
Australia
Israel
Japan
New Zealand
South Africa
REGION IV: LATIN AMERiCA (LA)
Developing economies
tion growth.
Argentina
Bahamas
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guadeloupe
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
with many energy resources and significant popula-
Honduras
Jamaica
Martinique
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Puerto Rico
Surinam
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Other Caribbean
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Reunion
Rhodesia
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania, United Republic of
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Upper Volta
Western Sahara
Zaire
Zambia
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REGION V: AFRICA (EXCEPT NORTHERN AFRICA
AND SOUTH AFRICA), SOUTH AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA (Af/SEA)
Developing economies with some energy resources and significant popula-
tion growth.
Africa
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Malta
Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Brunei
Burma
Comoros
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Korea, Republic of (South)
Macau
Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
East Timor
West South Asia n.e.s.
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REGION VI: MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTHERN AFRICA (ME/NAf)
Developing economies with large energy resources.
Member Countries of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OAPEC)
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Kuwait
Others
Libyan Arab Republic
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
United Arab Emirates
Iran
Jordan
Lebanon
Oman
Yemen
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of
REGION VII: CHINA AND CENTRALLY PLANNED
ASIAN ECONOMIES (C/CPA)
Developing centrally planned economies with modest energy resources.
China, People's Republic of
Kampuchea, Democratic (formerly Cambodia)
Korea, Democratic Republic of
Laos, People's Democratic Republic of
Mongolia
Viet-Nam, Socialist Republic of
B UNITS AND DEFINITIONS
CONVERSION FACTORS
The following gives the definitions of units of measure used throughout this
book as numerical multiples of coherent Standard International (SI) units.
The exact definition is indicated by I; other numbers are approximate to
the number of digits shown.
1 acre
1 bar
1 barrel (petroleum, 42 gallons)
1 Btu (British thermal unit)
1 calorie (thermochemical)
1 electron volt
1 erg
1 foot
1 gallon (U.K., liquid)
1 gallon (U.S., liquid)
1 hectare
1 horsepower (metric)
1 inch
1 kilopond
1 langley
=4046.8564224 m 2
= 100,000 N/m 2
= 0.1589873 m 3
= 10551
= 4.1841
= 1.60210 X 10-19 1
= 10-7 1
= 0.3048 m
= 4.546087 X 10-3 m 3
= 3.785411784 X 10-3 m 3
= 10,000 m 2
= 736 W
= 0.0254 m
= 9.80665 N
= 41,840 11m2
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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1 pound force
1 pound mass
1 mile (U.S. statute)
1 millibar
1 nautical mile
1 ton (long)
1 ton (metric)
1 ton (short, 2000 pounds)
1 Wyr
] yard
= 4.4482216152605 N
= 0.45359237 kg
= 1,609.344 m
= 100 N/m 2
= 1852 m
= 1016.0469088 kg
=1000 kg
= 907.18474 kg
= 31,536 X 103 J
= 0.9144 m
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
USEFUL APPROXIMATIONS
1 million barrels of oil per day
(l mbd)
1 million barrels of oil per day
1 Btu
1 TWyr
1 TWyr
=:: 71 GWyr/yr
=:: 50 million tons of oil per year
=:: 1 kJ
=:: 30 Quad
=:: 109 tce
PREFIXES
Factor Prefix Symbol
1018 exa E
lOiS peta D
1012 a tera T
109 gIga G
106 mega M
103 kilo k
102 hecto h
101 deka da
10-1 deci d
10-2 centi c
10-3 milli m
10-6 micro J1
10--9 nano n
10-12 plCO P
10-15 femto f
10-18 atto a
a 1TW (terawatt) = 1012 W.
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c THE SET OF IIASAENERGY MODELS
The set of lIAS A energy models is interconnected through the informa-
tion flow between the models within a model loop (see Figure C-1).
The demand for final energy in each of the seven world regions is evalu-
ated in the demand model MEDEE (Lapillone 1978), which is driven by the
population and economic growth that are initially specified exogenously.
The supply model MESSAGE (Agnew, Schrattenholzer, and Voss 1979)
then determines the optimal cost-supply ratio of the required energy, subject
to resource availability, technological, environmental and other relevant
constraints. The economic and other impacts of these energy supply strate-
gies are evaluated in the model IMPACT (Kononov and Por 1979), and the
corresponding macroeconomic issues are assessed in the aggregated economy
model MACRO (Norman 1977). This whole procedure is iterated region
by region, taking into account interregional energy trade, until a globally
consistent energy demand and supply pattern evolves. This also has a cor-
rective bearing on the originally exogenous specification of economic growth
of all seven regions.
Consistency checks are also carried out on the information flow between
the models in each step of the iteration. This is possible since the models
are not "hard wired," but allow for human judgement. All of the inputs and
outputs of the models are examined to be sure that credible results appear
at all steps. Furthermore, the interpretative results from IMPACT, MACRO,
international trade analyses, and the economic price and elasticity deter-
mination offer additional consistency checks.
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Figure C-1. IIASA's set of energy models: a simplified representation.
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PROFILE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) cameinto
being officially on October 4, 1972. On that day, representatives of dis-
tinguished scientific bodies from 12 nations gathered at The Royal So-
ciety in London to sign its Charter. But the signing was only the last of sev-
eral major steps in an international cooperative effort that had begun much
earlier.
Another critical meeting had taken place in 1967, when two men met in
Moscow and agreed that their nations would work to establish an interna-
tional scientific institution. They were McGeorge Bundy, former national
security adviser to President Lyndon Johnson of the US, and Professor Jer-
men Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and
Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers. The idea that brought them
together had been proposed by President Johnson, who had hoped that such
an institution could serve as a way to bring peoples of the world together.
Progress came slowly. For more than five years, spurts of negotiation were
followed by long periods of seeming inactivity. Yet progress was being made.
During those years, ten more nations joined the discussions, and the Charter
gradually emerged. It was a document designed to accommodate many
points of view, and its provisions have shaped lIASA's evolution.
Principal Features of IIASA
A key provision of the Charter makes lIASA international without being
governmental. Its members are not nations, but scientific institutions from
each participating nation. This structure helps keep lIAS A free of interna-
tional political pressures.
lIASA's founders reached another important agreement on the name of
the institute. With "systems analysis," they wanted to convey the impression
that research at lIASA would apply modern analytic tools to address major
problems of international concern. The word "applied" was meant to stress
lIASA's concern with practical, real-life issues. "Applied Systems Analysis"
is deliberately general-allowing the Institute to deal with a wide range of
topics.
The agreement reached on financing the Institute was also important to
its future. The scientific organizations from the US and the USSR had taken
leading roles in establishing the Institute. They agreed to pay the largest
amounts, which would be equal. Each of the scientific bodies from other
nations would contribute smaller but equal amounts, 15 percent of the larger
contributions. In 1980, the contributions of the two large category A mem-
bers were some 32 million Austrian schillings. Category B members, cur-
rently 15 in number, each contributed some 4.8 million Austrian schillings
in 1980.
Two other important decisions by the founders helped establish lIASA.
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One was the decision to make English the Institute's sole official language,
thereby facilitating working relations among its international staff. The other
was to accept an offer by the Austrian government to locate the Institute at
Schloss Laxenburg, a former summer residence of the Habsburgs, 16 kilo-
meters south of Vienna. The palace has been generously restored and
adapted to IIASA's needs by the Austrian authorities, who have made it
available to the Institute for a symbolic rent of one schilling per year.
The Institute's governing body is its Council, comprising one representa-
tive from each National Member Organization (NMO). The Council approves
the principal research directions and budget, sets financial and management
policies, deals with questions of membership, and appoints the Director
and Deputy Directors. The Chairman of the Council is Professor Jermen
Gvishiani.
The Director of IIASA, its chief executive officer, is responsible for for-
mulating, managing, and administering all the Institute's activities, including
preparing the budget and research plan and implementing the plan after
Council approval. Under the guidance of the Council, he represents the Insti-
tute in dealings with research agencies, governments, and multinational
bodies, and he is also an ex-officio member of the Council. The Director of
IIASA is Dr. Roger E. Levien, formerly of the Rand Corporation in the US.
Structure of Research Activities
In 1973, IIASA's first Director, Professor Howard Raiffa from Harvard
University in the US, welcomed the first scientists who came to Laxenburg
to work on six applied projects (energy systems, water resources, manage-
ment of urban systems, biological and medical systems, ecological systems,
and integrated industrial systems) and three supporting projects (methodol-
ogy, computer science, and design and management of large organizations).
By the end of IIASA's second year-just 16 months after the arrival of the
first full-time scientists-the Institute had established a full complement of
research activities and a scientific staff of 80.
In 1975 IIASA's second Director, Dr. Levien, proposed a two-dimensional
"matrix" organization for the Institute's research activities. The horizontal
rows of this matrix represent the two major cross-cutting research Programs,
which address major international issues. The Energy Systems Program ex-
amines strategies, at global, regional, and national levels, for achieving the
transition from oil- and gas-based energy systems to those based on more sus-
tainable sources. The Food and Agriculture Program is concerned with the
development of effective national food policies and the international interac-
tions among them. Each of these Programs has a four to five year lifetime.
Programs on regional development, industrial change, and risk and hazards
are under consideration.
The programs draw upon the broad range of talents that reside in the four
continuing research Areas, represented by the vertical columns in the matrix.
The Resources and Environment Area studies problems concerning the ex-
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Figure 1. IIASA's research matrix.
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ploitation of the earth's resources and the protection of its environment. The
Human Settlements and Services Area investigates the earth's population, its
distribution, and its needs for resources and services. The Management and
Technology Area pays attention to the design and operation of organizations
and the prospective development and consequences of technology. The Sys-
tem and Decision Sciences Area applies and develops the mathematical and
computational tools that assist in the investigation of complex systems or
decision problems. For activities that do not fit into the matrix, there is a
General Research category.
IIASA's Mandate
IIASA has three principal objectives, which derive from the aspirations of
its founders and the wishes of its members:
(l) To promote international collaboration, understanding and coopera-
tion by bringing together scientists of different disciplines and nationalities
for work on problems of concern to all mankind and by creating networks of
scientific institutions for collaborative research.
(2) To advance both systems analysis and the sciences contributing to it.
0) To apply IIASA's findings to problems of international importance by
providing decision makers with relevant information and appropriate tools
for dealing with these problems.

